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Summary and Conclusions 
 
The central question of this research project is: What kind of transposition instruments 
and techniques are used in Germany, Denmark, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, 
and Spain to transpose EC directives into the national legal order in a timely, precise 
and legally correct way? 
 The premise of this research is that the Netherlands can learn from the experiences 
of other Member States. In answering the central question – and the various sub 
questions resulting from it – this project has made an inventory of the available 
transposition instruments and techniques, which has been analyzed in relation to the 
context of national policy processes. The different dimensions of national policy 
processes play an important role concerning the timely and correct transposition of EC 
directives. 
 We have performed a comprehensive comparative analysis of relevant secondary 
sources combined with a series of in-depth expert interviews to gain as rich and 
accurate as possible insight into the different national transposition instruments and 
techniques as well as the way in which the techniques and instruments used are 
embedded in the national policy processes. Interviews have been conducted in 
Denmark, France, the United Kingdom and Spain, based on the comparability of these 
countries with the Netherlands and the variety of legal instruments and techniques 
involved. The analyses of Italy and Germany are based on relevant written 
documentation only. 
 Based on our comparison of the six countries, we have reached the following 
conclusions: 
- the introduction of special legal instruments and techniques for the transposition of 
EC 
Directives is not in and of itself an explanation for the improvement of timeliness in 
the transposition of directives; 
- the regular national legal system (including the common legislative procedures and 
legal instruments) is the point of departure for transposition. As a consequence, the 
national legal system is commonly used in the countries involved in this research; 
- there does not seem to be a preferred or best technique for the transposition of 
directives that is not already being used in the Netherlands; 
- delays in transposition are caused by combinations of several constitutional, legal, 
political and operational factors whose effect cannot be judged independently. 
Rather, these effects can only be considered interrelated elements of the national 
system; 
- important sets of legal factors improving the speed of transposition are the 
transposition of directives with delegated instruments (subordinated legislation), 
avoiding national “extras” when transposing directives and avoiding complications 
at the transposition stage by anticipating transposition issues during the 
negotiation stage of a directive; 
- important political factors are: giving priority to transposition and activating the 
national Parliament at the negotiation stage; and 
- important operational factors include clear-cut lines of administrative 
responsibilities for transposition, working with multidisciplinary project teams, and 
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accurate and frequent monitoring of progress. Of these conclusions we have 
highlighted those which are particularly relevant for the Dutch situation. 
On the basis of these findings, we recommend the following: 
- involve the Dutch Parliament by introducing a parliamentary scrutiny reserve, 
- pursue an active strategic policy with respect to the transposition of EC directives by 
organizing more efficiently responsibilities for the monitoring of progress for the 
transposition, 
- transpose the directive by the lowest possible legal instrument and use the existing 
legislative system and instruments to the full extent, instead of introducing new, 
special transposition instruments or procedures, that are alien to our constitutional 
system; 
- try to generate broadly-based and joint Dutch influence on European dossiers. 
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1  Rationale and Structure of the Research Project  
1.1  Background  
For a long time, the transposition of EC directives did not function smoothly in the 
Netherlands. On 31 December 2003, 59 directives whose transposition deadlines had 
already passed had not yet been transposed. The Lower House of the Dutch Parliament 
– the House of Representatives – expressed its concern1 because for years attempts had 
been made to reduce this transposition deficit.2 In the next few months, the deficit 
increased from 59 to 65 directives, as reflected in Table 1.1. As a result of this deficit 
increase, the Netherlands dropped from third place in 2003 to tenth place in the 
European Commission’s transposition rankings in 2004.3 
 
Table 1.1: Deficits in the Netherlands regarding the transposition of EC directives: 
by Ministry and for the period 2004-2005 
   Reference date: 
 
Ministry: 
31 December 
2003 
31 March 
2004 
30 June  
2004 
30 
September 
2004 
31 December 
2004 
31 March 
2005 
BZK 0 1 0 0 0 0 
EZ 7 8 1 1 0 0 
Finance 5 4 9 6 11 13 
Justice 9 10 7 4 5 3 
LNV 2 3 3 2 0 0 
OCW 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SZW 1 2 1 1 2 1 
V&W 13 14 14 12 3 2 
VROM 5 15 6 8 6 7 
VWS 3 8 7 7 3 3 
Other 14 0 1 0 0 0 
Total 59 65 49 41 30 29 
Source: Quarterly surveys on the Transposition of EC Directives, Parliamentary Papers II, 21 109. 
 
 Starting in the second quarter of 2004, things began to change in terms of the total 
number of directives still to be transposed for which the transposition deadline had 
already passed. Whereas there were still 65 overdue directives on 31 March 2004, this 
number had dropped to 29 a year later, on 31 March 2005. This amounts to a reduction 
of no less than 55%. In the second Report on the Implementation of the Internal 
                                                 
1  See the motion by Van Dijk et al., Parliamentary Papers II 2003/04, 21 109, no. 118. Note that the Dutch 
Parliament (Staten-Generaal) consists of two chambers: the Tweede Kamer (House of Representatives) is 
the main chamber directly elected, and the Eerste Kamer (Senate) indirectly elected by members of the 
provincial councils. In a legislative process the Tweede Kamer discusses, amends and votes first on a bill. 
If a bill is approved, discussions continue in the Eerste Kamer. The latter cannot amend a bill and 
formally only has the possibility of veto.  
2  See the initiative taken by State Secretary Nicolaï, Parliamentary Papers II 2003/04, 21 109, nos. 117 and 
119. The Dutch catch-all action (see Newsletter ICER of May 2003, no. 14, p. 1), which was initiated in the 
spring of 2003 in anticipation of the upcoming EU-Presidency, has not turned out to be effective. 
3  See Progress in notification of national measures implementing directives reference date 30/04/2004, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/secretariat general/sgb/droit com/index and.htm#transpositions. 
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Market Strategy 2003-2006,4 the Commission compliments the Netherlands for its 
efforts to reduce the transposition deficit over the past period. The Netherlands 
managed to reduce the transposition deficit to less than 1.9% in the light of the 
European Union’s 1.5% target and to reduce to zero the dossiers with a backlog of more 
than two years. 
 The extra efforts undertaken by the Netherlands before the Dutch EU-Presidency 
during the second half of 2004 certainly gave a boost to this catching-up maneuver. 
Nevertheless, there is still a substantial transposition deficit in absolute terms – i.e. 
directives for which the implementation deadline has passed and that have not yet been 
transposed. In addition, there is a chance that after the end of the Dutch Presidency in 
December 2004, attention to transposition will wane in the years ahead. Late 
transposition is a structural problem in the Netherlands, as Mastenbroek (2003) 
demonstrates, even if there are occasional bouts of feverish activity involving the 
transposition of a large number of directives, in particular in anticipation of an 
upcoming Presidency. 
 Furthermore, Table 1.1 shows that the catching-up maneuver in 2004 is attributable 
mainly to the handling of the deficit problem within the ministries of Transport, Public 
Works and Water Management (V&W), Housing, Spatial Planning and the 
Environment (VROM), Economic Affairs (EZ), the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry 
of Health, Welfare and Sport (VWS).5 It is also remarkable that the Ministry of Finance 
is responsible for a deficit increase of no fewer than 9 directives. This stymies the 
substantial efforts undertaken by the other ministries. The differing performance levels 
make it clear that not all obstacles to the speedy transposition of EC directives have 
been removed in the Netherlands. It is quite conceivable that the deficit in the 
Netherlands will increase again in the coming years because the causes of the deficit 
may still not be completely clear. In any case, we can conclude that the Netherlands is 
not performing badly in terms of the completeness and correctness of the transposition 
(from a quality perspective, in other words). Compared to other countries, the 
Netherlands has not faced many infringement proceedings on account of incorrect 
transposition, for example. The same picture emerges when we consider the letters of 
formal notice and the reasoned opinions for incorrect transposition of directives (see 
Section 3.1, Tables 3.3 and 3.4). These also reveal that, compared to other countries, the 
Netherlands is censured relatively infrequently by the Commission for incorrect 
transposition. 
 This does not detract from the conclusion, however, that the Netherlands is facing a 
relatively persistent transposition deficit. For years now, there has been much 
speculation and discussion about the causes of this growing deficit in the Netherlands, 
as in other countries. Some believe that the lengthy legislative procedures and the 
method of implementation are responsible for the deficit (see, inter alia, Mastenbroek, 
2003; König et al., 2005; Kaeding, 2005; Berglund et al., 2005).6 Others point to the 
                                                 
4  Commission Notice to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Second Report on the Implementation of the Internal 
Market Strategy 2003-2006, COM (2005). 
5  In this context, compare the deficit figures on 31 March 2004 to the figures on 31 March 2005 in Table 
1.1: the absolute reduction is 12 directives for V&W, 8 directives for VROM and EZ, 7 directives for the 
Ministry of Justice and 5 directives for VWS. 
6  See, for example, the analysis in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill concerning the passage and 
implementation of EC decisions in the area of energy, post and telecommunication, Parliamentary 
Papers II 2003/04, 29 474, nos. 1-3 (submitted to the House of Representatives on 26 March 2004). 
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problem of inadequate coordination and the insufficient political priority given to 
transposition as the main causes (Voermans, 2004; Steunenberg 2004; 2005). In 
addition, the search for causes is difficult due to the great differences in the content of 
directives. The complexity of some directives and the degree to which directives allow 
the Member States freedom of choice also seem to be relevant (see, for example, 
Thomson et al., 2005). It is certainly too early to draw any definitive conclusions about 
the factors that affect the deficit increase. The empirical research data available at this 
juncture have not enabled us to draw any strong conclusions (for an overview, see 
Steunenberg and Rhinard, 2005).7 
 Even though the causes of the transposition deficit are sometimes difficult to 
pinpoint, the Dutch government has not used this as an excuse to be passive. The 
present plan for tackling the deficit includes, inter alia, involving the Dutch Parliament 
in the preparation at an earlier stage and to provide it with greater insight into the 
implementation process. In addition, the Dutch negotiators will, wherever this is 
necessary or possible, stipulate a longer transposition period and the Dutch 
government will try to find ways to expedite the transposition or implementation 
process.8 Many attempts to expedite implementation through legal structures have had 
little impact so far. Admittedly, various legal obligations to seek advice on the 
implementation of EU decisions were abolished 10 years ago9, but expediting 
implementation through special delegation structures is still controversial.10 The final 
step in this direction is the bill concerning the passage and implementation of EC 
decisions in the area of energy, post and telecommunication, which was submitted to 
the House of Representatives on 26 March 2003, and which authorizes the 
implementation of EU decisions through subordinate legislation that may depart from 
higher national legislation in a limited number of areas. 
 At this juncture, the Dutch debate on faster implementation is facing an uncertain 
future, because it is not entirely clear which factors cause the implementation deficit 
and to what extent. It is also unclear whether the use of legal ‘acceleration techniques’ 
(using different procedures or input during the preparatory phase of transposition, 
implementation through delegation and authorization structures, further reduction of 
advisory obligations, other ways of cooperation with Parliament, etc.) will permanently 
contribute to the reduction of the implementation deficit.  
 Thus there are sufficient reasons to look abroad to see how other Member States are 
trying to deal with the growing flow of EU legislation that requires implementation. 
Knowledge gained by analyzing the experiences of other Member States may be used 
not only for shaping ideas for a Dutch plan of action but can also provide insight into 
the causes of the deficit and the way in which this can be tackled effectively.  
                                                 
7  At the moment of writing the report, various European research groups are investigating the causes of 
this deficit (inter alia, Berlin, Speyer, and a group of Dutch researchers coordinated by Leiden 
University). It is expected that the results will be available in the next few years. In addition to the sources 
mentioned above, the empirical research includes references to Lampinen and Uusikylä (1998), Mbaye 
(2001, 2003) and Giuliani (2003a, 2003b). 
8  Parliamentary Papers II 2003/04, 21 109, no. 120 (quite a lengthy overview of 54 pages).  
9  See Sections 1:7 and 1:8 of the General Administrative Law Act. 
10  See the discussion that prompted the government position paper on the accelerated implementation of 
EC and other international decisions (Parliamentary Papers II 1998/99, 26 200 VI, no. 65) and a follow-
up memorandum related to this (Parliamentary Papers II 1999-2000, 26 800 VI, no. 79). 
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1.2  Definition of the Problem 
The central question of the research project is the following: 
What kind of implementation instruments and techniques are used in Germany, 
Denmark, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Spain to transpose EC directives into 
the national legal order in a timely, precise and legally correct way?  
This central question of this research report includes six sub questions: 
1. What are the most important internal obstacles that hinder the Member States 
analyzed in this report in implementing and transposing EC legislation in a timely 
and precise way? 
2. What preventive measures are taken in the countries analyzed here, inter alia, 
during the preparation of the implementation, in order to limit or prevent 
implementation problems? Is there any implementation chain management, i.e. a 
system that anticipates the implementation of European legislation during the 
preparatory stages (transposition, implementation and enforcement)? 
3. What transposition and implementation techniques do the various EU Member 
States analyzed here use in implementing EU legislation? 
a. Are there any special statutory regulations that include procedures and standards 
for expedited or simplified implementation and transposition of EC legislation? 
b. are advisory bodies consulted about implementation measures or during the 
preparation of European legislation? If this is the case, is this consultation 
compulsory? 
c. When and how must the national Parliament be involved in the implementation 
of EC legislation? 
d. If EC legislation has to be implemented through statutory regulations, when 
does it have to be implemented by an Act of Parliament and when by delegation? 
e. Are there any special legislative procedures for treating EC legislation more 
quickly or in a simpler manner than comparable national legislative proposals 
(through authorization or delegation structures)? 
f. What is the approximate quantitative and qualitative relationship between 
implementation through an Act of Parliament and implementation by 
subordinate regulations?  
g. What are the effects of the implementation techniques studied in this report in 
terms of timing and transparency, the involvement of those working with these 
techniques (e.g. are the courts informed in a timely fashion), flexibility, and what 
are the effects on the legislative system? 
h. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the various techniques? 
4. Do regional or local governments (if applicable), independent administrative bodies 
and local government bodies play a role in the transposition and implementation 
process? 
5. Is there any political or societal discussion about this subject in the countries 
researched? 
6. Which of the findings in this report are potentially useful for the Netherlands? 
1.3  Implementation: Definitions  
In analyzing the implementation techniques and systems in this study, we use a broad 
concept of implementation. By implementation of EC law, we mean ‘the taking of all 
rationale and structure of the research project 
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general and special measures needed to ensure the operation of EC law in a country.’ 
This concept encompasses in the case of implementation of EU legislation11 a chain of 
activities ranging from: 
- the preparation of a piece of EU legislation; 
- the adoption of the EU legislation; 
- the incorporation of European legislation into the national legal order, which, in the 
case of a directive, means transposing the directive into the national regulatory 
framework, to  
- the execution and enforcement of the EU legislation (including the supervision of 
it).  
The term transposition is used for the selection of the appropriate forms and means to 
achieve the result required by an EC directive. 
 Under the present Article 249 of the EC Treaty, Member States are free to choose 
the most appropriate forms and means to achieve a result required by an EC directive. 
The Member States use a variety of instruments and techniques for transposing 
directives. 
 In this context, instruments refer to the legal instruments that allow the provisions of 
a directive to be transposed. In the Netherlands, the primary examples are regulatory 
instruments such as Acts of Parliament, general administrative orders, ministerial 
regulations, the bylaws of a local authority (such as regulatory industrial organizations, 
independent administrative bodies, provinces, municipalities, etc). We use a broad 
definition of the concept of instrument. Legal instruments also include regulations that 
do not contain any generally binding rules, such as policy rules and even alternative 
transposition instruments such as covenants and collective employment agreements.  
 In this context, techniques refer to the manner in which directive provisions are 
transposed by means of a legal instrument. Examples of techniques include the 
following:  
- the ‘1-to-1’ transposition (i.e. the literal copying of parts of the text of a directive in a 
new national regulation); 
- ‘1-to-1’ transposition with minor or major terminology changes, or other 
adjustments (for the Netherlands, see Instruction 56 of the Instructions for Drafting 
Legislation12); 
- transposition of an EC directive through an existing legal regime (if the 
transposition of a directive does not require the adoption of a new regulation, the 
mere issuance of a notice may be sufficient; see Instruction 347); 
- transposition through incorporating a directive into the system (corpus) of existing 
legislation (also known as elaboration); 
Within these techniques, the following approaches can be distinguished: 
- transposition by referencing (i.e. statistical and dynamic references to the provisions 
of an EC directive); 
- the annex method, which means that the directive is included as an annex to a 
national transposition measure; 
                                                 
11  In EU law, there is no distinction between materiële wet (generally binding regulation) and formele wet 
(Act of Parliament) as in the Netherlands. We use ‘European legislation’ as a shortcut for primary and 
secondary Community law (regulations, generally binding directives and generally binding decisions). 
12  Below, ‘instruction’ means an instruction in the context of the Instructions for Drafting Legislation, as 
used in the Netherlands. See Instructions for Drafting Legislation (2004), for an overview. 
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- straightforward transposition (Instruction 337); 
- using the transposition as a vehicle for additional national policy; 
 ‘Legal instruments’ include the manner in which a country uses delegated 
legislation. Not all countries covered in this study have a concept of delegation that is 
comparable to the one in the Netherlands concerning the transfer of powers to adopt 
generally binding rules. Admittedly, on the surface it seems that countries such as 
Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom have a concept of delegation that corresponds 
with the Dutch one, but if we consider the relationship between primary legislation and 
delegated legislation adopted by ‘lower’ regulators, it turns out that these countries 
assume quite a different attitude towards the hierarchical relationship between 
enabling legislation and delegated legislation. In this study, we therefore avoid 
comparing delegation techniques as such. 
1.4  Structure of the Country Studies  
For the country studies, we used a structure that emphasizes the national constitutional 
and legal context and the national policy process with respect to European directives. 
 In the description of the national constitutional and legal context in which the 
transposition process takes place, the various transposition instruments and techniques 
are discussed, including special or simplified possibilities, such as special delegation 
provisions aimed at achieving faster implementation. 
 In addition, attention will be focused on the national policy process relating to 
European directives. In this context, it will be assumed that transposition and actual 
application are parts of a longer sequence of steps that are connected with European 
legislation, in particular directives. Generally, this sequence consists of the following 
steps: 
1. the preparation of a European directive; 
2. the national and European decision-making on the proposed directive; 
3. the national transposition of the directive; 
4. the implementation, including the supervision and enforcement of the national 
policy measures aimed at implementing the directive;  
5. the evaluation of the effects of the national policy measures, and 
6. the feedback relating to the national (the contents and effects of the national 
measures implementing the directive) and the European policy (the contents of the 
directive). 
 By analyzing both the available instruments and techniques and the manner in 
which the national policy process is shaped, we attempt to form a picture of the degree 
to which Germany, Denmark, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and Spain are able to 
incorporate European directives into their legal system in a timely, precise and legally 
correct way.  
 On the basis of both lines of analysis– constitutional and legal context and policy 
process – the country studies are structured as follows: 
- general overview of the legal and political system, including the constitutional and 
political characteristics of the organization of the public administration/ministries; 
- political/societal discussion relating to European directives and their transposition; 
- description of legal instruments and techniques; 
rationale and structure of the research project 
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- description of the national policy cycle relating to directives, with a focus on 
administrative consultative and coordinating bodies involved in the process, the role 
of compulsory institutionalized advisory bodies, the role of the national Parliament, 
the role of other, sub national or functional administrations, and the role of interest 
groups; 
- an analysis of instruments and techniques in terms of timing, feasibility, 
completeness, flexibility, and in conjunction with other national legislation; 
- an analysis of the national procedure, focusing on the timeliness of transposition, 
the effectiveness in drafting the position, the relationship between preparation and 
execution, and the involvement of the national Parliament (democratic legitimacy). 
1.5  Method: Literature Review and Expert Interviews 
Insights into the experiences of the transposition instruments and techniques used and 
the national policy processes are based on an extensive literature review and expert 
interviews. For budgetary considerations, interviews were held only in: 
- Denmark, 
- France, 
- the United Kingdom, and 
- Spain. 
The following considerations are relevant to the selection of these countries. First, the 
constitutional system of these countries is more similar to that of the Netherlands, 
than, for example, a country like Germany. Germany’s federal structure entails its own 
transposition complications. Second, it was considered relevant to have a mix of 
countries with a good performance record (Denmark and Spain) and those with a 
poorer performance record (France). Finally, the United Kingdom is relevant because 
of the existence of specific instruments for transposing European directives. 
 We have opted for a more limited structure concerning Italy and Germany: as far as 
these countries are concerned, the study is based only on a review of existing literature. 
 We conducted interviews with persons from the following two categories. First, we 
interviewed civil servants responsible for coordinating the transposition of European 
legislation and/or for legislation quality assurance (comparable to the representatives of 
the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Justice, and participants in the ICER in the 
Netherlands). Second, we tried to arrange interviews with members of the national 
Parliaments. This concerned mainly members of the European Affairs Committees or 
committees that are closely involved in the debate on the decision-making about and 
the transposition and implementation of European directives. 
 The interviews are semi-structured, with the interviewers drawing up a report after 
the interview, which was sent to the respondents for verification purposes. The round 
of interviews in Denmark was also used for testing the list of questions. This has 
resulted in using a more limited number of open questions and in gearing the 
questions to the interviewee’s position. The adjusted questionnaire was used for the 
other country studies. 
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1.6  Structure of the Report 
The report consists of two parts. Part I is the main report in which the situation in the 
Netherlands is described and the findings based on the country reports are compared 
and analyzed. This part ends with conclusions and recommendations relating to the 
situation in the Netherlands. 
 Part II of the report contains the country studies relating to Denmark, France, 
Spain, the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy. As indicated above, the studies 
relating to Denmark, France, Spain and the United Kingdom are more extensive than 
those relating to Germany and Italy. As far as the latter two countries are concerned, we 
confined ourselves to a literature review and we did not conduct any interviews in these 
countries. In Section 1.5, this procedure is explained in more detail.  
 
Part I 
Main Report  
1
15 
2  Transposition of Directives in the Netherlands  
2.1  General: Dutch Debate on Faster Transposition of Directives 
As discussed in Section 1.1, the Dutch debate on both the implementation of EC 
directives and related policy developments has been very dependent on the Dutch 
transposition record over the years. This record was reasonably good in general until 
the end of the 1980s, even if this analysis is not beyond criticism (Mastenbroek 2003). 
With the acceleration of the implementation of the internal market and the 
accompanying increase in the number of directives, the transposition deficit began to 
grow in the Netherlands. During the Dutch Presidencies in the 1990s, there were 
several attempts to speed up the implementation of EC directives. During the first 
phase (from 1994), the Netherlands tried to speed up the implementation process by 
abolishing the legally required advisory procedures relating to proposals for EC 
directives13 and measures in the area of legislative policy. The year 1999 saw the 
beginnings of a new phase, which involved the search for new instruments and 
techniques (especially delegation structures) that might help to speed up the process of 
implementation. This has sparked an ongoing debate on ‘faster implementation’ in the 
Netherlands that continues to this day. Recently, this debate has been given an impetus 
in the run-up to the Dutch Presidency in 2004 and the bill concerning the passage and 
implementation of EC decisions in the field of energy, post and telecommunication.14 
The driving force behind the second phase in the debate was the attempt to speed up 
the implementation of directives in the field of telecommunication through clause 18.2 
in the proposal to amend the Telecommunication Act.15 This provision creates the 
possibility to deviate from the law in lower-level regulations if EC legislation so 
requires. The Senate opposed this and asked the Government for a broader framework 
of assessment. This framework was provided by the 1999 Government Position Paper 
on the permissibility of powers to decide on faster implementation. That Government 
Position Paper focused on the question of whether it is permissible to create structures 
offering a general provision that allows the adoption of delegated legislation for the 
purpose of implementing future directives, or, if that appears to be necessary, that 
allows the temporary deviation from an Act of Parliament if the relevant provision is 
inconsistent with a directive provision (power to render statutory provisions 
inoperative).16 In the position paper on faster implementation, the Government 
concludes that granting lower-level regulators the power to render statutory provisions 
inoperative is not unconstitutional. If European or other international legislation has a 
large impact in a specific policy area and the implementation periods are so short that 
implementation according to the customary procedures is unrealistic, it is permissible, 
according to the Government, to provide for a power to render provisions in an Act of 
Parliament or general administrative order temporarily inoperative by means of a 
lower-level instrument, provided that the necessary implementation rules are adopted 
                                                 
13  Advisory procedures with respect to regulations used for the transposition of directives have been 
reduced as well. The advisory role of the Council of State has been preserved. 
14  Parliamentary Papers II, 2003/04, 29 474, nos. 1-3. 
15  Parliamentary Papers I, 1998/99, 25 533, no. 11b.  
16  Government Position Paper on faster implementation of EC and other international decisions 
(Parliamentary Papers II 1998/99, 26 200 VI, no. 65) and the follow-up memorandum (Parliamentary 
Papers II 1999-2000, 26 800 VI, no. 79). 
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simultaneously in this regulation (substitution). From the perspective of the legal 
quality of legislation, however, this power should be exercised in a very restrained 
manner and should be subject to some strict conditions, according to the Govern-
ment.17 
 The Government’s position was not supported by everybody. In passing the Jurgens 
motion, the Senate took the position that EU legislation (or EC legislation, as the case 
may be) should be implemented in accordance with a regular constitutional process.18 
More recently it was also established that far-reaching delegation for the sake of speedy 
implementation, such as delegated power to render statutory provisions inoperative and 
the power of substitution (i.e. the power to substitute statutory provisions 
implementing EC directives by way of a decree or ministerial regulation if the EC 
directive is amended), is at odds with the principle of legality, the legislator’s 
supremacy and the corresponding prohibition against ‘free’ delegation (Besselink, 
2003). 
 After the debate on that Government Position Paper,19 two bills (amendment of the 
Media Act and a bill on the preparation and introduction of animal feeds)20 
incorporated a mitigated power to render Dutch statutory provisions – implementing 
EU legislation – inoperative (by governmental decree) in case new EU legislation was 
enacted that contravenes the original statutory implementation. Recently, the 
discussion on faster implementation gathered momentum when on 16 March 2004 
the bill concerning the passage and implementation of EC decisions in the area of 
energy, post and telecommunication was submitted to the House of Representatives.21 
The legislative proposal is based on a system allowing directives and regulations to be 
implemented by subordinate legislation. The bill is based on the premise that a 
directive can be implemented by subordinate legislation only if there is no need for any 
amendments at the level of primary legislation (i.e. Acts of Parliaments, or – treated 
here as the synonym – statutes). As there are over 15 directives and regulations in the 
policy areas of electricity, gas and post alone, these amendments to primary legislation 
are often necessary if one of the EU regulations and directives – already implemented 
in Dutch primary legislation – is amended (and that happens frequently in these areas). 
Even when the amendment to EU legislation is, of itself, of little consequence, the long 
and winding road of amending primary legislation has to be taken if the original 
(provisions of the) EU act was implemented in a Parliamentary Act. At present it is 
simply not possible to amend an Act of Parliament by – lower ranking – decrees or 
ministerial regulations. To prevent the stagnation of implementation because of the 
cumbersome and repetitive need of amendments to primary legislation due to frequent 
                                                 
17  The Government mentions seven conditions: strict necessity; a special act should authorize it (no general 
authorization law); only for implementation purposes; the power to render statutory provisions 
inoperative can be exercised only through an instrument at the level immediately below; a resolution 
procedure in the case of implementation of non-self-executing international regulations; power can be 
exercised only temporarily, and any exercise of power to render statutory provisions inoperative and of 
the power of substitution should always be published in the Bulletin of Acts and Decrees. See 
Parliamentary Papers II 1998/99, 26 200 VI, no. 65, pp. 5-6. 
18  The motion tabled by Jurgens, Kohnstamm and The Wolff, Parliamentary Papers I 2000-2001, 26 200 
VI no. 65 and no. 37b. 
19  Proceedings I 2000-2001:2-54. 
20  The bill amending the Media Act with a view to effecting necessary improvements in the act and its 
execution (Parliamentary Papers I 2002/03, 28 476, no. 189) and the bill introducing provisions 
concerning the preparation and introduction of animal feeds (Parliamentary Papers I 2002/03, 28 173, 
no. 212). 
21  Parliamentary Papers II 2003/04, 29 474, nos. 1-3. 
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amendments to EU Acts, the bill introduces a system that does allow statutory 
provisions to be rendered inoperative and even substituted by decrees or ministerial 
regulations. The bill tries to soften the constitutional blow of subordinated statutory 
instruments amending Acts of Parliament by introducing the system of the 
concordance tables. These concordance tables – annexed to Acts implementing EU 
legislation – indicate which section from the Act implements – or is intended to 
implement – which article from a directive or a regulation. The concordance table-
system makes it possible, if any amendment of European legislation so requires, to 
repeal predefined provisions mentioned in this annex of the Act by using a lower-level 
instrument. The system is accompanied by the intention of the Minister for Economic 
Affairs to inform the Dutch Parliament at an earlier stage about the passage of 
directives and regulations in the area of energy, post or telecommunication.22 In 
addition, the Council of State will be consulted at an early stage on important drafts for 
basic directives to be adopted in the previously mentioned policy areas in an attempt to 
invite Parliament to engage in a more active debate on proposed EC legislation. 
 During the discussion with the Senate on the amendment of the Media Act, which 
also includes a provision allowing statutory provisions to be rendered inoperative on the 
basis of the Government Position Paper from 1999, the Government was challenged in 
the Spring of 2004 once again to reconsider its position with respect to the desirability 
of special statutory provisions aimed at safeguarding timely implementation. In 
response, the Government sent a letter to the Senate which contained the 
Government’s amended position.23 The Senate wanted to know whether it was 
necessary to introduce a constitutional basis for faster transposition, or special statutory 
authorization structures. The policy line defined by the Government in its letter dated 
27 October 2004 opts for adequate regular delegation rather than special provisions. 
According to the Government, the existing legislative system is appropriate for 
implementation purposes, which means that there is no need for developing or 
applying special delegation provisions with or without the possibility of deviating from 
the law. Further, the Government is trying to achieve an effective level of implement-
ation and the earlier involvement of the Houses in the preparation and transposition of 
directives. Finally, the Government proposes a tailor-made approach for emergency 
situations. The Senate was critical of this letter in February of this year, when Senator 
Jurgens reiterated his view that where delegation constructions permit deviations from 
an Act of Parliament through subordinate legislation, for example, by means of 
substitution, this is inconsistent, as a matter of principle, with Article 81 of the Dutch 
Constitution.24 
 By now, a third phase seems to have begun in recent months because of the urgency 
of reducing the implementation deficit.25 This has involved the adoption of procedural 
                                                 
22  To this end, the Minister will inform the Houses about (a) the Government’s position on the main points 
concerning a proposal of the Commission of the European Communities for this kind of directive or 
regulation, as well as (b) an outline of his view to be expressed in the meeting of the Council of Ministers 
in which it is decided whether or not to adopt a common position, or – if applicable – in meetings of the 
Council of Ministers in which other crucial decisions (political agreement, general orientation) are taken 
(where he will add, where appropriate, the results of the advice of the Council of State to the outline 
position). 
23  Parliamentary Papers I 2003/04, 29 200 VI-F and – in connection with the discussion on the Media Act, 
the amended Government Position on the desirability of special statutory provisions aimed at 
safeguarding timely implementation, Parliamentary Papers I 2003/04, 29 200 VI, F, second reprint. 
24  Proceedings I 2004/05, 14 645-649. 
25  In April 2005, 51 directives were published, which will have to be transposed by 2006. 
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measures to speed up the process in anticipation of the outcome of the debate with 
Parliament on faster implementation. The first initiative has been taken by the House 
of Representatives itself. On 15 September 2004, the Presidium of the House of 
Representatives proposed to the House a better and more transparent specification of 
the implementation deadline of a bill aimed at transposing a directive, giving priority to 
the treatment of implementation proposals and the potential introduction of an 
optional, faster discussion procedure relating to implementation legislation in the 
House.26 In his letter of 9 November 2004, the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs – 
also on behalf of the Minister of Justice – announced six measures aimed at achieving 
faster transposition of directives in the short term.27 They include, inter alia, the 
following: planning and working arrangements for dealing with a new wave of 
directives; a progress monitoring system capable of quickly observing backlogs ; the 
adoption of a priority rule, which means that as a general rule, implementation 
legislation – within the various ministries – takes priority over national legislation, 
unless the responsible Minister or State Secretary decides otherwise in a concrete case; 
the measure that transposition legislation no longer needs be passed through ‘portals’ 
or sub councils but can be put directly on the agenda of the Council of Ministers; and 
the arrangement that in future advice is sought at the earliest possible opportunity 
(during the negotiation stage). For this purpose, the Minister of Justice announced 
several technical measures on 23 December 2004 aimed at preventing misconceptions 
arising in Parliament over the question whether a proposed regulation, or any part of it, 
is intended to transpose a directive or another Community obligation.28 
2.2  Preparation of the National Position 
In the Netherlands, proposals for EC directives are sent to the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs through the Permanent Representation. The proposals are also sent to the 
Working Group for the Assessment of New Commission Proposals (BNC), consisting 
of representatives of the ministries, and since 2001, local government representatives.29 
This working group is responsible for drawing up an explanatory memorandum that 
analyses the significance of the proposed directive for the Netherlands.30 In addition, 
the explanatory memorandum includes a proposal for the position to be taken by the 
Netherlands during the negotiations about the proposal and the anticipated method of 
implementing the proposal if it is adopted. After the explanatory memorandum has 
been approved by the BNC working group, it goes to the ‘CoCo’ (Coordination 
Committee for European Integration and Association Problems). The CoCo is the 
administrative gateway to the Council of Ministers and is chaired by the State Secretary 
for European Affairs. The CoCo passes the explanatory memoranda on to the Council 
of Ministers. The explanatory memoranda that have been approved constitute the basis 
for the Dutch contribution to negotiations on Commission proposals in the Council 
and its working groups in Brussels. A shorter, ‘political’ version of the explanatory 
                                                 
26  Parliamentary Papers II 2003/04 21 109, no. 142. 
27  Parliamentary Papers II 2004/05, 21 109, no. 144. 
28  Parliamentary Papers II 2004/05, 21 109, no. 145. 
29  Represented by the Association of Netherlands Municipalities and Interprovincial Consultations. 
30  An explanatory memorandum includes the following items: the approval procedure of the proposal in 
Brussels; the consequences of the proposal for the EC Budget; a brief summary and the objective of the 
proposal; the legal basis; an assessment in terms of subsidiarity, proportionality and deregulation; the 
Dutch interests in the proposal and the consequences for national legislation. 
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memoranda is also drawn up for the purpose of informing the Dutch Parliament about 
the directive proposal in question. The State Secretary for Foreign Affairs acts as an 
intermediary in this context. On the basis of the official explanatory memoranda, he 
sends periodic surveys of the Commission’s directive proposals, accompanied by 
‘political’ files, to the House of Representatives.31 The underlying idea is that on the 
basis of these explanatory memoranda, together with the annotated agenda of the 
relevant meeting of the Council of Ministers, there will be a discussion between 
Government and Parliament about the Dutch position in the Council meetings, so that 
the negotiations in Brussels are conducted on the basis of instructions agreed with 
Parliament. In this way, the Dutch Parliament may exercise influence on the passage 
and contents of EC legislation. The Netherlands does not have a system based on a 
written mandate, nor does it have a parliamentary reserve: without the discussion of an 
explanatory memorandum in the House of Representatives, a Dutch minister may also 
take a position in the Council. 
 Civil servants from the lead ministries negotiate EC directives in the Working 
Groups of the Council. Usually these are policy-making officials from the ministries 
and staff of the Permanent Representation. Sometimes, only the staff of the Permanent 
Representation in the relevant policy area is involved, sometimes only civil servants 
from the responsible ministry in The Hague. The Dutch Government’s intention of 
always sending law-making civil servants to ensure the quality of EC legislation has not 
been achieved to date. The Dutch Permanent Representation, as an intermediary, 
channels communication between Brussels and The Hague and informs the Dutch 
Government of current developments. 
 Adopted directives are usually transposed in the Netherlands by the same ministries 
that conducted the negotiations, but not always by the same civil servants. Whereas the 
negotiations are usually conducted by policy-making civil servants, the transposition of 
the directives is often carried out by civil servants specialized in the drafting of 
legislation. 
2.3  Transposition: Instruments and Techniques 
The Netherlands does not have general delegation structures for speeding up the 
transposition process. The standard legislative procedures are used for the 
transposition of EC directives. This means that the transposition of an EC directive is 
determined on a case-by-case basis. As a result of the legislator’s primacy, which 
requires that the basic elements of a statutory system be regulated through Acts of 
Parliament, and the constitutional system, which sometimes prescribes a regulation 
through an Act of Parliament, EC directives are implemented relatively frequently by 
the slow procedure applicable to the Act of Parliament. Parliament does not give high 
priority to the transposition of EC directives and does not give much weight to the 
debate on the negotiations, and this constitutes an important source for transposition 
delays (Voermans, 2004). The House of Representatives does not assert itself and does 
not draw the conclusion that there are problems or questions until the debate on the 
transposition measures has started. This is too late. As stated above, the Government 
initially tried to change this by submitting proposals for more sophisticated delegation 
                                                 
31  This can be found in Parliamentary Papers II, under number 22 112, titled: ‘Draft Directives of the 
European Commission’. 
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structures (power to render statutory provisions inoperative and the like) and earlier 
parliamentary involvement, but in the recent period, the Government has opted for the 
standard delegation options and legislative process.32 Transposition delays are caused 
not only by the lengthy procedure, the manner in which Parliament contributes 
towards the process, but also by the manner in which the ministries prepare the 
transposition. There are also obstacles in that area. Even though Instruction 335 of the 
Instructions for Drafting Legislation, amended with effect from 1 January 2005, 
requires that proposals for transposition measures be submitted to the Council of 
Ministers no later than 18 months before the expiry of the implementation period (with 
only a minor possibility for an extension), this deadline is not always met. This is why 
the Government has decided to tighten the policy relating to internal preparation as 
well. In future, a priority rule will be applicable, which means that before national bills 
are dealt with, directives must be transposed first. Ministerial action plans must be 
drawn up in order to remove the deficit. The relevant actors will now explicitly plan for 
dealing with a wave of EC directives and there will be a better progress monitoring 
system. In future, it will be possible to submit transposition measures directly to the 
Council of Ministers without any involvement from the gateway structures or sub 
councils. Compulsory review and advice about transposition measures will also be 
moved to an earlier stage in the process.33 
 Whereas there is still a debate on structures permitting a temporary or permanent 
deviation from a statutory provision if this provision is inconsistent with a directive 
provision (the power to render a statutory provision inoperative), the transposition of 
EC directives through delegated legislation as such is not very controversial.34 
Instruction 339 even recommends delegation structures for purposes of the 
implementation of Community legislation, to the extent that the constitutional system 
and the legislator’s primacy permit so. Certainly where the transposition no longer 
allows any scope for substantive choices, transposition through a ministerial regulation, 
which can be adopted rapidly, is preferable, and the latter is used quite extensively for 
this reason.  
 The Dutch legislative system, expressed through the legislator’s primacy, is 
inconsistent; however, with transposition rules without a direct or indirect statutory 
basis and that have extensive delegation possibilities. The underlying idea is that 
Parliament must always be able to contribute to legislation. There is a hierarchy 
between the various Dutch legislation instruments, which means that as a general rule, 
any lower-level regulation that is inconsistent with a higher one does not have binding 
effect.  
 Directives are usually incorporated into the system of the existing Dutch legislative 
framework. Even though the Instructions for Drafting Legislation insist that no extra 
national policy should be added in the process of transposing EC directives35, this does 
not prevent the incorporation of EC legislation into the corpus of existing national law. 
In the context of the transposition of EC directives, utilizing existing instruments and 
regulations is even preferred (Instruction 338). The Instructions also include the advice 
                                                 
32  See the above Government Position Paper, Parliamentary Papers I, 2003/04, 29 200 VI, F second 
reprint.  
33  Parliamentary Papers II 2004/05, 21 109, no. 144. 
34  For an overview of the numerous possibilities of implementing international and Community decisions 
through lower-level regulators, see Besselink et al. (2002: 112-113). 
35  See Instruction 337. 
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to use the terminology of Community legislation as much as possible (Instruction 56), 
unless this terminology is insufficiently precise, results in incorrect Dutch, or where 
another term reflects existing Dutch legislation more accurately. 
2.4  National Coordination of Transposition 
Once a directive has been adopted at the European level, it usually has to be transposed 
in the Netherlands, often through legislation. The type of legislation depends on the 
contents of the directive and the requirements set by the national law.36 The 
transposition is prepared at the departments, usually the ministries that were also 
involved in preparing the Dutch position. The Interdepartmental Committee on 
European Law (ICER), which was established after the Securitel affair in 199737, is 
responsible for coordinating the legal advice regarding the preparation and 
implementation of European law. As a general rule, the ICER is chaired jointly on 
behalf of the Minister of Justice and the Minister for Foreign Affairs.38 Following an 
evaluation in 2002, the ICER has three regular working groups: the ICER-I (Imple-
mentation); the ICER-N (Notification); and ICER-H (Court of Justice Cases). In 
addition, ad hoc working groups are set up. The first two regular working groups are 
chaired on behalf of the Minister of Justice and the latter regular working group on 
behalf of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Directives are transposed according to the 
implementation plan39 that has already been drawn up on the basis of the directive 
proposal and amended during the Community procedure. 
 In the Netherlands, approximately 87% of directives are transposed using forms of 
delegated legislation (general administrative orders, ministerial regulations, etc.) 
(Bovens and Yesilkagit, 2005: 525). In a number of cases, however, directives must be 
implemented by Act of Parliament. This usually takes a somewhat longer period (on 
average 15 months) and this is why this procedure is mentioned as one of the most 
important explanations for late transposition.40 
 If directives are to be transposed by an Act of Parliament or a general administrative 
order, the ordinary procedures are applicable as a general rule, under which the 
Council of State must give advice on the transposition proposal. 
                                                 
36  In a number of situations, the Dutch constitutional system dictates that important subjects may be 
regulated only through an Act of Parliament, in other words with the cooperation of Parliament. This is 
the case, for example, if the Constitution prescribes a regulation by an Act of Parliament for a subject, or 
where the legislator’s primacy, as enshrined in Instruction 22 in conjunction with 24, so requires. 
37  After the decision of the Court of Justice in the Securitel case of 30 April 1996 (C-194/94, ECR 1996 p. I-
2201), it became clear that the Netherlands was insufficiently alert to legal problems relating to the 
implementation of EC law. For example, the Netherlands had failed to notify the European Commission 
of a relatively large number of Dutch regulations. The cause of this failure was also thought to be related 
to the ministries’ lack of awareness and effective commitment and expertise. The ICER was designed to 
fill this gap.  
38  In addition to the ICER, there are another two interdepartmental coordination bodies specialized in 
economic government activities: the ISO (Interdepartmentaal Support Consultations) and the IOEA 
(Interdepartmental Consultative Body for European Tender Rules). 
39  Instruction 334 et seq. 
40  See, for example, the explanatory memorandum to the bill on the passage and implementation of EC 
decisions in the field of energy, post and telecommunication, Parliamentary Papers II 2003/04, 29 474, 
no. 3. 
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2.5  Compulsory Advisory Bodies 
As regards the preparation of EC legislation, there have not been any statutory advisory 
obligations for bills implementing EC directives since the early 1990s, apart from the 
advice of the Council of State. For its part, the Council of State does not advise on 
proposals for EC directives. In the period 2000-2002, however, the Government 
experimented with requests for advice from the Council of State about EC directive 
proposals. The results seem to have been positive.41 It has been found that an advisory 
procedure in two rounds may save time concerning compulsory consultation about the 
proposals for transposing directives. In that case, the Council of State already knows 
the relevant directive and can provide its advice more quickly. As stated in Section 2.3, 
the Government intends to reconsider and, where necessary, speed up the consultation 
procedure for transposition legislation. 
2.6 The role of Parliament 
Parliament is informed about directive proposals, their significance for the Netherlands 
and Dutch legislation, and about the proposed Dutch position by means of the 
explanatory memorandum procedure and the submission of the annotated council 
agendas. Nevertheless, the explanatory memorandum procedure does not function 
adequately. The consultation and negotiation circuits in the Netherlands and Brussels 
are separate and are not geared to each other. In Brussels Commission proposals are 
negotiated first in the Council Working Groups by Dutch civil servants and after that in 
the Comité des Représentants Permanents (Coreper). Feedback from these circuits to the 
Dutch Parliament in order to discuss the Dutch position and the Dutch instructions 
again is very difficult, because the cycle of priorities is different in Brussels and the 
Netherlands. The interaction between the Dutch Parliament and the responsible 
Minister about developments in the negotiations is very time-consuming and difficult 
as well.42 Del Grosso notes that the Dutch Parliament addresses European questions 
too little, in too fragmented a manner, and often at too late a stage. And where 
parliamentarians are in a position to exercise influence on the Dutch contribution to 
the European process of integration, they often fail to do so (Del Grosso, 2000). In its 
annual report for 2004, the Council of State draws a similar conclusion (Council of 
State, 2005). 
 In recent years, the Dutch Parliament’s attitude has also been mentioned as a 
possible source of transposition delay. The bill transposing a directive sometimes 
comes as an unpleasant surprise to Parliament. Especially where Parliament does not 
agree with the proposal, the passage of transposition legislation may well assume the 
characteristics of a rearguard action. (Public Administration Council, 2004: 26). In the 
meantime, the Council of State has drawn attention to the role of the Dutch actors in 
the Community legislative chain on a number of occasions. This role begins with the 
preparation of Dutch rules and ends with the adoption of the national implementation 
rules. As the Community is a co-legislator, the role played by Parliament in the context 
                                                 
41  Again, see, the explanatory memorandum to the bill on the passage and implementation of EC decisions 
in the field of energy, post and telecommunication, Parliamentary Papers II 2003/04, 29 474, no. 3. 
42  The Danes, however, have opted for a system under which its Parliament gives a strict and limited 
negotiation mandate to the government. This system requires the government to provide feedback about 
the negotiation results. Strict as it may be, it does not require a written negotiation mandate. 
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of transposition legislation is moving in the direction of mandator and inspector. This 
also means that an effective contribution in this legislative chain should be made as 
early as possible (Council of State, 2005: 141-2). 
 By now, the House of Representatives of Parliament is aware of this responsibility. 
The European legislation committee, consisting of members of the House of 
Representatives and members of the Senate, which was established in 2003, was in fact 
designed to prepare the Houses for the new role to be played by the national Parliam-
ents under the European Constitution, but it is currently in the process of encouraging 
the two Houses of Parliament to give priority to the treatment of European legislation. 
2.7  Conclusions 
The Netherlands is not among the countries researched in depth for the purposes of 
this study, but we discussed it briefly because it will probably serve as the reference 
point for many readers of this report. On the basis of this brief analysis, it is possible to 
conclude that the Netherlands has been struggling with the problem of the prevention 
and reduction of the transposition deficit for quite some time now. During the first 
phase (until 1999), attempts were made to deal with the deficit by means of minor 
procedural measures, but after that, during the second phase, possibilities for speeding 
up the process of transposing directives through flexible implementation techniques 
were explored as well. By now, this discussion appears to be stagnating. Time and time 
again, the Senate in particular has been very critical of proposals for new imple-
mentation instruments and techniques. This has also triggered a debate on the deeper 
causes of the transposition deficit. Is it due to the procedures (in particular the 
procedure of an Act of Parliament), to coordination43, or, by contrast, to a lack of 
understanding and, as a result, adequate management of the respective contributions to 
be made by the various Dutch actors in the Community’s legislative chain? 
 It now seems that a third phase has begun, which involves the exploration of a 
number of procedural solutions within the existing legislative system for the purpose of 
tackling the most urgent problems, which is reminiscent of the situation before 1999. 
The most important of these include the preparation of a planning and progress 
monitoring system, giving priority to transposition legislation in the Council of 
Ministers, and avoiding gateways and sub councils in the case of transposition 
proposals. 
 
                                                 
43  This coordination is quite ‘event-based’ in the Netherlands, according to the Public Administration 
Council (2004: 99-100), and therefore reactive rather than pro-active. For further comments on this 
report, see De Goede (2005). 
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3   Transposition and the Performance Records of the Various 
Member States 
3.1  Delay in Transposition 
Despite their obligation of timeliness and completeness, most EU Member States 
sometimes experience problems with the transposition of EC directives. 
 
Table 3.1: Transposition of directives by Member State: 
internal market directives vs. total number of directives 
Second Report on Internal Market 
Strategy (internal market directives) 
Overview Secretariat General of the European 
Commission 
reference date: 30 November 2004 reference date: 10 January 2005 
Member State: 
number of 
overdue 
directives* 
% non- 
transposed 
directives 
number 
of 
directives 
number of 
overdue directives 
delayed 
% non-transposed 
directives 
Lithuania 15 1.0% 2568 14 0.5% 
Spain 21 1.3% 2538 23 0.9% 
Austria 33 2.1% 2525 30 1.2% 
Denmark 36 2.3% 2517 30 1.2% 
Hungary 32 2.0% 2546 34 1.3% 
Finland 37 2.3% 2516 39 1.6% 
Slovenia 51 3.2% 2550 40 1.6% 
Poland 46 2.9% 2544 41 1.6% 
Belgium 54 3.4% 2575 42 1.6% 
UK 40 2.5% 2515 45 1.8% 
The Netherlands 31 2.0% 2517 47 1.9% 
France 50 3.2% 2520 48 1.9% 
Ireland 38 2.4% 2533 50 2.0% 
Sweden 32 2.0% 2502 50 2.0% 
Germany 40 2.5% 2520 52 2.1% 
Portugal 51 3.2% 2560 65 2.5% 
Luxembourg 67 4.2% 2525 72 2.9% 
Estonia 79 5.0% 2528 77 3.0% 
Cyprus 69 4.4% 2550 82 3.2% 
Latvia 110 7.0% 2566 90 3.5% 
Italy 71 4.5% 2529 90 3.6% 
Greece 80 5.1% 2524 92 3.6% 
Malta 95 6.0% 2549 93 3.6% 
Slovakia 99 6.3% 2561 96 3.7% 
Czech Republic 151 9.6% 2552 121 4.7% 
EU average 57 3.6% 2537 59 2.3% 
* The total number of internal market directives is 1579. 
Source: columns 2-4 are based on the European Commission (2005a); columns 5-7 on the European 
Commission (2005b). 
 
 A recent overview relating to internal market directives can be found in the second 
implementation report of the European Commission concerning the internal market 
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strategy 2003-2006 (European Commission, 2005a: 16-21). This shows that on 30 
November 2004, the average number of delayed and non-transposed directives 
amounts to 3.6%. Furthermore, most Member States still do not achieve the target 
agreed during the Stockholm European Council (2001). The target was to reduce the 
deficit to 1.5% of the total number of directives in force. An overview of the deficit by 
Member State is included in Table 3.1.44 
 A second overview of the transposition of EC directives originates from the 
Secretariat General of the European Commission (2005b).45 This overview is based on 
all directives and is not confined only to the internal market directives. This means that 
directives relating to flora, fauna, the habitat of animals, animal protection, swimming 
water, statistics, and export credit facilities and insurance have also been taken into 
account. Furthermore, there are two important differences between the figures from 
the report on the internal market and those from the Secretariat General: 
- the transposed directives in the internal market overview include directives that 
have been fully transposed according to the Commission; the overview of the 
Secretariat General is based only on the Member States’ notifications; and 
- the internal market overview includes only the directives in force; the Secretariat 
General’s overview includes all directives, including directives that are no longer in 
force.  
These data are included in columns 4 to 6 of Table 3.1. Based on these figures, which 
reflect the situation on 10 January 2005, the average deficit in the Union amounts to 
2.3%: for the EU-15 (the countries that were already Member States of the Union before 
1 May 2004), the transposition deficit is 2.0% on average; for the EU-10 (the countries 
that became Member States with effect from 1 May 2004), this is 2.7%. Furthermore, it 
turns out that 12 of the 15 ‘older’ Member States do not achieve the 1.5% standard. 
Among the ‘new’ Member States, 8 of the 10 countries do not meet the 1.5% target.46 
 In addition to the deficit concerning directives still to be transposed for which the 
transposition deadline has passed, a second indicator is used within the EU. This 
concerns the number of directives to be transposed for which the deadline passed more 
than two years ago. During the Barcelona European Council (2002), a ‘zero tolerance’ 
target was agreed for this group of directives: this number must be reduced to 0% 
within the Union. Table 3.2 shows the number of directives that have not been 
transposed more than two years after the implementation period has passed.  
                                                 
44  As a result of the use of different reference dates and delays in the processing of data, the number of 
directives the Netherlands still has to transpose but for which the implementation deadline has passed 
sometimes deviates from the number mentioned in Table 1.1. 
45  This overview is found at  
 http://europa.eu.int/comm/secretariat_general/sgb/droit_com/index_en.htm#transpositions 
46  The performance records of Lithuania and Hungary are spectacular in this respect. At the same time, the 
European Commission notes in its second report concerning the internal market that the figures for the 
‘new’ Member States are provisional only because the national implementation instruments still have to 
be verified by the Commission (European Commission, 2005: 16). 
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Table 3.2: The number of directives more than two years overdue: 
by Member States of the EU-15 
Member State: 
Second Report on Internal Market 
Strategy (internal market directives) 
Reference date: 30 November 2004 
 
 
number of directives change compared  
to May 2004 
Portugal 0 0 
Sweden 0 0 
The Netherlands 0 -3 
Finland 1 0 
UK 1 0 
Ireland 1 -2 
Denmark 1 +1 
Spain 1 +1 
Belgium 3 -1 
Greece 3 +2 
Italy 3 +2 
Austria 3 +1 
Luxembourg 4 +1 
Germany 5 0 
France 5 -4 
    Source: European Commission (2005a: 20). 
 
 
Table 3.2 shows that at this juncture the Netherlands is doing relatively well in terms of 
directives delayed for more than two years. In this respect, the recent catching-up 
maneuver, which also involved the transposition of three long overdue directives, 
seems to have been successful. At the time of the reference date, the United Kingdom, 
Denmark and Spain each have one long overdue directive. As far as Denmark and 
Spain are concerned, this deficit arose in the period May 2004 – November 2004. 
France, with five directives delayed for a long time, is not performing as well. Even so, 
France’s reduction from nine to five overdue directives is impressive.  
 In a more general sense, the performance records of the countries studied here vary. 
Based on the most recent – and the most complete – overview of the European 
Commission, the following picture emerges: 
- Spain and Denmark have a transposition deficit of 0.9% and 1.2%, respectively; 
which means that both countries satisfy the 1.5% standard (based on the earlier, 
internal market overview, only Spain satisfies this standard, with a deficit of 1.3%; in 
that report, Denmark has a deficit of no less than 2.3%); 
- The Netherlands (1.9%) and the United Kingdom (1.8%) are in the middle bracket. 
Compared to other Member States, both countries have a deficit that is well below 
the average for the EU-15 (which average is 2.0%), but do not meet the 1.5% 
standard; 
- in the last overview, the position of France (1.9%) has improved. In the internal 
market overview, France is invariably at the bottom of the list (with a deficit of 
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3.2%). Further, France has a relatively large number of directives more than two 
years overdue; 
- Germany (2.1%) and Italy (3.6%) perform notoriously badly in the overview as far as 
the EU-15 is concerned. 
 
3.2  Quality of Transposition: Infringement Proceedings 
 
Apart from the delay in transposition, it is also important to gain a picture of the quality 
of transposition. This quality is revealed in part by the number of infringement 
proceedings initiated against a country. As the quality of the transposition improves, a 
smaller number of infringement proceedings is to be expected.  
 The analysis of the number of infringement actions takes two factors into 
consideration. First, the number of Court of Justice cases instituted against a Member 
State. The choice of the number of Court of Justice cases is related to the idea that not 
all stages of an infringement proceeding are equally as relevant as a quality indicator. 
The letters of notice sent by the Commission and its reasoned opinions constitute steps 
that are usually due to delays in the Member States. As is shown by the research 
project, the number of cases falls sharply after letters of notice are sent and opinions 
issued (see Börzel, 2001; Tallberg, 2002). In that event, a Member State does transpose 
a directive, which prevents further steps by the Commission and a case before the 
European Court of Justice. In such cases, factors other than problems relating to the 
quality of national transposition measures usually play a role – for example the 
temporary postponement of the date of entry into force of transposition measures that 
have a negative effect on domestic business. This is why we focus on the number of 
Court of Justice cases as the first indicator. 
 Second, we take account of the number of cases involving directives that have been 
incorrectly transposed, according to the European Commission. Besides the incorrect 
transposition of a directive, the Commission distinguishes two other grounds that may 
result in a letter of notice and a Court of Justice case. These are the failure to notify a 
national measure and the incorrect implementation of a directive for which the 
implementation period has passed. These grounds reveal much less about the quality of 
transposition. This is why we do not take these cases into consideration as a quality 
indicator. The second indicator we use is the number of cases against a country – in 
terms of letters of notice, reasoned opinions and Court of Justice cases – based on the 
incorrect transposition of a directive. 
 By using both of these indicators, we hope to gain a sufficiently reliable picture of 
the quality of transposition in the various EU Member States and in particular in the 
countries analyzed here.  
 Table 3.3 shows the number of Court of Justice cases that have been initiated, 
broken down by country and by year. The table shows that the Scandinavian countries 
perform relatively well. These countries face an average of about 3 Court of Justice 
cases per year. The Netherlands follows these countries with an average of 8 new Court 
of Justice cases per year. Countries such as France, Italy and Greece perform badly. 
Spain, too, has a relatively high average of 14 cases initiated by the Commission before 
the Court of Justice. This could mean that in these countries the transposition quality is 
relatively poor.  
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Table 3.3: the number of ECJ cases involving Member States of the EU-15 
as of 31 December of the relevant year 
Member State: 2000 2001 2002 2003 Average 
Denmark 0 2 2 3 2 
Finland 4 2 1 6 3 
Sweden 3 3 2 7 4 
The Netherlands  12 5 7 9 8 
Portugal 10 7 10 10 9 
UK 4 14 16 11 11 
Belgium 5 13 8 19 11 
Austria  8 7 15 22 13 
Luxembourg 16 10 12 16 14 
Germany 11 12 16 18 14 
Ireland 17 13 9 18 14 
Spain 8 14 11 23 14 
Greece 23 16 17 14 18 
Italy 24 22 23 18 22 
France 27 22 31 21 25 
EU 172 162 180 411 231 
  Source: European Commission (2004b). 
 
 The second quality indicator is included in Table 3.4. This table includes the 
number of cases involving incorrect transposition of EC directives according to the 
Commission for each Member State. This relates to the period 1999-2002. This table 
shows that Italy, France, Austria and Belgium have a relatively large number of cases 
where the Commission intervenes on the ground of the incorrect transposition of 
directives. Even though there is some variation in terms of the number of letters of 
notice, reasoned opinions and Court of Justice cases, these Member States are 
responsible for most cases, on average, for each of the distinct stages of the 
infringement proceeding. After these four countries, Germany and Spain are ranked 
next. This means that the quality of the transposition measures in these countries 
appears to be relatively lower than in countries such as Denmark, Finland and, in third 
position, the Netherlands.  
 
Table 3.4: The number of cases involving the incorrect transposition of EC directives, by 
Member States of the EU-15 as of 31 December of the relevant year 
1999 2000 2001 2002 Average  
N O C N O C N O C N O C N O C 
Denmark 4 0 1 2 3 0 2 2 0 1 1 0 2 2 0 
Finland 2 3 0 2 3 0 10 3 0 1 8 0 4 4 0 
The 
Netherlands  
2 0 1 3 2 1 2 2 2 2 0 1 2 1 1 
Ireland 3 4 1 0 2 1 2 2 1 0 0 2 1 2 1 
Portugal 4 4 3 3 4 0 2 1 0 3 0 2 3 2 1 
UK 2 4 1 5 1 0 3 4 1 3 2 3 3 3 1 
Greece 4 6 1 4 2 1 3 1 1 4 1 0 4 J 1 
Sweden 6 4 1 3 4 0 5 1 2 2 5 0 4 4 1 
Luxembourg 10 5 2 1 7 0 4 2 2 2 1 2 4 4 2 
Spain 5 4 4 4 1 1 2 4 0 6 6 1 4 4 2 
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1999 2000 2001 2002 Average  
N O C N O C N O C N O C N O C 
Germany 7 5 1 7 4 2 0 4 4 4 4 0 5 4 2 
Belgium 10 6 5 6 6 1 1 7 4 1 0 0 5 5 3 
Austria 12 4 2 13 6 1 13 11 3 3 6 6 10 7 3 
France 3 11 2 8 6 5 7 4 3 8 9 2 7 8 3 
Italy 4 8 4 15 4 5 6 8 5 7 3 6 8 6 5 
EU 78 68 29 76 55 18 62 56 28 47 46 25 66 56 25 
Declaration: N=letter of notice; O=reasoned opinion; C=ECJ case instituted.  
Source: European Commission (2003a). 
 
 The general picture emerging from both of these indicators is that France and Italy 
show relatively poor performance in terms of quality. In recent years, these countries 
have had a relatively large number of 
Court of Justice cases initiated against them as well as a relatively large number of 
infringement actions based on the incorrect transposition of directives. Germany and 
Spain follow these countries with a slightly better performance record, but these 
countries also have a rather poor quality level. These poor performance records are at 
odds with the earlier picture of Spain as one of the countries that transposes directives 
relatively quickly and satisfies the 1.5% and 0% targets defined by the European 
Council. Apparently, speed does not always mean that directives are transposed 
correctly. 
 Countries with a very limited number of Court of Justice cases and with a good 
performance record in terms of the number of cases based on incorrect transposition 
include Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands. In these countries, the transposition 
quality appears to be high. Sometimes this involves a limited delay: for example, the 
Netherlands does not satisfy the Union’s 1.5% standard. At the same time, Denmark is 
able to transpose directives both rapidly and accurately. Denmark satisfies the 1.5% 
standard and has the smallest number of Court of Justice cases in the period 2000-03. 
It remains an open question whether carefulness in the transposition process takes 
more time and may therefore result in delay. 
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4   Instruments and Techniques 
 
A great variety of instruments and techniques is used to implement EC directives in the 
countries researched. The variations in the different legal instruments often depend 
greatly on a country’s constitutional system, making it difficult to compare these 
instruments. 
4.1  Special Implementation Procedures 
None of the countries researched for this report utilize special, faster implementation 
procedures for transposing EC directives. The constitutions of these countries do not 
include any special provisions for speeding up the treatment of EC directives, nor are 
there any other special procedures permitting a simplified or another kind of treatment 
of EC directives for transposition purposes. Articles 1:7 and 1:8 of the General 
Administrative Law Act, which permit consultation to be bypassed for the purposes of 
implementing EC legislation, come closest to a separate procedural provision aimed at 
implementation. Countries such as France and the United Kingdom do have various 
special statutory regulations permitting the use of special instruments (for example, the 
extensive use of delegated legislation) for transposing EC directives. The result of these 
special instruments is that the transposition procedure is less time-consuming: as a 
general rule, delegated legislation is adopted faster than Acts of Parliament in all 
countries studied.47 This means that the legal instrument also defines the duration of 
the procedure. 
 Even though there are no separate transposition procedures in the literal sense of 
the word, the resolution procedures used in the United Kingdom pursuant to the 
European Communities Act 1972 are still often regarded as such. Under the European 
Communities Act, the British Government has wide powers to transpose directives 
through ‘statutory instruments’ provided that the draft instrument is presented to 
Parliament. The two resolution possibilities, the ‘negative resolution procedure’, under 
which Parliament may approve the draft statutory instrument by implication, and the 
‘affirmative resolution procedure’, under which the draft instrument requires 
Parliament’s express approval, are actual ‘procedures’. These resolution procedures, 
however, are not exclusively reserved for the transposition of EC directives. They are 
also used in the case of regular delegation to a Minister under ordinary British statutes. 
4.2  Instruments 
4.2.1  Instruments I: no or a trivial instrument (direct effect or transposition through 
reference) 
Member States are required to transpose EC directives precisely and completely.48 
Admittedly, under Article 249 of the ECT, Member States are free to choose the 
appropriate form and methods in order to achieve the result required by a directive, but 
                                                 
47  As a result of non-procedural factors, the introduction of subordinate legislation may take longer than the 
approval of primary legislation. An example that came up during the interviews concerns France, where 
the ministerial process is sometimes considerably delayed as a result of transposition receiving low 
priority. 
48  For a recent decision, see, inter alia, ECJ, C 194-01 Commission v. Austria. 
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this freedom of choice is not without limitations. The form chosen must be suitable for 
achieving the aim of the directive. Nevertheless, precise and complete transposition 
means that Member States have to make an assessment of how the various directive 
provisions are to be transposed into the national legal order. Member States are not 
permitted to strive for the direct effect of directives by doing nothing. And methods that 
do not involve any assessment regarding transposition but that declare a directive 
applicable in a country’s national legal order unconditionally – without any substantive 
considerations – are not always acceptable either.  
 These criteria make it immediately clear that the non-transposition of a directive as 
a method or instrument (the directive itself is the instrument in that case) is not 
permitted under Community law.49 Transposition through reference in a national act is 
not prohibited as such. It depends on the contents of the directive (or the parts of the 
directive to which reference is made) whether this is permitted. In a number of the 
countries studied, transposition of directives through reference takes place, especially 
in Italy, Denmark and Germany. In Italy, this ‘trivial’ instrument (actually not a ‘real’ 
form or method of transposition, because there is no substantive review of any kind), is 
occasionally part of the Pergola system. This study does not permit us to draw any exact 
conclusions about how frequently this instrument is used, because we have not 
conducted any interviews in Italy for this research project. The literature search creates 
the impression that it is hardly ever used. 
4.2.2  Instruments II: Package Laws and Omnibus Laws 
Package law 
A transposition instrument that we found in several countries studied is the package 
law. A package law is an act whereby a number of directives for which the 
implementation deadline has passed are transposed into the national legal order 
simultaneously. These laws are like an emergency measure. This instrument was 
occasionally used mainly in Italy in the late 1970s for the purpose of reducing the 
transposition deficit.50 In Spain it was used once at the time of its accession to the 
European Union. The package law in Italy took the form of an ordinary Act of 
Parliament. The once-only package law in Spain was based on a Delegation of Powers 
Act that granted the government the power to transpose a large number of directives 
through a Decree-Law (real decreto-legislativo).51 
 
Omnibus law 
An omnibus law, too, transposes several directives into the national legal system 
simultaneously, but is not necessarily designed to reduce the deficit by way of an 
emergency measure. In Italy and France, omnibus laws are more or less part of the 
regular transposition system. In Italy, the system of the Pergola Act (legge Pergola)52 
                                                 
49  This situation should be distinguished from the situation where a directive is transposed through the 
‘existing national regime’, i.e. the situation where an EC directive can be transposed into existing 
regulations without the passage of a new regulation or amendment legislation. In the Netherlands this 
situation is regulated by Instruction 347. In the Netherlands, this form of transposition must be 
published in the Government Gazette. 
50  Act 42/87 implemented 97 directives and Act 183/87 100 directives. 
51  Ley the Bases 47/1985 the 27 diciembre, para la delegación al Gobierno para la aplicación del Derecho 
Comunitario. 
52  Legge 9 marzo 1989, n. 86, Gazz. Uff., 10 marzo, n. 58. 
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allows omnibus laws to be adopted. The Pergola system instructs the government to 
prepare a bill every year that is designed to implement EC directives that are in direct or 
indirect need of transposition and to introduce it, together with a report on the 
significance of European policy for Italy and the Italian position, to the Italian 
Parliament. Usually, this kind of EC law transposes several EC directives 
simultaneously. The French DDAC laws (Disposition d’adaption au droit Community) are 
also omnibus laws, but these do not have the periodic nature of the Italian EC law and 
they are often (preferably) confined to one policy area. 
4.2.3  Instruments III: Delegation Structures 
Apart from the package and omnibus laws, we have not found any special legal 
instruments in the countries analyzed in this report that are specifically designed to 
transpose or implement EC directives. All of the instruments used in the countries for 
the purpose of transposing EC directives are taken from the regular repertoire of 
regulations and other instruments. This also applies to the package and omnibus laws, 
which are regular Acts of Parliament in terms of form.  
 Even so, countries frequently attempt to transpose EC directives through delegated 
legislation within their regular legislative system in order to avoid the often time-
consuming road to an Act of Parliament. It is striking that none of the countries 
studied here makes any constitutional concessions in the context of their attempts to 
transpose directives at the lowest possible regulatory level. The existing instruments are 
used to the fullest extent within the limits of the countries’ own constitutional system 
and the requirements placed by the Court of Justice on precise and complete 
transposition. In Spain, approximately 84% of the directives are transposed through 
subordinate legislation. In the United Kingdom, the figure is about 80-90%; in 
Denmark 85%. In France it is estimated that approximately 60% of directives are 
transposed through subordinate legislation. In this comparison, the Dutch figure is 
among the highest: approximately 87% of the EC directives are transposed by 
instruments other than an Act of Parliament (Bovens and Yesilkagit, 2005: 525). There 
are no figures for Germany and Italy because these countries were not part of the 
fieldwork for this study.53 
 All of the Member States we studied use delegation structures in order to transpose 
directives at the lowest possible level. Below, we will first discuss the types of delegation 
(general or special authorization), followed by the delegation standards (delegation 
prohibitions and restrictions) and finally, the delegation structure (statutory or 
constitutional basis, direct or cascade delegation, hierarchy of standards). 
 
a. Types of delegation: general authorization (‘umbrella’ delegation) or specified delegation  
Some of the countries we studied use ‘general authorization laws’. General 
authorization laws allow a group of EC directives defined in general terms to be 
transposed through subordinate legislation (government decree or ministerial 
regulation). 
 The European Communities Act 1972 in the United Kingdom is an authorization 
law with an extraordinarily broad scope. The law permits nearly all EC directives to be 
                                                 
53  Jenny and Müller (2005) show with respect to the federal government of Austria that approximately 41% 
of the EC directives were transposed through Acts of Parliament in the period 1995-2003. About 59% of 
directives were transposed by subordinate legislation. 
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transposed through a ministerial order, rule or regulation (known as a ‘statutory 
instrument’). The only exceptions concern cases where the transposition of EC 
directives would involve new taxes, grant new regulatory powers to British authorities 
or define important new summary or indictable offences.54 This far-reaching form of 
delegation is subject to a restriction, however. Proposals for statutory instruments 
designed to transpose EC directives have to be presented to Parliament. 
 The resolution procedure as used in the United Kingdom has two versions that were 
already discussed in Section 4.1. Parliament may say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to the proposal 
presented to Parliament, either through approval by implication (‘negative procedure’), 
or through express approval (‘affirmative procedure’). The advantage of this general 
authorization is that a great deal of time can be saved compared to the ordinary Act of 
Parliament procedure. According to the interviewees, the disadvantage is the loss of 
parliamentary control and, consequently, legitimacy and support. The UK Parliament 
does not exercise its power to critically discuss proposals for ‘transposing’ ministerial 
orders or regulations very frequently. Parliament hardly ever blocks a proposal. This 
loss is somewhat compensated by extensive consultations at the time of the preparation 
of ‘transposing’ regulations and parliamentary control in retrospect (Joint Scrutiny 
Committee on Statutory Instruments & Merits Committee), but this is not quite 
sufficient.  
 France uses general authorization laws known as lois d’habilitation. This kind of law 
grants the government the power, possibly on the basis of Article 38 of the French 
Constitution, to implement a number of directives through Decree-Laws. A special 
characteristic of these French authorization laws is that the authorization is only valid 
for a specified period and that the ordonnances have to be approved by Parliament 
(without the possibility of amendment). If the authorization law has already entered 
into force and Parliament does not grant its approval, all the consequences will have to 
be undone. The French Parliament uses this option only a few times a year. Since the 
proposals must always be accompanied by a list of non-transposed directives, they 
include an element of self-criticism on the part of the Government. 
 This form of authorization law is also possible in Spain under Article 82 of the 
Spanish Constitution (ley de bases). As in France, this form of delegation in Spain is 
based on a list of directives, is valid for a limited period, and lapses after the entry into 
force of government decrees (real decreto-legislativo). As stated above, this form of 
authorization has been used only once: at the time of the Spanish accession to the 
Union. 
 The general authorization delegation is also an established part of the Italian EC 
laws on the basis of the Pergola system. Under Article 76 of the Italian Constitution, the 
legislator is empowered to authorize the government in this way. Through a general 
authorization law, the government is granted the power to adopt Decree-Laws relating 
to a specific subject – for example, the transposition of EC directives. 
 In this context, the Constitution requires that the law includes principles and 
criteria for the exercise of this power. As in France, the authorization can be granted 
only for a specified period and in Italy as well. Parliamentary approval (without the 
right to amendments) is necessary.55 This procedure is widely used in Italy.  
                                                 
54  Schedule 2 to the European Communities Act 1972. 
55  Article 77 of the Italian Constitution. 
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 In Denmark and Germany, the special delegation system prevails, as in the 
Netherlands. Incidentally, in the countries with general authorization laws, there are 
also opportunities for special delegation. Special delegation means that powers to adopt 
further legislation are transferred by Act of Parliament to the government or to a 
Minister on a case-by-case basis (for example, according to subject, specific powers, or 
specific directives). In many countries, the extent to which there are opportunities for 
delegation very much depends on the policy area concerned. In Denmark, for example, 
it is mainly the Danish laws governing the Union’s traditional, first-pillar policy areas 
that provide many opportunities for special delegation. This does not apply to the same 
extent to Danish laws governing third-pillar issues. 
 Opportunities for special delegation come in many forms. Sometimes, delegation 
possibilities in a special act (special delegation possibilities, in other words) are very 
open in that they grant the government or a Minister exceedingly broad powers to 
transpose each and every directive within the scope of the relevant Act. We have found 
examples of this in Spain, but this is not an unknown phenomenon in the Netherlands 
either, notwithstanding the prohibition included in Instruction 25. 
 
b. Delegation standards: delegation prohibitions and restrictions 
In searching for the lowest possible form of transposition, many of the countries we 
studied face restrictions in terms of delegation possibilities. For example, the Spanish 
and German constitutions have restrictions relating to the legislative power of the 
central and federal government. When the federal government does not have powers in 
a specific area under the Constitution, it goes without saying that an EC directive 
concerning this area cannot be transposed at a federal level through delegated 
legislation. In the United Kingdom, too, Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland have 
been granted significant autonomous powers quite recently. In the context of the 
transposition of directives, these autonomous powers of Länder or regions sometimes 
give rise to complications, because the central (federal) government is and remains 
responsible for complete and precise transposition. Spain and – to a somewhat less 
extent – Germany seem to have found a means to deal with this problem, but the 
United Kingdom is still experiencing difficulties.  
 A second form of delegation restriction also has a constitutional origin. In most of 
the countries we studied, the constitution contains delegation prohibitions or 
restrictions in one form or another with respect to specific subjects. Explicit examples 
can be found in Article 34 of the French Constitution and Articles 81-92 of the Spanish 
Constitution and the organic law based on it.56 
 Even if there are no prohibitions on delegation, some of the countries we studied 
still choose to transpose directives by Act of Parliament. In the countries without 
general authorization laws but with only special delegation possibilities, the rule is that 
if an EC directive concerns a subject for which there is no national legislation yet, this 
directive must first be transposed by an Act of Parliament. In addition, the societal, 
administrative or political significance of a subject covered by a directive is sometimes 
mentioned as a reason for transposing a directive by Act of Parliament in Denmark and 
the United Kingdom. In the United Kingdom, as in France, consistency with national 
law or policy tradition can be a reason for using an Act of Parliament. In the United 
Kingdom, company law, for example, is traditionally governed by Act of Parliament. 
                                                 
56  An organic law is an Act of Parliament that implements one or more constitutional provisions. 
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c. Delegation structures 
As far as delegation structures are concerned, this study shows that in some cases, the 
granting of legislative power to the government is based directly on the constitution. In 
France, Italy and in Spain, the government is empowered directly under the 
constitution or organic laws based on the constitution to adopt Decree-Laws for the 
purpose of implementing legislation under specified conditions. It is important to note 
that in Italy and Spain the government’s constitutional power to issue decrees without 
parliamentary interference is hardly ever used for transposing directives. In these 
countries, the power to adopt decrees is designed to take decisions quickly in 
emergency situations. These statutory orders are reserved for exceptional situations and 
require retrospective parliamentary approval in one form or another. 
 The situation is different in France, where the government has a regular, separate 
constitutional power to draft Decree-Laws in those areas that are not governed by Acts 
or that do not fall within the legislative domain (Article 37 of the French Constitution). 
This is due to the complicated (from a Dutch perspective) demarcation of powers under 
the Constitution of the Fifth Republic. 
 In several countries there is no hierarchy of legislation as in the Netherlands. In 
Spain, Italy and France, certain Decree-Laws adopted by the government (for example, 
decreti leggi, real decretos-legislativos, or décrets) have the same order and rank as Acts of 
Parliament. Considering the general priority rule that new regulations prevail over 
older ones (lex posterior derogat lege priori), this may mean that a decree takes 
precedence over an Act of Parliament. 
 In the United Kingdom, it is possible not only that ministerial regulations take 
precedence over Acts of Parliament, but even that they expressly deviate from or amend 
Acts of Parliament. The provisions granting such powers are fittingly called Henry VIII 
powers. 
 This study has not investigated the rules that apply in the countries we studied 
concerning direct delegation and indirect or cascade delegation. This would require 
additional research. 
4.3  Techniques 
The implementation techniques used by the countries we studied present a varied 
picture. The differences are the result of a Member State’s answer to the question of 
which system governs transposition: the national system or the European system? In 
France, Denmark57 and Germany, the national legislative system is used as the point of 
departure for the transposition of EC directives. The substance of the directive is 
incorporated into national legislation, which usually means that the terminology used 
in the directive is changed. In the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands, 
there is a preference for staying as close as possible to the text of the EC directive and 
generally using it as a basis for legislation in order promote the speed, accuracy and 
completeness of the transposition. 
 Concurrent to the policy in the United Kingdom, the Dutch legislative policy prefers 
the copy-out technique wherever this is possible.58 In most countries that share this 
                                                 
57  See Instruction 56 of the Instructions for Drafting Legislation (2004). This study has shown that in 
recent years the copying method has gained popularity in Denmark. 
58  In the United Kingdom, this is known as the ‘copy-out technique’. In recent years, the UK has seen a 
debate on the question whether copy-out or the best possible incorporation of the directive into the 
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preference, it is considered to be almost a matter of course that where it is not possible 
to use the copy-out technique, this is not required either. It could be, for example, that 
the text of the directive is confusing, in terms of language or contents, or that the text of 
the directive and national regulations are not consistent with each other. In this 
situation, re-wording is recommended. 
 The copy-out technique can be used in a variety of ways. First, transposition through 
reference automatically means that contents will be copied out. This may be done 
dynamically, as in the Netherlands (meaning that national legislation includes 
references to the provisions of a directive, including any future amendments to it) or 
static (references to the provisions of a directive as specified at a given moment in 
time).59 Section 4.2.1 discussed the technique of transposition through reference. The 
advantage of this technique is speed of transposition. The limited recognizability and 
the deficient way in which justice is done to the nature of the directive instrument may 
be considered disadvantages. Directives are also transposed through the ‘annex 
method’: an article in a national regulation declares an annex to the regulation 
applicable. In this way, the often-technical annexes to European directives are declared 
applicable by direct referencing.  
 There is a difference between the Member States concerning the question of 
whether or not there should be a minimalist approach towards transposition. The 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom prefer to transpose directives in as 
straightforward a manner as possible – which is understandable in view of the volume 
of directives to be transposed – which means that only the directives are transposed, 
and extra national measures or policies are not adopted.60 Moreover, imposing extra 
requirements (gold-plating) often increases the burdens attached to the regulation for 
businesses and citizens. In the United Kingdom, this is an added reason to refrain 
from adopting additional requirements, based on the concept of Better Regulation. 
 A related question is whether directives should be transposed through a new 
separate regulation or whether existing instruments and regulations should be used. 
This study shows that countries adopt a case-by-case attitude on this issue and do not 
pursue any deliberate policy. Of course, in the case of package and omnibus laws, 
existing national instruments are not used, and in the case of delegated legislation, a 
directive is often transposed without involving any existing national regulations, but 
there does not appear to be any real consistent and deliberate policy. In the context of 
the British legislative policy, the co-existence of double regimes governing the same 
subject – national and European – (this is known as double-banking) is discouraged, 
however. 
                                                                                                                            
existing British legislative system (the technique of ‘elaboration’) is preferable. The supporters of 
incorporation in the UK have pointed out that it not only has systematic advantages, but that it is also a 
service to the courts, which are not used to working with European legislation. In the UK the debate has 
been won by the copy-out technique, which is faster, often more precise, and which is also more popular 
with judges. They are the ones who have to apply EC law and this is simpler if only the original text is 
used or if the relevant regulation stays quite close to the latter. 
59  See Instructions 342 and 341. 
60  See, for example, Instruction 337 of the Instructions for Drafting Legislation.  
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4.4  Conclusion 
 
In the countries studied in this report, the normal legislative system is used for 
transposing EC directives. There are no separate procedures for transposing EC 
directives, and no special instruments. The various countries, however, frequently use 
the possibilities of transposing directives at the lowest possible regulatory level. It is 
remarkable that in transposing directives through instruments ranked lower than an 
Act of Parliament, all countries do so within the limits of the regular constitutional 
system, within the framework of the ordinary delegation techniques and the existing 
national repertoire of regulatory forms, in short within the normal national legislative 
system. Some countries do have forms of parliamentary legislation (package and 
omnibus laws) and forms of delegation (general authorization) that allow groups of 
directives to be transposed simultaneously, or that allow directives to be transposed by 
definition through delegated legislation. Other countries opt for forms of specific 
delegation rather than forms of generic delegation. The advantage of the former 
technique is that the best balance between transposition by Act of Parliament and 
transposition through delegation can be defined for each individual Act.  
 Transposing directives through instruments ranked lower than an Act of Parliament 
may save a great deal of time, but has the general disadvantage that there can be little 
parliamentary control over the relevant instrument in advance. The result of this is that 
legitimacy is sometimes low. Yet, despite these objections, delegated instruments are 
widely used. In most of the countries surveyed, more than 80% of directives are 
transposed through delegated instruments. 
 As far as the techniques used are concerned, this study reveals a varied picture. 
Some countries attempt to stay as close as possible to the text of the directive and to 
transpose in as minimalist a manner as possible. Other countries prefer to incorporate 
the directives as carefully as possible into the national legislative system, which often 
entails deviations from the terminology used in the directive text. Naturally, the latter 
technique has the disadvantage of being more time-consuming and more vulnerable to 
infringement proceedings. Its advantage is that it may do a better job at safeguarding 
the coherence of the national system. There is also a varied picture with respect to the 
use of already existing national instruments or the adoption of a new regulation for 
every transposition of a directive. This depends greatly on the instruments used for 
implementation purposes.  
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5  The National Policy Cycle 
5.1  General 
The national policy cycle relating to European legislation begins with the preparation of 
an initiative by the European Commission. In none of the countries studied is there 
any systematic preparation and discussion of proposals circulating within the 
Commission that the Commission has not yet presented to the Council. Occasionally, a 
specific proposal attracts some attention, especially if the European Commission 
publishes a policy document on it. It is true that some observers argue that it is 
important to take note of ideas within the Commission at an early stage, but this has 
not yet resulted in a specific procedure or working method. Some national Parliaments 
also try to gather more information about forthcoming Commission proposals by 
maintaining close ties with the national Permanent Representation and perhaps by 
posting their own representative in Brussels. Another reason to do this is the 
subsidiarity and proportionality tests to be introduced by the European Constitution. 
But these parliaments do not systematically discuss potential pre-proposals either. The 
publication of new Commission proposal signals the beginning of the drafting of the 
national position. 
5.2  Drafting of the National Position 
Start. In the countries studied here, the drafting of the national position concerning a 
Commission proposal begins after the publication of a proposal. The lead ministry 
begins the drafting process by analyzing the proposal and surveying potential 
problems. Only in France is the Council of State systematically involved at this stage 
because the Council must assess under the French Constitution whether a new 
proposal contains only ‘legislative’ or ‘executive’ elements, or both. This assessment is 
relevant to further proceedings, since the French national Parliament gives its opinion 
only for proposals or parts of proposals with ‘legislative’ relevance. 
 
Ministerial preparation. The manner in which the ministry organizes the discussion 
about the proposal varies. At this point, it is possible to distinguish two models:  
- A broad consultation model for all proposals, with active involvement of various 
interest groups and local authorities. This model is used in Denmark and the 
United Kingdom. In Denmark, the discussion is held in a large number of 
institutionalized EU committees in various policy fields. This extensive discussion 
fits with the national Parliament’s active involvement during the follow-up stages of 
ministerial preparation. In the United Kingdom, broad consultation, also with other 
ministries, is recommended as well, but the lead Minister manages the process. The 
informal consultations are intended especially for interested citizens, businesses 
and institutions. Interested parties are also invited to express their views in 
Brussels.  
- A limited consultation model, sometimes only involving civil servants, depending 
on the policy field: in this model, it is mainly the various ministries that provide 
their input in the process of drafting legislation. Depending on the policy field, 
interest groups are sometimes involved in the consultations as well. This model is 
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found mainly in Spain and France, where ad hoc committees primarily consisting 
of civil servants are set up (through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Spain – or a 
secretariat under the Prime Minister that is specifically focused on Europe – France) 
for drafting the country’s position.  
As soon as a position has been reached, this is usually presented to the Cabinet through 
a sub council.  
 
Internal information provision and explanatory memorandum. In all of the countries we 
studied, a document is drawn up that is used as a basis for both the administrative and 
political decision-making process at the preliminary stage.  
 In France, an explanatory memorandum is drawn up that focuses special attention 
on the manner in which the proposal affects the national legislative framework (fiche 
d’impact). This is related to the French constitutional difference between ‘legislative’ 
and ‘executive’ measures, which defines the further decision-making process (whether 
or not the national Parliament is involved in the process) and the fact that the French 
generally want to gain insight at an early stage into the question of which French 
legislation must be amended if the proposal is approved. Thus one reason for changing 
parts of the proposal during the negotiations in Brussels is to avoid transposition 
problems later.  
 In Spain, an explanatory memorandum is also drawn up and sent to Parliament. 
The Spanish explanatory memorandum is more detailed than the French one, but it 
deals with rather formal items.  
The most detailed explanatory memoranda can be found in the United Kingdom and 
Denmark. In some respects, these memoranda are comparable to those used in the 
Netherlands, where, in addition to a number of formal points (such as the responsible 
ministry, the legal basis and the background of the directive), attention is also paid to 
the financial, personnel and administrative consequences of the proposal, the 
consequences for national and local regulations and policies, the consequences for 
developing countries and the feasibility of the time limits suggested in the draft 
proposal. A short version of the explanatory memorandum is presented to the national 
Parliament in the Netherlands.  
 In the United Kingdom, the government draws up the explanatory memorandum 
for the Parliament’s benefit when an EC proposal is received. This memorandum deals 
with the various aspects of the proposal and a report is added, which includes a 
‘regulatory impact assessment’ of the economic, legal, social and environmental effects 
of the proposal. In this context, special attention is paid to the administrative 
consequences for British businesses and civilians. The drawing up of a memorandum 
is subject to a strict protocol. A special unit within the Cabinet Office (Regulatory 
Impact Unit) provides assistance to ministries in the preparation of impact 
assessments. In addition, there is an independent Scrutiny Team, which tries to 
convince departments and interested parties of the importance of Better (read: 
especially more business-friendly) Regulation.  
 In Denmark, a memorandum is drawn up in the drafting process, which is 
presented to Parliament (grundnotat). The Danish procedure is the most extensive 
compared to other countries we studied. The Danish memorandum includes a total of 
13 sections, the most important of which are the assessment in terms of financial, 
socio-economic and environmental aspects, the results of interest-group consultations, 
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the position of the Danish government compared to the position of other governments 
in the EU and the Danish position in comparable cases.  
 
Coordination. The coordination of the drafting process is organized differently in the 
countries studied.  
 Denmark has the most decentralized form of coordination. Danish line ministries 
are, for the most part, responsible for the drafting process. The Danish position is 
prepared by the institutionalized committees that have been set up for each policy field 
and in which interested groups are represented as well. This position is then raised in 
the Council of Ministers through an interdepartmental coordination group and a sub 
council. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs acts as the secretary in this process.  
 The Spanish model is somewhat similar. One difference is that the preparations 
take place in an ad hoc working group that is set up on the initiative of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. At this stage, depending on the subject, the line ministry sometimes 
consults interested groups and autonomous regions. Through an interdepartmental, 
administrative coordination group and a sub council, the proposal is placed on the 
agenda of the Council of Ministers.  
 In the United Kingdom, the Cabinet Office is entrusted with the central 
coordination of the drafting and transposition of EC directives. The Cabinet Office 
manages this process. In many cases, the division of responsibilities between the 
ministries, laid down in the Designating Order, determines the lead ministry.  
 The French model differs from the models in Denmark and Spain. The drafting of 
France’s position is a co-production of two coordination bodies under the Prime 
Minister: the Secretariat for European affairs – the Secrétariat Général de la Comité 
Interministériel, the SGCI – which is charged with the management of European 
policies, and the coordinating Secretariat for Legislative Affairs – the Secrétariat Général 
du Gouvernment Général, the SGG. The SGCI establishes an ad hoc committee for each 
dossier, in which the line ministers concerned are represented. Although the SGCI 
prefers one line ministry to assume the leadership in the drafting of the French 
position, it frequently happens that several ministries claim leadership. This is due to 
the French line ministries’ relative autonomy and the fact that a Commission proposal 
sometimes has consequences for several ministries. As soon as the ministries have 
developed a draft position, the SGCI and subsequently the SGG present it to the 
Council of Ministers. The French coordination model is formalistic and complex. 
Furthermore, there are two bodies engaged in the internal coordination and each has a 
different perspective. 
 
Drafting the position. As soon as the Council of Ministers has defined its provisional 
position, the various countries differ in terms of follow-up. 
 In France, the follow-up depends on whether the directive contains ‘legislative’ 
elements. If this is the case, Parliament is informed through an explanatory 
memorandum (fiche d’impact). Parliament and in particular the Assemblé Nationale may 
ask the government to take a number of points into account by tabling a motion. This 
does not happen very frequently. The government is not forced to implement the 
motion, which explains the limited popularity of this instrument, but the government is 
required to make a reservation during the European negotiations until Parliament’s 
view is known. Parliament is not informed any further about directives that contain 
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merely ‘executive’ elements. The government is autonomous concerning these 
directives, or parts thereof. 
 In Spain, all Commission proposals are presented to the national Parliament with 
an explanatory memorandum. Parliament can take a position on this proposal, but it 
little incentive to do so. This is partly due to the fact that Parliament’s position is not a 
mandate within which the government must conduct negotiations in Brussels.  
 In the United Kingdom, the existence of the ‘scrutiny reserve’ means that the 
Government cannot enter into negotiation on EC proposals that have not yet been 
discussed by the British Parliament. In practice, this requirement is flexibly applied. On 
the basis of the explanatory memorandum, including a proposal for the British 
position, the European Scrutiny Committee, a separate House of Commons committee, 
selects the EC proposals that must be discussed by Parliament. The committee usually 
refers only some proposals to Parliament. A small minority of the proposals referred to 
the House are actually discussed substantively in the House of Commons. 
 In Denmark, all Commission proposals are submitted to the national Parliament 
through an explanatory memorandum (grundnotat) and discussed with the government 
in detail. After other, relevant standing committees have presented their views on the 
proposal, there is a discussion in the European Affairs Committee of the Danish 
Parliament. Based on the discussion, the European Affairs Committee adopts the 
Government’s negotiation mandate. The Danish government is obliged to obtain the 
national Parliament’s consent before it assumes a position for negotiations in Brussels. 
5.3  Transposition 
Start. The transposition of a European directive is usually prepared after the decision 
on the directive has been published in the Official Journal. Although various 
representatives have expressed their willingness to begin the transposition process at 
an earlier stage, in practice the process begins only after the publication of the directive. 
 
Preparation. In the various countries, the line ministries are responsible for preparing 
the transposition process. In this context, the following points are relevant: 
- In some countries it is not the same team that is responsible for both the 
negotiations on the directive and for the transposition (especially in France this is 
still a problem); 
- concerning the division of responsibilities, France in particular faces the problem 
that several ministries assume a leading role, which means that the responsibility 
for the progress of the transposition is often unclear; 
- the legal support for transposition varies from country to country: in Denmark, 
‘multidisciplinary’ teams are set up to supervise the negotiations regarding 
transposition. The United Kingdom also relies on multidisciplinary project teams, 
but transposition through statutory instruments is usually carried out by civil 
servants specialized in drafting legislation. The quality of their work is considered 
much lower than that of the Parliamentary Counsel’s Office, which writes proposals 
for Parliamentary Acts. In Spain, legal expertise is obtained from the central staff 
departments within the ministry (Secretario General Tecnicos). In France, legal 
support is not systematic and varies greatly from ministry to ministry. 
- in some countries, interested parties (inter alia, interest groups and lower 
authorities) are consulted at this stage. This is mainly the case in Spain and France. 
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This consultation process has a statutory basis and is, in the short term, 
unavoidable. In Spain, this sometimes delays the process somewhat. In France 
these delays are sometimes very substantial because of the strongly autonomous 
nature of these consultation forums; 
- the procedure concerning the transposition of European directives does not differ 
greatly from the procedure concerning national measures. There is no classification 
system according to types of directives that are decisive for the approach to be 
adopted (with the exception of the classification according to ‘legislative’ and 
‘executive’ elements in France);  
- several of the countries studied do not provide instructions concerning 
transposition, or more generally, relating to legislation. National guidelines are used 
in Denmark and the United Kingdom; various Prime Ministerial circulars are used 
in France; Spain has hardly any well-defined and uniform instructions. Each 
ministry formulates its own ‘instructions’, which may vary substantially between the 
various ministries. Even so, uniform instructions do not seem to have a very 
positive effect on the speed and quality of the transposition process. 
 
Coordination. Administrative coordination at the transposition stage has various shapes 
and forms in the countries we studied, with Denmark and France appearing to take the 
most extreme positions. Spain and the United Kingdom take intermediate positions. 
We identified the following models: 
- decentralized coordination: Denmark has a decentralized form of coordination 
between the various line ministries. In the Danish model, the ministries are 
responsible for the transposition of directives, and other ministries are involved as 
well. Only if an infringement proceeding is initiated does a special Ministry of 
Justice committee convene to discuss the situation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
responsible for coordinating the process during the negotiation stage, bears no 
responsibility for coordination at the transposition stage.  
- centralized interdepartmental coordination: Spain has opted for a model in which the 
ministries are primarily responsible for the transposition and in which the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs identifies possible and expected backlogs. In Spain, problems are 
on the weekly agenda of the Committee of State-secretaries and Sub-secretaries, 
which is the administrative gateway to the Council of Ministers. The progress of the 
transposition and any complications and problems are discussed in this committee. 
 In the United Kingdom, the Cabinet Office functions as a “spider in the web,” in 
consultation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Cabinet Office is the central 
coordinator. The Cabinet Office acts as an intermediary between London and the 
Permanent Representation in Brussels, intervenes where there are problems 
between ministries during the implementation process, takes the lead in the 
explanatory memoranda that concern vital British interests, and monitors the 
progress of implementation. The Cabinet Office is close to the Prime Minister and 
therefore has authority over other line ministries and other departments.  
- coordination of the coordinators: in France, the coordination regarding the 
transposition of European directives is traditionally entrusted to the SGCI and, in 
the second instance, to the SGG (see the drafting stage concerning Commission 
proposals). Together with the Junior Minister for European Affairs, the SGCI is 
responsible for identifying any problems and backlog. With the recent reforms of 
the French coordination system, a new interdepartmental coordination committee 
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has been set up, chaired by the SGCI and SGG jointly. This new committee is to 
discuss problems concerning the transposition of directives (réseau interministériel 
des correspondants de la transposition) and attempt to improve the structure of the 
administrative coordination in France. The Junior Minister for European Affairs is 
supposed to take a tougher stance vis-à-vis the ministries regarding transposition 
deficits. 
So far, the Danish and Spanish models – but to a certain extent, the United Kingdom 
model as well – have turned out to be the most effective. In Denmark, most of the work 
– and the coordination relating to it – is carried out when a directive is being negotiated 
in Brussels. 
 In Spain, it is remarkable how frequently (a weekly discussion) those responsible for 
transposition backlogs are called to account. Furthermore, the ‘naming and shaming’ 
in the Committee of State-secretaries and Sub-secretaries has turned out to be very 
effective, since none of the administrative heads of the ministries (and sometimes of 
the policy departments within the ministries) want to be reminded of the poor 
performance of the ministry time after time. In most cases, persistent disagreements 
between the ministries are discussed and dealt with at this level. The Council of 
Ministers hardly ever needs to deal with the transposition of directives. This also 
applies to the United Kingdom, where for the most part, transposition is carried out by 
delegated legislation. In the United Kingdom, the Cabinet occasionally launches a 
targeted action to quickly clear transposition deficits.61 Some years ago, an 
undersecretary was assigned the job of implementing an action plan for cutting the 
deficit at a faster pace in collaboration with the departments. 
 France faces the complication that there are two different administrative bodies with 
transposition responsibilities: the SGCI is responsible for coordinating the 
transposition of European directives and the SGG for coordinating the preparation of 
legislation. The recent introduction of a coordination structure involving both 
coordinating bodies and the main administrative and political officials within a 
ministry may improve this situation. In each ministry, the members of the newly 
established committee – the transposition ‘correspondents’ – include a high-ranking 
civil servant responsible for transposition and a member of the Minister’s ‘political’ 
Cabinet (in other words: per ministry, two representatives participate in the 
consultation). It is hoped that any controversy within and between the ministries, to the 
extent that this has not been resolved at an earlier stage, will be addressed within this 
committee. If a solution cannot be reached, the Junior Minister for European Affairs, 
who participates in the meetings, will place the problem on the agenda of the Council 
of Ministers, together with a survey of the general progress relating to transposition 
within the various ministries. It is remarkable that France has seen the rise of a 
structure of coordination of coordinators, which is the result of a very formalized and 
sometimes laborious relationship between the ministries and bodies such as the SGCI 
and SGG. This means that France has a rather extensive and heavy coordination 
structure, certainly in comparison with a country like Denmark. 
                                                 
61  This is comparable to the situation in Ireland, where the Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern, started a targeted 
action for the purpose of improving the poor Irish transposition record more than six months before the 
Irish Presidency. By drawing attention to transposition progress during the weekly Cabinet meetings – 
on the basis of ‘naming and shaming’– the number of overdue directives was reduced from 13 to 3 in a 
short time.  
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 Concerning the coordination of transposition, it is worth mentioning that there are 
differences between the countries we studied in terms of the priority given to 
transposition. In Denmark each ministry is keenly aware of the fact that EC directives 
must be transposed in a timely fashion. None of the ministries is eager to attend the 
special Ministry of Justice committee that convenes when an infringement proceeding 
against Denmark has been initiated. Especially because Denmark has few overdue 
directives and hardly ever faces any infringement proceedings, the civil service and the 
government will quickly learn about a poorly performing ministry. Up to now, this has 
been an incentive to perform well and has been the main reason for the high priority 
given to transposing directives in Denmark. 
 In Spain, the transposition of directives is given extra political weight. As indicated 
above, there is a weekly progress meeting within the sub council of the Council of 
Ministers, the Committee of State-secretaries and Sub-secretaries. In the United 
Kingdom, political pressure plays a role as well. In the British system, this is reflected 
in the watchdog role of the Cabinet Office, which is closely associated with the Prime 
Minister. Backed by the Prime Minister’s political weight, the Cabinet Office may force 
line ministries to work out compromises in the case of deadlock. 
 The present situation in France is complex: if one has the Prime Minister’s support, 
the Junior Minister for European Affairs appears to be able to speed up the 
transposition process. Through the recently established réseau interministériel des 
correspondants de la transposition, progress is discussed with the various line ministries 
and the traditional coordination bodies for transposition (SGCI) and legislation (SGG) 
once every two or three months. A striking feature is the low frequency of the meetings 
of this coordination body and the limited political weight of the responsible Junior 
Minister. As soon as other issues dominate the Prime Minister’s agenda, transposition 
is given a lower priority. 
5.4  Compulsory Advisory Bodies 
The countries we studied show differences as far as compulsory advisory bodies are 
concerned. The situation in the United Kingdom is remarkable in that consultation of 
other ministries and interest groups is rather informal. Denmark has a ‘light’ 
compulsory advisory procedure at the stage of transposition concerning the legal 
quality and administrative burdens. Spain and France also provide for compulsory legal 
advice that takes the form of the review of proposals by the Council of State. In 
addition, interest groups are consulted at the transposition stage in these countries (for 
more details, see Section 5.7). The following overview summarizes the situation: 
- informal consultation: the United Kingdom provides for a system of extensive 
informal (which means not legally required) consultation of interested parties 
(governmental and non-governmental) both in relation to the EC proposal itself and 
proposed transposition measures; 
- limited compulsory consultation: in Denmark, the lead ministry may, if required, use 
the expertise of a specific department within the Ministry of Justice regarding 
European legislation and transposition. Legislative proposals are, however, assessed 
in terms of their legal merits (by the Ministry of Justice) and administrative burdens 
(on the basis of a panel discussion with the business sector organized by the 
Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs); 
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- extensive, compulsory consultation: Spain and France. In Spain, compulsory 
consultation during transposition consists (besides the compulsory consultation of 
interest groups), of a test of the legal quality of the proposal by the General 
Technical Secretariat of the Ministry, the compulsory advice on the proposal by the 
Council of State, and consultations with the autonomous areas in Spain, if the 
proposal concerns one of the competences shared by the central government and 
these areas. 
 During the preparation of a transposition instrument, France provides for the 
compulsory consultation of interest groups, as enshrined in the French legislative 
framework, and the compulsory advice by the Council of State. Considering the 
diversity characterizing the French ministries, it is impossible to give an indication 
of the advisory regulations applicable within the ministries. In any case, there is no 
uniformity. 
 In France the Council of State is involved in the preparation and transposition 
process several times. 
 At the beginning of the process of drafting the country’s position on a new 
Commission proposal, the Council must indicate how the proposal is to be 
characterized: is it a ‘legislative’ or ‘executive’ proposal or does it contain both 
‘legislative’ and ‘executive’ elements. This characterization is relevant to the follow-up 
process in France and the type of instruments that must be prepared. If the 
Commission proposal is substantially amended as a result of the negotiations, the 
Council may have to render a new opinion in the preparation process of the directive. 
At the transposition stage, the Council assesses whether the government has 
transposed the directive in accordance with the advice provided at an earlier stage and 
the legal quality is reviewed. As for the latter, the Council frequently indicates that the 
quality leaves much to be desired. This may result in a substantial revision of the 
original text. 
 The legal advice provided by the Council of State (Spain, France) or by the Ministry 
of Justice (Denmark) and the assessment in terms of administrative burdens 
(Denmark) are not considered obstacles to the transposition process. This advice 
appears to improve the quality of the proposals. In France, some observers point out, 
however, that the compulsory consultation of interest groups is one of the main factors 
responsible for delay. This point is discussed in more detail in Section 5.7. 
5.5  The Role of the National Parliament 
The national Parliament is involved in the process in several ways. In this context, three 
aspects can be distinguished: 
a. the degree to which the national Parliament is involved in drafting the national 
position on new directives, 
b. the moment at which the national Parliament is asked for its input, and 
c. the manner in which the national Parliament is informed about the contents of the 
proposals. 
 
Is the national Parliament involved in the process? 
In the countries we studied, the national Parliaments are not always informed by the 
government about the new proposals for European directives on the basis of 
explanatory memoranda. In the French constitutional system, Parliament is informed 
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about new Commission proposals only if these proposals contain ‘legislative’ elements. 
If the Council of State characterizes the proposal as ‘executive’, the proposal is not sent 
to Parliament, which in that case cannot take any position on it, and the government 
decides the implementation measure without further parliamentary interference once 
the directive has been adopted. The French system is unique in this respect. In the 
Netherlands, explanatory memoranda relating to Commission proposals are not always 
prepared. In Denmark, Spain and the United Kingdom, however, the national 
Parliament is informed about all new Commission proposals. 
 
When is the national Parliament asked for its input? 
As for the role played by the national Parliaments in the next stage of the process, a 
distinction should be drawn between countries that actively involve the national 
Parliament in the debate on new Commission proposals (Denmark), countries where 
some subjects expressly selected by Parliament are discussed (the United Kingdom) 
and countries where discussion on the merits of a proposed directive is held only at a 
later stage (Spain and France). 
 The differences between the United Kingdom, Spain and France are not that great. 
Like Spain and France, the national Parliament in the UK does not thoroughly address 
each Commission proposal. The European Scrutiny Committee, which determines 
within the framework of the ‘scrutiny reserve’ which Commission proposals are 
suitable for a discussion on the merits, acts as a strong filter. The Committee refers 
only a small minority of the Commission proposals to the House, as a result of which 
the British Parliament is often confronted with a directive only at the stage of the 
transposition measure. And even in that case, there is often no discussion on the 
proposal’s merits, because most directives are transposed through ministerial 
regulations that are subject to the parliamentary resolution procedure. 
 In Spain and France, there are occasional debates in the national Parliaments on 
Commission proposals and the position the government intends to take. These debates 
do not replace the substantive debates relating to national bills implementing these 
directives. In other words, the national Parliament in these countries has input at the 
transposition stage to the extent that statutory measures are required. 
 
How is the national Parliament informed? 
The national Parliaments receive an explanatory memorandum that includes the main 
information about new Commission proposals. In Denmark, these explanatory 
memoranda (grundnotat) are, with 13 compulsory sections, the most extensive; in 
France the explanatory memorandum (fiche d’ impact) has only 5 compulsory sections 
and is less detailed. The Spanish explanatory memorandum is more extensive than the 
French one, but to a significant extent, it deals with similar items. The annex to the 
British explanatory memorandum deals with the legal, financial, social and business 
impact of a directive. With 14 compulsory sections and a focus on the legal, policy, 
financial and administrative effects of the draft directive, the Dutch explanatory 
memorandum is similar to the Danish and British documents. 
 The information contained in the explanatory memorandum constitutes the basis 
for the discussion between government and Parliament. In this respect the countries 
we studied differ. In Denmark, the explanatory memorandum is the basis for the 
discussion, which results in the adoption of the government’s negotiation mandate. In 
Spain and the United Kingdom, as in the Netherlands, explanatory memoranda are 
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occasionally discussed in the national Parliament and these may result in 
recommendations. In France, too, a parliamentary discussion about new proposals is 
sometimes held, which may result in a recommendation. If the French Parliament 
indicates that it wants to make a recommendation, the government is forced to wait for 
this position before it starts negotiations in Brussels. The government determines 
whether and to what extent it considers Parliament’s recommendations. 
 In the United Kingdom and France attempts are made to amend and refine the 
explanatory memorandum during the negotiations and discussions. In France this is 
mainly inspired by the need to make a distinction between ‘legislative’ and ‘executive’ 
elements of the proposal, which are highly relevant to the transposition. As soon as a 
draft directive has been approved, the explanatory memorandum, accompanied by an 
implementation table prepared by the SGCI, constitutes the basis for the 
implementation plan. In the United Kingdom, transposition notes are now added to the 
proposals for transposition measures, as a result of which it is immediately clear 
whether the United Kingdom has not done more than strictly necessary. 
 At the transposition stage, information is given to the Parliament through the 
regular procedure for legislative proposals. 
5.6  The role of Lower-level Government Authorities  
Local government authorities play a role in the field of European directives only in 
Denmark, the United Kingdom and Spain. In France, these hardly play any role. 
 In Denmark, local authorities sometimes participate in the special committees that 
have been established within the various ministries relating to the rendition of advice 
on new Commission proposals. The lower authorities’ input may play a role, in 
addition to the input of interest groups, in defining the Danish negotiation position. 
 In the United Kingdom, the devolved governments of Wales, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland participate in the transposition process. With the new division of powers, they 
are autonomously empowered to transpose directives in specific areas. It is always the 
central Government, however, that takes the lead in the negotiation process and that 
bears final responsibility for transposition. The effects of the new division of powers are 
not yet completely clear and the current complaint is that some of the new autonomous 
areas do not work hard enough to reduce the transposition deficit. 
 In Spain the autonomous regions have a role to play when a directive concerns a 
competence shared between the central government and the regions. In Spain, there 
are 17 regions. The autonomous regions are consulted by the ministries during the 
preliminary stages concerning Commission proposals that are also subject to the 
competence of the autonomous regions. In the transposition process, attempts are 
made to coordinate the activities between the line ministry and the autonomous 
regions through special conferences. 
 In the transposition process, the autonomous regions must amend legislation to 
make sure it is in line with the legislation of the central government. The central 
government usually takes the initiative and introduces a “skeleton” Act that provides a 
framework within which the autonomous regions can decide their own statutory 
measures. If the central government is delayed and a region has introduced a legislative 
proposal in order to prevent delayed transposition (in that region), this may mean that 
the region must amend its legislation later because of the delayed central legislation. 
Occasionally some regions are late in completing their part of the transposition process, 
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in which case the entire transposition process takes place at the central level. In that 
case, the central government tries to encourage the regions concerned to transpose 
directives faster by offering them financial incentives. 
5.7  The role of Interest Groups 
In the countries we researched, the intensity of interest group involvement varies. The 
way in which a country has shaped the preparation and implementation of the 
directives affects the timing of transposition.  
 In Denmark interest groups are part of the broad-based EU committees that play an 
important role in the advisory process relating to the Danish position on a new 
proposal. In addition to civil servants from the various ministries, representatives of 
interest groups, municipalities and other organizations active in specific policy areas 
increasingly participate in this consultation process. There are now 34 committees and 
their field of activity overlaps with the policy areas of the DGs of the European 
Commission. In addition, the interest groups sometimes approach the European 
Affairs Committee of the national Parliament. This committee has a key role in 
determining the Danish position. Because of the interest groups’ active involvement 
during the preliminary stages, there is consultation at the transposition stage only if the 
directive adopted by the Council contains new elements or offers specific options to 
choose from. Additionally, interest groups – and the business sector in particular – 
contribute to the transposition process in the context of the administrative burden test. 
 The United Kingdom attaches great value to broad consultation. This takes place at 
the negotiation stage and in the preparation of transposition. The Code of Practice on 
Consultation encourages broad consultation in order to mobilizing support as well. In 
principle, written consultations must be held in connection with transposition 
measures, and these take 12 weeks. Recently, consultations have focused on the 
prevention of red tape, restricting administrative burdens and attention to impact on 
business. There is no legally required consultation. 
 In Spain, interest groups play a role in particular at the transposition stage. 
Depending on obligations arising from national legislation, interest groups are involved 
in the manner in which directives are transposed, depending on the policy area. This 
consultation takes place at the stage of preparation of the draft implementing 
regulations. This consultation is not considered an obstacle to a speedy transposition 
process as it can usually be completed within a reasonably short time span. 
Occasionally, this consultation may result in delays, however. It is important that the 
ministry take the initiative for consultation, so that the advisory procedure fits in well 
with the planning of the transposition process. 
 In France too, interest-group consultation is held at the transposition stage. As in 
Spain, this compulsory consultation is enshrined in national legislation. The problem 
of the French model is that these consultation structures are independent of the 
government, as a result of which the ministry is no longer in control of this advisory 
process. It is estimated that this advisory procedure delays the process by an average of 
three to six months (Philip, 2004). Delays may be much longer if the committee 
concerned meets only once a year and believes that it has insufficient time to complete 
the advisory process in one meeting. At the same time, various observers point out that 
this consultation is completely redundant because the proposal cannot be amended on 
many points since it follows the text of the directive. Consequently, this advisory 
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procedure is rather frustrating both for the ministries and the parties involved. Many 
feel that it would be better to move the consultation process to the preparatory stages. 
Even so, there are no signs that these countries have taken any steps toward this. 
5.8  Priority Rules 
In Section 2.1, the measure62 adopted in 2004 to give priority to legislative proposals 
aimed at transposing EC directives was discussed in the context of the Dutch efforts to 
speed up the transposition of EC directives. The country studies show that the 
Netherlands is not the only country to give priority to transposition regulations. Spain 
sometimes does so by using the possibility offered by the Constitution to designate 
legislative proposals as urgent, which means that these proposals go through the 
legislative process at an accelerated pace. An accelerated procedure applies to such 
cases, somewhat comparable to the procedure proposed by the Presidium of the Dutch 
House of Representatives 2004.63 
                                                 
62  Parliamentary Papers II 2004/05, 21 109, no. 144. 
63  Letter by the Presidium to the President of the House of Representatives of Parliament, dated 15 
September 2004, Parliamentary Papers II, 2003/04, 21109, no. 142.  
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6   Discussions in the Countries Studied 
 
Not all of the countries we studied regard the timely transposition of directives as an 
urgent problem, which means that there is hardly any political or public debate on this 
issue. In Denmark and Spain, this is undoubtedly due to the favorable long-term 
transposition record, but in other countries it is more difficult to identify why the 
transposition deficit attracts hardly any attention. 
 In Denmark the timely transposition of directives is not so much the focus of 
attention; rather, as European cooperation as such attracts the most attention. The 
Danes are very focused on European influence on Denmark, demonstrated by the 
rejection of the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and the discussion about and rejection of the 
euro (2000). This is why it is actually surprising that the Danes transpose directives so 
loyally and in a timely fashion. Some observers argue that the Danes’ intensive 
involvement in the passage of Community legislation saves time during the 
transposition process.  
 Spain’s reputation in terms of timely transposition is good. Perhaps because Spain 
wants to maintain this reputation, various internal discussions are now conducted that 
should contribute to an acceleration and a simplification of the transposition of EC 
directives. For example, the Secretariat of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs is 
working on a proposal for a uniform transposition procedure in the various ministries. 
It is unclear whether this proposal will gain sufficient support. In addition, forms of 
authorization that allow more use of delegated legislation in the transposition of 
technical directives are also considered. One suggestion is to increase the potestad 
reglementaria64, through which the government may independently transpose directives 
that no longer allow any further substantive choices.  
 In France, as in the Netherlands, there are worries about the increasing 
transposition deficit. As mentioned in Section 3.1, the deficit is 3.2% for the internal 
market directives. This is remarkable, as framework acts (DDAC) have been adopted 
regularly, which allow the government to implement many directives through 
implementing legislation at an accelerated pace.65 Philip (2004), a member of the 
French Assemblée Nationale, has doubts about the effectiveness of these framework acts. 
He thinks that the deficit is not caused by the implementation instrument that is 
chosen, but by delays due to late government initiatives (submitting legislative 
proposals too late, or adopting ordinances too late), by too little in-depth analyses of the 
consequences of a directive proposal during the negotiation stage and legal 
perfectionism in the transposition process. The report, which contains an extensive 
comparative law study into the implementation practices in other Member States, 
recommends another approach, also based on the recommended best practices defined 
by the European Commission (2004a). The French government will have to give 
                                                 
64  This power is vested in the government under Section 23 of the organic law Ley 50/1997 de 27 
noviembre, del Gobierno.  
65 Loi n° 2001-1 du 3 janvier 2001 portant habilitation du Gouvernement à transposer, par ordonnances, 
des directives communautaires et à mettre en oeuvre certaines dispositions du droit communautaire, 
JORF 4 
January 2001. In this framework act, Parliament delegates the power to transpose 46 directives to the 
government. More recently, the following act was enacted: Loi n° 2004-237 du 18 mars 2004 portant 
habilitation du Gouvernement à transposer, par ordonnance, des directives communautaires et à mettre 
en œuvre certaines dispositions du droit communautaire, JORF 19 March 2004. This act delegates the 
power to transpose 20 directives. 
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priority to transposition of EC directives through various channels. This caused the 
French government to decide to speed up implementation. The French government 
launched an action plan, partly included in a circular of 27 September 2004, which 
requires that in future, all government members will be responsible for their own 
transposition deficit. Furthermore, a new interdepartmental committee has been 
established to monitor the progress of implementation, applying improved test 
methods concerning the draft implementation legislation and assessing proposals for 
EC legislation in terms of their legal and socio- economic consequences for France.66 
The committee is also responsible for the interdepartmental coordination relating to 
the French negotiation position. There are also efforts to improve the supply of 
information to Parliament, whilst the possibilities of simplifying the parliamentary 
debate procedure for implementation legislation are considered. Finally, the 
government accepts the idea of using framework legislation as a regular instrument for 
the implementation of technical directives. Within Parliament, there is some 
opposition to the frequent use of this instrument.  
 Over the past few years, Germany has had a poor transposition record as well, but 
the political debate has hardly addressed the consequences of this. The mixed 
Kommission von Bundestag und Bundesrat zur Modernisierung der bundesstaatlichen 
Ordnung, which had to provide advice on possibilities for renewing the federal structure 
of Europe, was also asked – because of the poor performance record – to consider 
structures (procedures or instruments) that could help to speed up the transposition of 
EC directives. As it happens, transposition is impeded as a result of the Länder and the 
Federation each having their own distinct responsibilities (due to the constitutional 
division of powers). Still, the German Federal Government is the contact point for 
Brussels. The discussions within the mixed Committee are, however, deadlocked, and 
the Committee was dissolved in December 2004. A new Committee is now being 
considered. 
 In the United Kingdom, which has had a reasonable to good transposition record 
over the years, public debate is not focused on transposition itself but on legislative 
policy. The heart of the modern British Better Regulation policy comprises measures 
aimed at protecting citizens and businesses from unnecessary administrative and 
bureaucratic burdens and legislative effects. This influences the discussion concerning 
timely and complete transposition. For this reason, the United Kingdom considers the 
transposition record with a critical eye and asks whether it does not transpose directives 
all too loyally and in too timely a fashion, causing relative harm to the British business 
community in the process. A second point of discussion concerns the question of how 
directives are to be transposed. Should a directive be properly incorporated into in the 
British system, or can and should directives be transposed in a minimalist and 
straightforward manner? The current debate favors the latter, as this also prevents the 
transposition measure from being unnecessarily burdened with additional national 
policies, which may also result in extra burdens for citizens and businesses.  
 The latest developments in the Italian debate are unclear, since Italy has not been 
included in the in-depth country studies. For the debate on the prevention and 
                                                 
66  Circulaire du 27 septembre à la procédure de transposition en droit interne des directives et décisions-
cadres négociées dans le cadre des institutions européennes, J.O. no. 230 (2 octobre 2004): 16920. See 
also Communication au Conseil des ministres du 20 decembre sur l’application des lois et la 
transposition des directives et des decisions-cadres communautaires. For a further discussion, reference 
is made to the chapter on France.  
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reduction of the transposition deficit in the Netherlands, we refer, for the sake of 
brevity, to Section 2.1 of Chapter 2. 
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7   Decisive Factors in the Transposition Process 
7.1  Introduction 
The analysis in the preceding chapters shows differences and similarities in the 
manner in which the countries studied organize the preparatory work for new 
Commission proposals and the transposition of European directives. Attention was also 
focused on the available legal transposition instruments and the techniques used. At 
the same time, there are major differences concerning the extent to which these 
countries transpose directives: 
- Spain and Denmark have been at the top of the European Commission’s 
scoreboards for quite some time; 
- the United Kingdom and the Netherlands are ranked in the middle;  
- France is often at the bottom of the list.  
What does this mean for the factors that allow or prevent timely transposition? To what 
extent are special techniques important for speedy transposition? To what extent does 
the organization of the policy process play a role? Before evaluating the factors that 
could be decisive in this respect, we will first compare the various countries in terms of 
their performance record, available instruments and the organization of the 
transposition process. Germany and Italy will not be addressed because we have not 
carried out an extensive study of these countries – these country studies are more 
concise and based only on a literature review.  
 The structure of this chapter is as follows. In Section 7.2, we first present an 
overview of important factors for each country on the basis of our country studies in 
Part II of the study. In Section 7.3, the perspective is shifted from a country-based 
analysis to a comparative analysis of the countries studied. This analysis reveals 
decisive factors affecting the transposition process. 
7.2  Differences in Performance Record, Instruments and Organization between 
the Countries 
Denmark 
Denmark does not have any special legal techniques. Transposition usually does not 
pose any problems because most coordination and consultation procedures have been 
moved to the preparation phase. Even though attempts are made to transpose directives 
as much as possible on the basis of ministerial regulations, the existing legislation 
must include a delegation provision. If there is no such provision, a bill is submitted to 
Parliament.. As far as the introduction of a ministerial regulation is concerned, the 
following situation is typical of the Danish political system with minority governments: 
if the Minister is under the impression that the ministerial regulation is potentially 
controversial or may include elements some Members of Parliament may disagree 
with, the regulation is discussed with Parliament in advance. This happens even if the 
regulation does not have to be formally approved by Parliament. 
 The fact that the Danish political debate on directives has been moved to the stage at 
which the position on the Commission proposal is drafted is more important than 
which instruments are used. At this stage, there is extensive consultation involving the 
relevant ministries, interest groups and, in a number of cases, municipalities. This 
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time shift in the political debate means that there is no longer any need for extensive 
discussions concerning transposition between politicians and civil servants. This is an 
important factor contributing to the success of the Danish model. In addition, there are 
other factors contributing to Denmark’s success, including the clear division of 
responsibilities concerning directives, the deployment of broadly based project teams, 
the continued use of these teams from the negotiation stage to the implementation 
stage, the businesslike and flexible working procedures within the various ministries 
and a certain ‘pride’ in the proper and speedy transposition of directives, combined 
with ‘naming and shaming’ of the ministries responsible for the late or incorrect 
transposition of directives. 
 
Spain 
Unlike Denmark, Spain has a number of special legal instruments that can be sued for 
transposition. First, there is the decreto-ley, an instrument that may be used only in very 
urgent or emergency situations. Sometimes, when Spain faces an infringement 
proceeding, this instrument is used as an escape. Experts believe that this use is 
questionable, if not unconstitutional, however. In short, the decreto-ley does not play a 
very significant role in the transposition of European directives. Besides, this is not an 
instrument specially developed for the purpose of transposing EC directives. 
 A second instrument is the real decreto legislativo, which is based on a separate 
authorization law that must first be approved by Parliament. This Act defines which 
directives the government may transpose by means of the decreto legislativo within a 
predefined period. As soon as the measures have been accepted, the authorization 
expires. Since this instrument requires a separate Act, the decision-making procedure 
is not much faster than that of ordinary Acts. These authorization laws are not 
instruments used only for the purpose of transposing directives either: they are regular 
constitutional instruments which are also used for transposing directives. 
 In Spain the majority of European directives are transposed through subordinate 
legislation (government decrees and ministerial orders). This means that Spain’s 
speedy transposition of directives is not related to the use of special instruments. The 
success of the Spanish model could be the result of political will; as a relatively new 
Member State, Spain takes membership obligations seriously, including implement-
ation. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that, as a net recipient, Spain has a clear and 
direct financial interest in the European Union. In addition, the Spanish model is 
characterized by quite accurate monitoring and weekly discussions about the progress 
of the transposition of directives at the highest civil service level, combined with 
political support for fast and, above all, smooth procedures. In this way there is a clear 
incentive to transpose directives in a timely fashion. Finally, Spain approaches the 
transposition issue in a fairly pragmatic way. 
 
The United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom’s transposition performance record is reasonable and stable. One 
of the most important reasons for the current performance record is undoubtedly the 
operation of the European Communities Act of 1972, which allows the UK Government 
to transpose directives through a system of general authorization by ministerial 
regulations. This system has a number of safeguards designed to ensure equilibrium 
and control. The Act itself is designed to guarantee that Parliament is informed about 
ministerial transposition measures and any related drafts through the negative and 
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affirmative resolution procedure. In addition, there are attempts to compensate for the 
loss of parliamentary control and input relating to the transposition by allowing 
Parliament to make a formal contribution to the negotiations (‘scrutiny reserve’) and 
broad consultation both relating to the Commission proposal for a directive and 
relating to the intended British transposition measure. 
 Another speed-enhancing factor is the role of the Cabinet Office as a watchdog in 
the negotiation and transposition process. The Cabinet Office (CO) is responsible for 
the progress of the negotiations and the transposition. Operating close to the British 
Prime Minister, it is an authoritative “spider in the web”. The Cabinet Office closely 
monitors the progress of the negotiations and maintains close contacts with the 
Permanent Representation. The Cabinet Office deals with important dossiers itself. In 
addition, it coordinates and acts as an intermediary between the Government and 
Parliament and between the various ministries. Every week, the head of the European 
Desk of the Cabinet Office meets the Permanent Representation (Grant Darroch 
meeting) in order to discuss subjects that require attention. Depending on the subjects 
to be raised, civil servants from the line ministries are invited for these talks. Where 
progress is at issue, the Cabinet Office may take active measures at the lead ministry. If 
necessary, the Cabinet Office and the Permanent Representation may take away 
responsibilities for an issue. This threat means that ministries are sufficiently 
encouraged to coordinate their efforts properly with the other ministries. 
 An issue that dominates the transposition debate in the United Kingdom at this 
juncture is that of the Better Regulation policy. At present, the British are quite focused 
on business and citizen-friendly legislation aimed at minimizing regulatory burdens on 
the British business sector. This results in a jumble of measures, such as sophisticated 
impact studies of directive proposals and intended transposition measures, written 
consultations of interested parties, both in the context of the Commission proposal and 
the transposition measure, and common commencement dates designed to avoid 
burdening business with new statutory rules. 
 A remarkable feature of the present transposition strategy is the Realpolitik 
approach. In the United Kingdom, there is a debate within specific departments at this 
juncture on the question of whether the British transposition record might actually be 
too good, and whether the United Kingdom’s transposition performance might be too 
Euro friendly. Some believe that from an economic cost and benefit perspective, it is 
not always a good idea to implement in a timely fashion. 
 
France 
France has various special legal instruments for speeding up the transposition of 
directives, such as the introduction of an authorization law (loi d’habilitation) and the 
possibility of a package law (DDAC). The advantage of an authorization law is that the 
government may take measures (ordonnances) in fields where it is usually necessary to 
adopt several Acts. The instrument of a package law prevents the government from 
having to submit several bills to Parliament. The discussion of this group of bills would 
be more time-consuming than the introduction of a single Act due to the busy 
parliamentary agenda and the fact that there has to be a separate parliamentary debate 
for each bill in each Chamber (and, if there are differences of opinion, an attempt to 
reach a compromise). 
 In addition, the French constitutional system distinguishes between ‘legislative’ and 
‘executive’ subjects, which means that some directives may be transposed by the 
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government autonomously and without any parliamentary involvement as soon as 
these are classified as ‘executive’. This constitutional delegation of specific subjects to 
the government is unique. This could make a contribution to the speed of 
transposition, because a number of directives can be transposed immediately after 
having been approved at the European level. 
 It is remarkable that despite these technical opportunities, France’s transposition 
record is poor. Some observers report that even the introduction of ministerial 
regulations is sometimes more time-consuming, contrary to expectations, than the 
introduction of amendments to an Act. Statistical data supporting this claim are not 
available, which means that it is not clear whether this is really true. In any case, France 
is a country where the available legal instruments do not result in faster transposition. 
 This means that the factors affecting the French performance record are related 
mainly to the national policy process, including the organization of the transposition 
process. Factors preventing speedy transposition include the relative autonomy of the 
French line ministries, a lack of clarity about which of the ministries is responsible for 
the transposition of directives, the transfer of dossiers when the negotiations in 
Brussels have been finished, extensive compulsory consultation involving interest 
groups, the different political priorities within the ministries, the fact that the 
government does not always give priority to transposition, the involvement of various 
coordination bodies in the transposition process (even though this may improve with 
the introduction of a structure in the autumn of 2004) and the extent to which 
politicians are interested in the transposition issue, which changes over time. 
7.3  Analysis 
Delays in the transposition of directives are caused by a range of different, inter-related 
factors. In Section 1.1, we pointed out that the literature mentions many potential 
causes underlying the transposition deficit. 
 This study demonstrates that delays in transposition are never caused by a single 
factor but always by several factors combined. The country studies show different 
results in this respect. For example, the monitoring and coordination of the 
transposition process by the ministries themselves is regarded as a success factor in 
Denmark, whereas in another country (Spain), the central coordination between the 
various ministries is pinpointed as a relevant factor. Coordination is important, but 
there can be different arrangements for coordination. Furthermore, like France, Spain 
has rather autonomous ministries able to determine their own working methods. In 
Spain this does not result in long delays, but in France it does, which may also be 
caused by unclear political priorities and overlapping procedures in the coordination 
structure. Accordingly, the same factors, in combination with other factors, may 
produce different results. The same applies to the procedures, instruments and 
techniques used by countries to prevent a deficit, for where the latter procedures are 
concerned, too, it is a combination of factors that is decisive for the question of whether 
or not these procedures can speed up the transposition process. 
 Even if it is difficult to answer the question which obstacles hamper or delay the 
transposition of EC directives, a comparative analysis reveals a number of factors that 
could be relevant in this context: 
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1. special instruments: the availability of special legal instruments, such as package laws 
and the delegation of the transposition to the government, may be helpful in 
specific cases, but this is not decisive for a country’s general performance in terms 
of timely transposition. France, which has a variety of special instruments at its 
disposal, performs significantly worse than Denmark, which does not use any 
special instruments. Spain provides a second example. Spain has special 
instruments, but it hardly ever uses these instruments for transposing directives. 
Italy is particularly instructive because it has a very rich repertoire of general 
authorization and delegation mechanisms under the Pergola system, but its 
performance record has been poor for many years. As far as a country’s general 
transposition record is concerned, the availability of special legal instruments is not 
a sufficient and perhaps not a necessary condition for achieving timeliness. The 
European Communities Act 1972 may be an exception in this context, because the 
reasonable British transposition record is probably attributable to a great extent to 
the ample possibilities for transposing directives through statutory instruments. In 
this context, the question arises, however, why in view of the broad scope of the 
authorization system of the European Communities Act 1972, the United Kingdom 
does not achieve a better transposition record than countries that do not have this 
instrument. Moreover, even within the United Kingdom, it is impossible to 
determine to what extent the system of the European Communities Act 1972 
contributes to a better or worse UK transposition record, because the Act has been 
in force since the date of the United Kingdom’s accession to the Union. 
 
2. subordinate legislation: European directives are usually transposed at the lowest 
possible level. In the countries studied, there is a clear tendency to do so for the sake 
of speed. Both the countries using package and omnibus laws and/or general – i.e. 
without there being the need for Acts of Parliament – authorizations and the 
countries using specific delegation provisions in statutory regulations have been 
capable of transposing between 60 and 80 percent of the directives through 
delegated legislation. In nearly all countries studied, saving time is mentioned as an 
advantage of transposition through subordinate legislation, whilst the lack of 
parliamentary involvement and, consequently, weaker democratic legitimacy are 
mentioned as disadvantages. 
 
3. no extras: in several of the countries we studied, including the Netherlands and the 
UK, it is assumed that extra national measures and the precise incorporation of 
directives into national legislation, accompanied by adjustments of the directive 
terminology, delay the transposition process. For this reason, various countries 
prefer straightforward transposition. 
 
4. an early start: anticipation of the transposition phase during the negotiations saves 
time in the transposition process. 
 
5. administrative responsibility: unequivocal and transparent administrative 
responsibility for the preparation and transposition of directives is an important 
factor affecting timeliness. This unequivocal and transparent responsibility is 
expressed, for example, in: 
 - working with one ministry that is responsible for the directive procedure;  
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 - a transparent structure within the ministry geared to the persons in effective 
control of the preparation and transposition (bottom-up); 
 - frequent monitoring of the progress of the activities at departmental and/or 
inter- departmental level. 
These elements emerge after experiences in Denmark and Spain. Experiences in 
France are indicative of the relevancy of these elements, even though French 
practice is often inconsistent with the points mentioned. In this context, reference 
can also be made to a recent recommendation by the European Commission 
(2004a). In addition, it is important that there should be decentralized, businesslike 
collaboration between the ministries. This collaboration is important in order to 
prevent differences and conflicts. 
 
6. project teams: the deployment of the same national project teams during the drafting 
of the national position and the transposition seems to have a positive effect on the 
speed of transposition. In several countries multidisciplinary project teams are used 
to safeguard consistency of treatment in this way (including policy-specific and legal 
expertise). This factor is demonstrated by the positive experiences of the use of 
multidisciplinary teams in Denmark, in contrast to the negative experiences of the 
absence of a good and especially legal support structure in France. However, the 
deployment of these teams does not mean that all team members participate in the 
negotiations. This task may be entrusted to one of the team members or someone 
from the Permanent Representation. The team-based approach also has the 
advantage that draft measures can be assessed in terms of their possibilities for 
transposition into the national legal system at an early stage. 
 
7. frequent progress monitoring: timeliness is affected positively by the accurate and 
frequent monitoring of the progress of the transposition of directives at a high 
departmental and interdepartmental level. This factor is based on positive 
experiences in Spain, where an interdepartmental committee discusses progress on 
a weekly basis. In the United Kingdom, the Cabinet Office keeps a close watch on 
the progress of the transposition by the various line ministries. By contrast, France 
has two coordination bodies (SGCI and SGG), which recently concentrated their 
coordination efforts in a new committee – the réseau interministériel des 
correspondants the la transposition. In Denmark there is little interdepartmental 
coordination, but the relevant ministry is called for the Special Legal Committee of 
the Ministry of Justice in the case of an imminent infringement proceeding. This 
threat is sufficient to force the line ministries to cooperate in Denmark. 
 
8. political priority: if the government gives priority to transposition, this accelerates the 
process. Transposition has priority both in Denmark and in Spain. It is a task that is 
taken seriously by high-level civil servants and politicians alike. In France, 
transposition is often overshadowed by other, national priorities: 
 - within ministries, no special attention is paid to transposition; 
 - ministers often prefer their ‘own’ priorities and the corresponding legislative 
procedures that delay the transposition of directives; 
 - within SGCI and SGG, which are responsible for monitoring the transposition 
process, there are also different priorities; and 
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 - within the French government and in particular the Prime Minister’s Office – 
the transposition issue is currently receiving attention, but this may change over 
time, as it has in the past. 
The importance of political priority is also shown by the package operations that 
have taken place in various countries, often in anticipation of the EU Presidency (for 
example, Ireland and, recently, in the Netherlands). This point is closely related to 
the preceding point related to the effectiveness of progress monitoring: no matter 
which system is used, there can be no effective progress monitoring without 
political support. The latter can be arranged in various ways: from appointing a 
politician as a chairperson of a coordination committee dealing with transposition, 
to creating close and regular contacts with the Prime Minister who unconditionally 
supports speedy transposition. 
 
9. parliamentary involvement: involving the national Parliament at the negotiation stage 
may speed up the transposition process. In most of the countries we studied, the 
negotiation stage and the transposition stage of a directive are communicative 
processes. The interested parties are of the opinion that solid preparation speeds up 
the transposition process, certainly if there is intense parliamentary involvement. 
The success of the Danish model is the clearest example of this. Extensive 
consultation of the national Parliament means that Parliament’s view is taken into 
account in the negotiations in Brussels, so there is less need for the extensive 
treatment of ‘implementing’ legislation. This accelerates the transposition process. 
 
10. broad consultation: the broad and early consultation of interest groups, including the 
business sector and possibly local government authorities, improves the process of 
drafting the national position and may mobilize support for a directive and the 
transposition measure. This may subsequently have a positive effect on the 
execution of new policies. The examples of Denmark and the United Kingdom show 
that broad consultation does not necessarily cause any delay and has advantages in 
the context of the drafting of the national position on a directive. In addition, it 
improves the quality of the transposition measure in terms of feasibility and may 
prevent excessive burdens on citizens, institutions and businesses. It is, however, 
important to move this consultation procedure, if possible, to the drafting of the 
national position phase. Furthermore, in some countries consultation is regarded as 
an important supplement in order to compensate for the lack of parliamentary 
control and the loss of democratic legitimacy as a result of the transposition of 
directives through subordinate legislation that does have the rank of an Act of 
Parliament. 
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8   Conclusions and Recommendations  
 
The central question of this research project is: what kinds of implementation 
techniques and systems are used in Germany, Denmark, France, Italy, the United 
Kingdom and Spain to transpose EC directives into the national legal order in a timely, 
precise and legally correct way. In order to answer this question, this study surveyed the 
available legal instruments and techniques and analyzed the national policy process 
relating to directives. Specific aspects of the policy process may also influence the 
timely and precise transposition of directives. 
8.1  Conclusions  
Based on the experiences in the countries we studied, we reach the following 
conclusions. 
 
1. The introduction of special legal instruments and techniques does not by itself explain 
sustained improvements in the punctuality of transposition. First, we should note that 
there is no connection between the introduction of new transposition instruments 
ranked lower than Acts of Parliament and the long-term improvement of the 
transposition performance record. In most of the countries we studied, with the 
exception of the United Kingdom, the introduction of authorization instruments 
and delegation techniques has a limited and temporarily positive effect. A special set 
of instruments may be helpful in a number of specific cases, but is not decisive for a 
country’s general performance in terms of timely transposition. In other words, it is 
not a sufficient condition for the timely transposition of European directives on a 
long-term basis. 
 
2. The national legislative system is usually the basis for transposition. For the most part, 
the countries analyzed here use instruments within the regular constitutional 
system as much as possible. The regular national legislative process sets the limits 
for the transposition of EC directives. None of the countries – not even the United 
Kingdom – have amended the Constitution or the constitutional system in order to 
speed up the transposition of EC directives. Since transposition instruments depend 
on constitutional provisions, it is difficult to compare the transposition strategies 
and the performance records of the countries analyzed in this report because of 
their diversity. Even so, we have not found transposition instruments in any of the 
countries we studied that are used solely for transposing directives. 
 
3. There is no single preferred technique for transposing directives. On the issue of the 
techniques used for transposition, our findings suggest a varied picture. In some 
countries, the national system of pre-existing laws defines how directives are 
transposed, whereas in other countries this is not the case. In the former case, there 
is a preference for the best possible incorporation of the directive into the national 
legislative system. Delays are accepted as the price to be paid for the consistency and 
integrity of the national system. Other countries choose to stay as close as possible 
to the text and content of the directive, even if it is inconsistent with the national 
system. In this context, these countries, including the Netherlands and the United 
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Kingdom, often prefer ‘straightforward implementation’, i.e. avoiding including 
extra national policies when transposing directives.  
 
4. Delays are the result of various factors. Timely and precise transposition is the result of 
various constitutional/legal, political and operational factors.67 Any of these factors 
may have a decisive impact on transposition outcomes and as such each one is a 
prerequisite for timely and precise transposition. At the same time, the study shows 
that none of these factors on its own is sufficient to ensure timely and precise 
transposition. 
 
5. Legal factors. Even though the availability of a special set of legal instruments as such 
does not appear to have a long-term effect on the timeliness of transposition, other 
legal factors are relevant in this respect. Our findings suggest that the following 
elements are important: 
- transposing the directives at the lowest possible level; 
- preventing the inclusion of national extras; and 
- anticipating complications in the transposition process by starting to prepare for 
transposition during the final stages of the negotiations. 
In addition, some countries use common start dates aimed at limiting the 
administrative burdens on businesses and institutions. 
 
6. Operational factors. The importance of these factors was recently noted by the 
European Commission (2004a). In this study, three elements are found to be 
particularly relevant.  
- division of responsibilities: unequivocal and clear-cut lines of administrative 
responsibilities relating to the preparation and transposition of directives;  
- project teams: it is important to work with the same multidisciplinary project 
teams (including, in any case, policy-specific and legal disciplines) during the 
preparation and transposition stages. We do not argue that these teams should 
conduct the actual negotiations in Brussels. This can be done by a representative, 
seconded to the Permanent Representation or otherwise. We believe that the 
main point is that the drafting of the Dutch position and the transposition of 
directives be prepared from different angles within the line ministries. This 
prevents problems and delays during the later stages of the policy process; 
- monitoring of progress: accurate and frequent monitoring of the progress of the 
transposition of directives at a high administrative level. This requires, first, an 
effective administrative system that can monitor the progress of the 
transposition process. Without information about progress, it is impossible to 
pursue a policy concerning this progress. In this context, information is a 
necessary condition for monitoring timeliness. Second, it is necessary to pursue 
a policy concerning transposition so that it is clear what can be expected in terms 
of the treatment of the various EC directives.  
 
7. Political factors. Political factors are important in terms of prioritizing transposition 
and ensuring effective monitoring of progress. In most of the countries we studied, 
                                                 
67  For this distinction, see Kiser and Ostrom (1982).  
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the transposition of directives is primarily a task of the government. This is related 
to the choice of transposing directives at the lowest possible level, i.e. through 
government decrees or ministerial regulations. A limited proportion of the 
directives are transposed by Acts of Parliament, which is a procedure that involves 
the national Parliaments. The following political factors influence the speed of 
transposition: 
- transposition should have political priority: The importance of this factor is clear 
when there are package operations based on political priorities, often in 
anticipation of the EU Presidency. This applies, for example, to the efforts made 
by the Netherlands before the Presidency in the autumn of 2004, and which has 
had considerable success. Similar actions have taken place in Ireland, and at this 
juncture there is a catch-up maneuver occurring in France. Without political 
support, the monitoring of any kind of progress is less effective. 
- active involvement of the national Parliament: by activating the national Parliament 
in the negotiation stage, less time needs to be spent on discussions during the 
transposition stage. At this juncture, there is active involvement in defining the 
national position during the negotiation stage only in Denmark. The role of the 
other national Parliaments in the negotiations on Commission proposals is of 
only minor practical significance, which sometimes results in lengthy debates 
and, consequently, delays in the transposition phase. 
8.2  Recommendations for the Netherlands 
On the basis of the findings of this research project, we make the following 
recommendations for the situation in the Netherlands, taking into account the recent 
amendments to transposition policies which are designed to improve Dutch 
performance: 
 
1. Involve the Dutch Parliament more by introducing a scrutiny reserve 
More systematic parliamentary involvement during the drafting of the Dutch position 
is extremely important for the timely transposition of directives. This will speed up the 
process of transposition particularly concerning subjects that require an Act of 
Parliament during the transposition phase (and to a lesser extent for subjects requiring 
a general administrative order subject to a resolution procedure).68 In a more general 
sense, the active involvement of the national Parliament has advantages in terms of the 
better utilization of the national legislative system in transposing directives (the 
different use of existing possibilities within the existing constitutional framework) and 
democratic legitimacy. 
 We propose the introduction of a scrutiny reserve – like the one in the United 
Kingdom – to ensure a more active role for the Parliament.69 To achieve a scrutiny 
reserve (which basically means that the Government cannot negotiate the terms of a 
European legislative proposal before Parliament has discussed it) the two Houses of 
                                                 
68  In accordance with Article 1:7 of the General Administrative Law Act, resolution procedures in the 
context of implementing administrative orders are applicable only if conditional delegation has been 
provided for, and this is only the case in a minority of the resolution cases. 
69  Denmark also uses a reserve of this kind since all proposals must be discussed by the national 
Parliament. In France, a reserve is made when Parliament has indicated that it wants to draw up a 
motion.  
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Parliament could establish a selection committee responsible for reviewing, like the 
scrutiny committee of the British Parliament, which proposals should and should not 
be submitted to the Houses for discussion. This ensures that important dossiers that 
Parliament does not take a keen interest in for whatever reason, are still discussed. 
Selection will also substantially reduce the permanent committee’s workload relating to 
proposals, which should result in more time for a discussion based on the merits of a 
proposal. If the selection committee refers a proposal to a permanent committee for a 
discussion on the merits of a proposal, the latter may ask the Government after this 
discussion to focus on specific points to be included in the negotiations. The reserve 
means that the Government is required to wait until after the parliamentary discussion 
before presenting its own position on behalf of the Netherlands in the Council 
negotiations. As for the question of which committee should act as ‘gatekeeper’, the 
most obvious candidates would be the existing European Affairs committees of both 
Houses. An alternative is to entrust this task in one form or another to the recently 
established Joint Committee on the Application of Subsidiarity, which is currently – by 
way of an experiment currently under way – responsible for administering the 
subsidiarity and proportionality tests under the terms of the protocols to the – yet-to-be-
ratified– European Constitution. 
 If the Dutch Parliament is to seize the opportunity of being more closely involved in 
the negotiations about the transposition of directives, it is also extremely important that 
the MPs enhance their knowledge about the European agenda and the Dutch 
contribution to the European legislative chain. 
 
2. Pursue an active, strategic policy relating to the transposition of EC directives 
In the Netherlands, the ICER (Interdepartementale Commissie Europees Recht) is 
responsible for monitoring the progress of the transposition of directives. This is an 
interdepartmental commission chaired by representatives of the Ministries of Justice 
and the Interior, and it is charged with monitoring the quality of the transposition 
measures (inter alia). Despite the work performed by the committee, the ICER (-I)70 is 
insufficiently equipped at this juncture for monitoring the progress of transposition in 
the various ministries. The committee is unable to call the line ministries to account 
concerning progress issues and to make arrangements about the manner in which the 
transposition deficit is to be resolved. 
 For this reason, it seems natural to move progress monitoring to a high 
administrative level, perhaps the level of one of the sub councils of the Council of 
Ministers, which could then be specifically entrusted with the central responsibility for 
monitoring progress. At this level, it is possible to consult with representatives from the 
relevant ministries about progress issues and to make arrangements about the date at 
which specified directives are to be transposed. The present Coordination Committee 
(CoCo) is not yet equipped for this task. 
 In addition to this structure, we recommend developing a strategic policy relating to 
the transposition of directives. This policy could define the desired rate of transposition, 
with due regard for the interests of the relevant sector, within the limits set by the 
European Commission. 
 
                                                 
70  ICER (-I) is the working group of the ICER entrusted with implementation. 
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3. Transpose directives at the lowest possible level and use the existing legislative system and 
instruments to the fullest extent possible 
We recommend utilizing the possibilities offered by the existing legislative system – 
including the regular instruments and delegation options – in a more effective manner 
and to encourage the transposition of EC directives at the lowest possible regulatory 
level. It has not been established that new generic transposition instruments or 
procedures provide a significant and long-term advantage in terms of the speed of 
transposition, certainly not if we consider the latent potential of the present instrum-
ents and delegation possibilities. In addition, far-reaching authorization constructions 
in transposition instruments occasionally have certain constitutional disadvantages. 
Furthermore, if the existing legislative system is used in a more effective manner, it is 
easier to do justice to the individual character of the directives to be transposed in a 
specific policy area. 
 
4. Work on a broadly supported, joint Dutch influence on European dossiers 
With the enlargement of the European Union, the influence exerted by the Nether-
lands, as one of the founding members of the Union, will decline both in absolute and 
in relative terms. To date, the Netherlands seems to have assumed the attitude that 
whatever is good for Europe is also good for the Netherlands. This position will 
probably not be tenable in the future. This means that the Netherlands has to change 
the manner in which it operates in Brussels. This could include strengthening the role 
of the national Parliament during the negotiation phase, developing closer ties with 
members of the European Parliament and engaging in broad consultation involving 
interest groups at the negotiation stage.  
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9  Denmark 
9.1  General overview of the constitutional and political system 
9.1.1 Constitutional characteristics 
Denmark is a constitutional monarchy with its first constitution dating from 1849 and 
several subsequent revisions, most recently from 1953. Legislative powers are formally 
divided between the Parliament and the Queen (article 3 of the Danish constitution).  
 The parliament, the Folketing, consists of one chamber. It has 179 members, 
directly elected for a mandate of 4 years. Seats are distributed using a mixed district 
based and proportional system (Thomsen and Pennings, 2002).  
9.1.2 Political characteristics  
The Danish government is formed in coalition between parties in the Folketing. The 
future Prime Minister is responsible for forming a coalition. Minority cabinets are 
frequently formed. Remarkably, no single party has had a parliamentary majority since 
1909 (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs at www.denmark.dk, consulted at 19 January 
2005). Ministers are chosen from the ranks of parliament and remain members during 
their executive term of office. They can also be occasionally recruited outside the 
parliament. 
9.1.3 Political administrative characteristics  
The Danish executive has 18 ministries. There are also a number of government 
agencies, which play a central role in EU policy making. They operate under the 
responsibility of the Minister, but enjoy a great degree of discretion (Steenbeek and 
Gilhuis, 2003: 86).Importantly, the bulk of administrative staff is in the agencies and 
ministries are small, compared to the Netherlands (Mandrup Thomsen and Pennings, 
2002: 17).  
 Another important characteristic of the Danish political-administrative system is the 
high level of autonomy of local and regional authorities, seen by the Danes themselves 
as some of the most extensive in the world. The local authorities’ right to manage their 
own affairs is enshrined in the constitution of 1849. There are 14 counties and 275 
municipalities. A reform of the municipal system is due to take place after the 
parliamentary elections due on 8 February 2005 (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs). 
 A third important feature is the important role played by interest groups. A high 
degree of (neo-) corporatism is present in most policy fields (Jørgensen, 2002: 2). 
Denmark has a high density of societal organization in a wide range of areas. Policy-
making is generally highly corporatist, with interest groups playing a crucial role.  
 Finally, the Danish politico-administrative system is generally considered open and 
informal, mainly oiled by unwritten rules. Policy making is very much decentralized, 
individual ministers being responsible for their policy areas. (Von Dosenrode, 1998: 52) 
chapter 9 
72 
9.2  Political or public discussion concerning EU directives and their transposition 
There is little wide public discussion on the transposition of directives in Denmark. 
Timely transposition for a long time was not considered an issue, because of 
Denmark’s good record. Yet, sometimes relevant public or professional debate occurs. 
Public debate focuses on general topics of Denmark’s involvement with the EU, while 
recent professional debate has involved some limited discussion of transposition linked 
to the latest scoreboard results. 
 Public debate is mostly focused on the general issues of Denmark’s EU membership 
and controversial decisions such as the adoption of the Euro. These discussions need to 
be understood in the general context of Denmark’s attitude to the EU ever since the 
country’s accession in 1973.  
 Denmark’s accession to the EU and the ratification of subsequent EU treaties were 
based on referendums held in accordance with Article 20 of the 1953 Danish 
constitution. Article 20 is a provision allowing Denmark to commit itself to 
international treaties if a five-sixths majority in the Folketing, or alternatively a simple 
majority in a referendum, can be established. According to the Economist, Article 20 
represented a significant shift in the Danish constitution by providing for the transfer 
of some sovereignty to international institutions.  
 The Danish system of incorporating international treaties is dualistic, with the 
principle of incorporating international treaties enshrined in the abovementioned 
article 20 of the Constitution. Yet is it arguable whether this dualism has much impact 
on the transposition of directives since the development of the doctrines of direct effect 
and supremacy of EC law by the ECJ in the 1960s71 has eroded national autonomy with 
secondary legislation from the EU. The direct effect of EC law has led to some debate in 
Denmark (Steenbeek en Gilhuis, 2003:70-71) and the erosion of sovereignty has not 
been accepted easily. As the Economist noted, the rejection of the Treaty on European 
Union (Maastricht treaty) in a referendum in 1992, as well as polls that consistently 
show that the population has some concerns about the EU encroaching upon national 
sovereignty, seem to indicate that a large part of the population disagrees with any 
transfers of sovereignty.72 
 On the whole, Danish attitudes to European integration can be described as 
cautious or even Eurosceptic. In September 2000, the Danes rejected participation in 
the common European currency, the Euro, in a referendum which was the culmination 
of an intense societal discussion. Their foreign policy is described as ‘torn between its 
activist stance and a very cautious approach to integration into the EU’ (The Economist 
Country report).  
 In the light of this it is even more remarkable that Denmark has a very good record 
of transposing EU directives. Some experts suggest an indirect link, in the sense that 
the Danes’ skepticism at the political level has lead to procedures of extensive 
consultation which in their turn ensure smooth transposition once a measure is 
passed. And, interestingly, good transposition is seen in specialist circles as a way to 
ensure Denmark’s room for maneuver at the negotiation stage and a positive stance 
                                                 
71  HvJEG 5 February 1963, 26/62, Jur. 1963, p. 1-59, Van Gend en Loos and HvJEG 15 July 1964, 6/64, Jur. 
1964, 1209-1259, Costa/ENEL). 
72  The Economist Country Reports at  
 http://www.economist.com/countries/Denmark/PrinterFriendly.cfm?Story_ID=2920616, consulted at 
18 January 2005. 
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from the Commission towards Danish positions. Interview evidence suggests that the 
Danes see their good transposition record as a key to their standing in the EU. 
 Also, occasionally there is public debate on the transposition of a particular 
directive, especially in the rare case that transposition is problematic for political 
reasons (interview ISA). An example is the directive on personal data protection. 
 Professional debate has recently focused on the deterioration of the Danish position 
in the latest edition of the internal market scoreboard. Danish civil servants have taken 
pride in their excellent transposition record and thus recent results have been some 
cause for concern, but it is clearly limited to a narrow circle of specialists. The Ministry 
of Economic Affairs has taken the lead in this respect, because the scoreboard concerns 
the area of the internal market. In terms of press comments, the Danish business 
newspaper has devoted a couple of articles to the worsening of the Danish position. 
9.2.1  Discussion of recent reports and their recommendations 
As a measure taken to improve the standing of Denmark in the last scoreboard, the 
Minister for economic and business affairs has recently written a letter to his colleagues 
responsible for directives on the scoreboard for Denmark. In the letter the minister 
urges his colleagues to pay attention to the obligations of securing correct and timely 
transposition. The ministry has also sent around a list of non transposed directives, the 
idea is to make the list shorter. 
 There has been also some reaction to a Commission idea of appointing a 
transposition coordinator. Most of our respondents found this would not be a good idea 
for Denmark as it would create a center of coordination that would potentially take 
away responsibilities from the line ministries. The Danes prefer that line ministries 
continue to take responsibility for transposition. Furthermore, no Ministry seems 
particularly keen to have such a position, although the Ministries of Justice and 
Economic affairs have been mentioned as potential centers where the coordinator could 
be placed.  
 Following a recent report, there has also been some professional discussion 
regarding the role of Parliament in the EU decision making process. One of the issues 
discussed was how to integrate the sub-committees and the entire parliament into the 
EU decision making cycle. The need was seen to balance the need for coordination with 
the need for substantive treatment. The Secretariat of The European Affairs committee 
(EAC) recognizes that in recent years they have been overwhelmed by information – 
nowadays members of parliament want not so much more information as they want 
better and specific information from us. The next step is simply to integrate EU policies 
in the entire Parliament. 
9.2.2  Expectations regarding the process and results of these discussions  
The expectation of most interviewed civil servants is that the Danish record will soon be 
improved again, mostly because they see the slip up in the scoreboard ranking as a 
result of failure to notify by ministries and difficulties with the electronic system of 
notification, rather than real cases of non-transposition. 
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9.3  Description of judicial instruments and techniques 
9.3.1. Instruments 
We can distinguish the following instruments (see Table 9.1 for an overview): 
• Laws or amendments of existing laws 
• Ministerial orders or amendments thereof: addressing the wider public, published 
in the State gazette. A particular form this instrument may take is the Technical 
Regulation, which addresses the professional world, and is published in the Notices 
of the implementing agency. Otherwise, the status and procedure of these two 
instruments is the same (Asser Instituut, 2004a: 24). 
 
Laws and ministerial orders are by far the most important instruments, technical 
regulations are used only in a limited number of sectors, namely transport (air, motor 
vehicles, maritime) and electrical safety rules. According to experts from the Ministry of 
Justice, technical regulations are essentially the same as Ministerial orders. Only rarely 
is a totally new law required for transposition, as most policy areas are already densely 
regulated. Furthermore, there is no difference in speed between adopting a new law 
and amending an existing one. The same is claimed to hold for ministerial orders.  
 The bulk of transposition, about 85% of all directives, takes place by means of 
Ministerial orders (bekendtgørelse). Over time, the trend has been to use more and more 
delegation to a Minister to pass certain provisions. The use of delegation varies in time 
but also from policy area to policy area. While in agriculture and fisheries, all measures 
are transposed by delegated measures, in an area such as Justice and Home Affairs 
delegation is not used so much, due to the policy’s sensitivity and the fact that these 
areas are only now beginning to be regulated by the European Union. Other highly 
sensitive areas are taxation, financial regulation, and financial services. Most internal 
market directives are transposed through ministerial orders. 
 Delegation is specific and contained in a law relevant to a certain sector, a parent 
law. The delegating provision contained in a specific law stipulates that ‘The Minister of 
so-and-so can enact the necessary orders in order to fulfill Denmark’s obligations under 
EU law.’ This can only be done if it is clear what to do, that is if the necessary changes 
are quite specific. However, when the issues concerned is highly political, even if 
delegation is possible, a law may be used after all. Also, it is sometimes not clear to a 
civil servant which of the two is to be used. 
 Alternative instruments are never used. It is generally known that these cannot be 
used for transposition, as they are not binding. Denmark sometimes uses collective 
labor agreements, but then a backup law is used, covering those not included in the 
collective agreement and providing minimum guarantees. 
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Table 9.1: Danish legal instruments used for transposition 
 love bekendtgørelse  
 
anordning/ kongelig anordning73 
 act ministerial order 
Main features adopted by Parliament, often 
taking the form of framework laws 
Based on delegation 
Advice State Council Not required (Denmark has no 
State Council)  
Not required (Denmark has no 
State Council) 
Parliamentary 
approval  
Required 
 
Not required formally, but 
sometimes informally needed 
Remarks All bills submitted in one 
parliamentary year must be 
concluded in the same year. If not, 
submitted again.  
Sometimes these are called 
technical regulations. 
9.3.2. Techniques 
The two most important techniques or methods used in Denmark according to the 
interviewed officials and experts are copying and re-wording. Whereas for a long time 
rewording was the most popular technique, nowadays copying is increasingly used.  
A. Copying, one to one, the contents of a directive in a Danish translation into 
one law. This law is then an exact copy of the directive. Sometimes, but not 
always, such a law is then appended to the ‘original’ version of a law. However, 
the annex is in most cases for information and is not meant to be the legal text in 
force. Thus copying is sometimes combined with annexing, which is mostly 
used in technical areas.  
• Annexing: the directive is annexed to a new Danish regulation. Annexing the 
directive is not very popular, mainly used in technical areas. E.g. transposing 
measures in industrial regulation can consist of 1 article: ‘The annex to this 
law is now in force’  
• Referencing: As above, the passing of a law with only one article, which states 
that ‘this law is in force in Denmark’, with the directive as an appendage. We 
have not found many cases of using of this method alone. According to most 
interviewed experts, dynamic referencing is not used at all! 
  
B. Re-wording: putting the directive into an own version. It seems to be the 
preferred strategy in Denmark, although respondents differ in their opinion as 
to how often it is used in relation to copying. It is a sort of unpacking of 
directives to be put into the Danish legal order. Sometimes the annex method 
and re—wording are combined, whereby certain sections are re-worded and in 
others the annex method is used.(Asser Instituut, 2004a: 18)  
  
In addition to these, the following types of amendments should be differentiated: A 
common procedure is the adoption of subordinating legislation under an umbrella act 
(also called ‘parent act’ by experts) as in the case of transport directives described in the 
                                                 
73  According to our Danish sources, all these are identical. 
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Asser report. In the case described by the Asser report, the umbrella law delegates to 
the Danish maritime agency the adoption of subordinate legislative acts, such as 
regulations. If the umbrella Act does not provide a legal basis for the transposing 
measure, the Act itself is amended.  
 Agencies or ministries responsible for negotiation of a directive check already at the 
negotiation stage whether subjects in a directive are in conflict with existing Danish 
law. 
 Finally, in densely regulated areas, one directive will often require changes in 
various existing laws/orders. In this case, one transposing measure is adopted, listing 
all the changes. As a next step, the various laws/orders thus changed are then 
consolidated into one piece. Ministries make sure we consolidate the act immediately 
so that the most advanced version is available to make it clear to the user. Also, 
sometimes several directives are combined into one transposing measure, which is 
called the ‘package law’ method. 
9.3.3  Character and level of implementing measure 
Directives are transposed at the levels of: 
• Primary legislation: laws and amendments of Laws/acts  
• subordinate/secondary legislation such as ministerial orders and technical 
Regulations. 
9.3.4 Specific instruments 
As said above, there are no possibilities for other instruments. 
9.4 The national policy cycle concerning directives 
9.4.1 General overview of the process 
9.4.1.1. National preparation of Commission initiatives 
There is no formal procedure for signaling and preparing Commission initiatives in an 
early stage. Even though the formal preparation procedure (see below) may be set in 
motion with an initiative that has not yet the status of a formal proposal, government 
and Parliament to a large extent have to rely on the Commission and informal contacts 
for information. Yet, individual ministries try to anticipate on forthcoming 
Commission proposals, and start working earlier (interview). At the same time, since 
1991 the Folketing has had a representative in Brussels, which is to inform Parliament 
as early as possible on EU initiatives (Folketing et al., 2002: 18).  
9.4.1.2 National treatment of Commission proposals 
The process of EU policy making in Denmark has been described as having two sides: a 
government side and a parliament side, related to the activities of the Danish 
Parliament’s European committee (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs). It mirrors the 
decision-making process at the European level, and it is characterized by high time 
pressure (Pedersen, 2000: 221). There are four levels: the EU special committees, the 
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EU committee, the government’s foreign policy committee and the Folketing´s 
European Affairs Committee (see Table 9.2). 
 
Table 9.2: Key meetings on EU decision-making on a weekly basis 
Government  Parliament 
Ad hoc Tuesday  
(if needed) 
Thursday 
(if needed) 
Friday 
EU special 
committees 
EU committee Foreign Affairs 
Committee 
European Affairs 
Committee 
 
 National decision making on EU matters starts in the EU special committees (EF-
special udvalgene) based in the line ministries (Nedergaard, 1995:118). These committees 
have the task of coordinating the viewpoints of the different ministries involved and 
recommend a Danish position (Von Dosenrode, 1998: 55). Also, the special committees 
are the place for internal consultation involving interest groups at a very early stage. 
Already in 1972, it was formally stated that the special committees are responsible for 
hearing relevant interest groups (Von Dosenrode, 1998: 55). They are hence seen as 
real negotiating bodies in which public and private interests are merged (Asser 
Instituut, 2004a: 9). The special committees also hold the technical expertise necessary 
for deciding on many of the legislative proposals to be put forward by the Commission 
(Nedergaard, 1995:118-119).  
 There are currently 34 standing special committees, which largely reflect the 
division of policy areas in the European Commission´s directorate-generals (Pedersen, 
2000: 223). In addition, there may be ad hoc committees, concentrating on temporary 
matters. The committees are usually quite large; that of environmental affairs has 75 
members (Pedersen, 2000; 223). They are normally chaired by a civil servant from the 
responsible ministry, typically the head of division and composed of civil servants from 
other relevant ministries (interview). EU cases are generally handled by the sections 
that are responsible for the corresponding ‘Danish’ cases (Von Dosenrode, 1998: 57). 
Increasingly, committees have interest groups as their members (i.e. committees for 
environmental affairs, transport, and labor), though in some cases they are simply 
heard (i.e. finance). According to one of our respondents, the reason for the increased 
participation of interest groups is to prevent them ‘taking revenge’ when the proposal 
goes to Parliament. Because of its coordinating role vis-à-vis EU questions, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs is represented on all special committees. 
 The basis for deliberations in the special committees is formed by draft position 
papers. These are drawn up by the responsible ministry, and discussed by the other 
members of the committee. (Pedersen, 2000: 225). Also, the committee draws up 
memoranda for Parliament, which serve as the basis for discussions there (see section 
9.4.4). 
 The process enters the second stage when the special committee presents its draft 
proposal to the leading ministry. Then the minister makes a proposal based on the 
advice of the special committee. This proposal is coordinated at the interdepartmental 
level74 in the EU Committee (EF-Udvalget), which meets when needed on Tuesdays75. 
                                                 
74  As a convention we use the term ‘interdepartmental’ for discussions between officials from different 
ministries, while the term ‘interministerial’ is reserved for discussions between different ministers. 
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The ministries which are most involved in EU matters are permanent members of the 
Committee. Other Ministries participate on an ad-hoc basis.  The head of the so-called 
North group of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs holds the chairmanship and secretariat 
of the EU Committee. Originally, the committee consisted of high-level civil servants, 
typically heads of division, but according to Pedersen (2000: 223-224) it is now usually 
attended by juniors.  
 Nowadays, the role of the EU Committee is to a great extent symbolic, in that 
agreement in the majority of the cases is reached in the special committees.76 Politically 
sensitive issues are passed on to the higher level. For this reason, the EU committee 
deals in particular with EU questions that have horizontal, fundamental or sensitive 
aspects. It should be noted, though, that the committee over time seems to have lost 
power to the Government´s Foreign Policy committee, which has taken to deciding all 
politically sensitive acts (Pedersen, 2000: 223). The task of the Committee hence seems 
to have been reduced to ‘helping the government separate technical and administrative 
cases from political cases’.(Nedergaard, 1995: 121). 
 The third tier in the system is the Government’s Foreign Policy Committee (Regeringens 
Udenrigspolitiske Udvalg). This committee has as its members the Prime Minister, the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, and eight sectoral ministers. Chaired by Foreign Affairs, it 
is the highest coordinating body. The committee is chaired by the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and includes the prime Minister and other Ministers from Ministries most 
involved with European affairs. It meets on Tuesdays, if needed- which is not very often 
(Pedersen, 2000: 224). According to one of our interviewees, it often communicates 
through e-mail, as ´they don´t want to meet on issues where everyone agrees.´ The 
central task of the government’s foreign policy committee is to formulate the political 
guidelines for the Danish position  
 
 As a final step, the government’s position has to be coordinated with the Folketing. 
Here, sectoral committees may play a role in evaluating proposals but the main role is 
reserved for the European Affairs Committee (Europa Udvalget) and its secretariat (see 
also Section 9.4).  
 All in all, the different steps in the decision-making process can be depicted as 
follows (see Figure 9.1). 
                                                                                                                            
75  This is not to be confused with the Government’s Foreign Policy Committee which lays down the 
Government’s position in EU matters on a higher, ‘political level’. The Chairman is the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs. In addition to the permanent members all other ministers are normally invited to the 
meetings. The Committee meets when needed on Thursdays. 
76  In the field of environment, this is estimated to be the case for some 95 per cent of the Commission 
proposals (Pedersen, 2000: 222). 
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Figure 9.1: The Danish EU decision making process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9.4.1.3  National transposition 
There is a stark contrast between the phases of decision-making and transposition with 
respect to centralization and formality. Whereas the first stage is well-regulated and 
coordinated by Foreign Affairs the second stage is the responsibility of the ministries 
(Mandrup Thomsen and Pennings, 2002: 15). Coordination here is completely absent, 
except for the Special Legal Committee at the Ministry of Justice, which supervises all 
infringement cases (Biering, 2000: 959). There is no central body that keeps 
information on the progress made with transposition; The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
is no longer involved. The general feeling is that to install coordinating bodies would 
lead to unnecessary bureaucracy, and at the same time take away the responsibility 
from the ministries, which take their job very seriously. For these reasons, it is hard to 
sketch a general picture of transposition; practices and procedures may differ from 
ministry to ministry, and agency to agency. Yet some commonalities exist. 
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 Concerning the preparatory stage, one important characteristic is the absence of so-
called Chinese Walls: the civil servants and ministers responsible for negotiating are 
also responsible for transposition (Biering, 2000: 959, Mandrup Thomsen and 
Pennings, 2002: 15). Moreover, Denmark has no clear dividing line between legislative 
and policy civil servants. Bills are drafted by lawyers who also have policy 
responsibilities (Mandrup Thomsen and Pennings, 2002: 9). This practice is sustained 
by the interviews we held at the Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs, the Danish 
Financial Supervisory Committee, and the Ministry of the Environment, which 
together are responsible for a great part of the directives. Most ministries have an EU 
law section, which is involved in transposition (Mandrup Thomsen and Pennings, 
2002: 15). Yet often the several policy divisions are responsible for transposition in their 
own area. 
 A second crucial characteristic of Danish transposition is that, in principle, all 
substantive discussions are held during the decision-making stage. Generally, the tight 
coordination procedure in the first stage prevents further debates during transposition. 
In the words of one of our interviewees: ‘We have a very participatory approach that 
creates a lot of awareness, so when we transpose we don’t start from scratch.’ There 
generally is no duplication (interview). What is more, the general attitude is ‘to go by 
the rules, even if we are outvoted’ (interview).  
 There is no special procedure for transposition; the regular procedures for adopting 
statutes or ministerial orders apply. In drafting statutes, the ministries are guided by 
the Guidelines on Quality of the Legislation (Lovkvalitetsvejledning). However, these only 
contain minimal provisions that specifically concern the process of transposition. 
Notably, these are that a transposing bill must clearly refer to the directive in question, 
as well as state the type, contents, and deadline of the directive in the explanatory notes. 
What is more, it must be clearly states which parts of a transposing bill are EU relevant, 
and which are not. Gold-plating should also be explicitly stated. (Lovkvalitetsvejledning, 
art. 2.3.3. g).  
 When the draft of the bill is complete, it is sent to the Ministry of Justice for the 
usual advisory procedures (see 9.4.3.). Changes are not made very often. Then, the bill 
is discussed in Cabinet (Ministersmøde) (Steenbeek and Gilhuis, 2003: 90). If 
everything goes well, the bill can then be submitted to the Folketing. There are no 
‘Raad van State’, nor advisory bodies that need to be heard. In Parliament, the 
European Affairs Committee is no longer involved (Folketing et al, 2002, 9). 
Parliament treats every bill three times, at increasing levels of specificity. The sectoral 
committees play an important role here. After the third reading, the minister signs it, 
as well as the King, after which it is published in the Law Gazette (Lovtidende) 
(Steenbeek and Gilhuis, 2003: 91). The legislative process is hence much shorter than 
in the Netherlands. In reality it is even shorter, though, because generally transposing 
bills are not discussed in committees, but rubberstamped in the plenary. According to 
our interview partner at the Folketing: ‘The Danish parliament is not a legislator when 
it comes to already adopted EU issues.’ 
 For ministerial orders, the procedure is even shorter. Drafts are not seen the 
Ministry of Justice, but by internal evaluators (Mandrup Thomsen and Pennings, 2002: 
17).  
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9.4.2 Bureaucratic consultative and coordinating bodies 
As said, the Danish politico-administrative system is generally informal and 
decentralized in nature. A puzzling exception to this general qualification is Denmark’s 
EU coordination system, which is remarkably formal and centralized (Von Dosenrode, 
1998: 57; Nedergaard, 1995: 114). Yet this seeming contradiction in reality is more of a 
paradox, since the formal and centralized procedures are underpinned by flexibility and 
strong informal networks. What is more, over time centralization has been countered 
by a process of sectorization (Pedersen, 2000: 220), so that in reality individual 
ministries play the key role in the process (Nedergaard, 1995: 115). The role of the 
ministry of Foreign Affairs has developed from ‘police-patrol’ to that of a backstop 
(Pedersen, 2000: 226-228). Furthermore, ´the wheels of the rigid procedure are oiled´ 
by a culture of pragmatism and informality, and a strong wish to reach consensus 
(Nedergaard, 1996: 115, Pedersen, 2000: 221). Finally, the formal and centralized 
coordination procedure only applies to the EU decision-making stage. Transposition is 
characterized by the common pattern of decentralization and informal rules. 
Coordination in this stage is virtually non-existing, ministries are on their own 
(Nedergaard, 1996: 115; interviews).  
 All, in all, the following institutions play some coordinating role:  
• At the lowest level, the EU special committees coordinate positions with 
other ministries and interest groups. 
• At the second tier, coordination takes place in the EU Committee composed 
of civil servants and chaired by the Foreign Affairs Ministry  
• The highest coordinating actor is the Foreign Policy Committee of the 
cabinet 
• Coordination in parliament is undertaken by the Parliamentary European 
Affairs committee and its secretariat which coordinate the positions of 
specialized standing committees 
• The Ministry of Foreign Affairs plays the central coordinating role in the 
decision-making process. The North group of the Ministry participates in all 
meetings of the special committees, chairs the EU committees, functions as 
secretary for the government’s foreign policy committee, and attends all 
meetings of the Folketing´s European Affairs Committee. In addition, it acts 
as a clearing house for communications to and from the EU, and to the 
Folketing. Finally, it presents the final negotiating instruction to the Danish 
EU representation. All in all, it is a central node in the coordination system. 
• In the transposition stage, an important role is played by the Special Legal 
Committee, chaired by the Ministry of Justice. This Committee meets 
biweekly to discuss all infringement cases, also the relevant ones against 
other member states. Here, each line Ministry has to explain what went 
wrong. Being called for the Committee is considered harmful to a Ministry’s 
professional pride and reputation (interview).  
9.4.3 The role of compulsory advisory bodies 
Denmark does not have any advisory bodies, nor an advisory institution similar to the 
Dutch Raad van State (Mandrup Thomsen and Pennings, 2002: 11). However, each 
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department is required to consult with relevant interest groups and the public. 
Furthermore, all draft law proposals coming from the government, including those for 
implementation, are subject to a quality of legislation check by the Legislative 
Department of the Ministry of Justice (Mandrup Thomsen and Pennings, 2002: 15). 
The Ministry of Justice also has a division EC law which controls compatibility of 
proposals with EC law (MandrupThomsen and Pennings, 2002:9). This section may 
also be consulted about particular issues concerning transposition (Mandrup Thomsen 
and Pennings, 2002: 15). Finally, a compulsory assessment of the administrative 
burdens resulting from new legislation is made by the Ministry of Economics and 
Business Affairs in a panel with business representatives. The line ministries have to 
include the results of these assessments in their advice on the proposed legislation 
(Asser Instituut, 2004b: 9). 
9.4.4 The role of parliament 
Denmark has an unparalleled system for democratic control over EU policies: the 
Folketing has an extremely powerful role in the preparation of Danish European policy. 
For each negotiation process, government is required to obtain a mandate from 
Parliament. The rationale for this construction, is twofold. First, because Denmark has 
a strong tradition of minority government, it is deemed important to prevent cabinets 
from being voted down by Parliament (Nedergaard, 1995, 129). Second, due to 
Denmark’s EU-skeptical stance, most political parties want to keep a firm check on EU 
policy. This system is not known in any other member state, even though the UK and 
Sweden come close. 
 The key player in Parliament is the European Affairs Committee, previously called 
the Market Relations Committee. It has seventeen members, proportionally 
representing the political parties represented in Parliament. It is mostly comprised of 
senior MPs, among whom many former ministers (Von Dosenrode, 1998: 60). It is 
supported by a secretariat consisting of 22 staff members and some 8 interns, which is 
the largest staff of all Parliamentary committees (Folketing et al, 2002: 23, Von 
Dosenrode, 1998; 61), The meetings of the European Affairs Committee normally take 
place on Fridays and deal with all the Council meetings taking place in the following 
week. The meetings typically take 2 to 5 hours (Eliason, 2001: 200). 
 Parliament’s powers in EU policy-making are laid down in the 1972 Law on 
Denmark’s accession to the EC, and have been further specified in reports by the 
Committee, agreed by the government (Folketing et al, 2002: 5). Originally, the 
Government was obliged to consult with the Parliament’s European Committee in EU 
matters of essential importance. The mandate obligation follows from the first report 
from the Committee in 1973, which holds that ‘Prior to negotiations in the EC Council 
of Ministers on decisions of a wider scope, the Government submits an oral mandate 
for Negotiation to the Market Committee. If there is no majority against the mandate, 
the Government negotiates on this basis’. Thus, the Danish government cannot 
conduct negotiations without receiving a mandate from the Parliament (Nordic 
Parliaments Report, (2002:7). The political development has been such, that the 
mandate procedure now applies to every proposal for a new directive. The mandate is 
never set in writing and is not legally binding, yet in the context of Danish politics it has 
decisive weight in determining the positions of Danish Ministers in the Council of 
Ministers (Rehof, 1996:68-69). 
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 Deliberations in the EAC´s meeting are structured on basis of a so-called summary 
memorandum, which is an annotated agenda of an upcoming Council meeting 
(Folketing et al, 2002: 13). This is distributed Friday morning at the latest, so 8 days 
before the Council meeting, and a few hours before the EAC meeting (Nedergaard, 
1995: 124). For each pending proposal, the responsible minister has two options (Von 
Dosenrode, 1998: 60). First, he or she may simply brief the committee, if no decision 
by the Council of Ministers is to be expected. The second option is to propose a 
negotiating mandate (forhandlingsopslæg). If the latter is the case, the parties proceed by 
giving their positions, after which discussions may ensue. Finally, the Chairman of the 
Committee presents the conclusion, after counting the number of votes. The mandate 
is not written, but oral, even though a stenographic record is kept (Eliason, 2001: 200). 
It contains agreement on the subject matter, the allies to be sought, and the degree of 
discretion for the negotiator (Von Dosenrode, 1998: 60). 
 
Table 9.3: Contents of Danish basic memorandum 
1 Title and nickname of initiative 
2 Parallel distribution to sectoral committees 
3 Identification, relevant dates and legal basis 
4 Previous presentation to the EAC 
5 Resume of contents 
6 Most important elements 
7 Consequences for Danish law 
8 Principles of subsidiarity and proportionality (new) 
9 Financial, socio-economic, and environmental consequences 
10 Hearings of interest groups  
11 Danish attitude (new) 
12 Public attitudes of other member states (new) 
13 Relevant Danish decisions on European policies 
  Source: European Affairs Committee, 2004: 23-24. 
 
 In forming its opinion about a proposed mandate, Parliament to a great extent relies 
on the so-called basic memorandum (grundnotat). This is a standardized document, 
composed by the special committee, which must be sent to the EAC within four weeks 
after a Commission proposal is made. Over the course of the negotiation process, the 
memo may be modified, after which it is called a topical memorandum (Folketing et al, 
2002: 13). Its main elements are: a description of the Commission proposal, its 
legislative and financial consequences, previous considerations by the EAC, possible 
compromise proposals by the Presidency, amendments proposed by the European 
Parliament, its itinerary through the EU institutions, and the opinion of interest groups 
(Folketing, 2002: 7; Pedersen, 2000: 230; Von Dosenrode, 1998: 61; see Table 9.3 for a 
full overview). For a long time, it did not contain the government’s opinion, but this has 
changed in January 2005, when a new EAC report entered into force. Parliament is 
generally satisfied with the documents it gets. They are usually rather elaborate, 
comprising 5 to 20 pages (interview). Finally, Parliament receives all Commission 
proposals directly from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as lists of all the 
proposals received (Folketing, 2002: 5-6). 
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9.4.5  The role of other, subnational or functional governments 
Local government is represented in the special committees, as they represent 
employers throughout the country. According to one of our interviewees (ENV), this is 
really important, as local government often needs extra resources to comply with 
European directives.  
9.4.6  The role of interest groups 
Interest groups are involved throughout the process of EU policy-making and 
implementation. First, they are member of or heard by the special committees that 
make the initial policy proposals. They are consulted at the early stage of preparation of 
legislation. Second, they play a role in preparing transposition, and the actual 
application of directives, just like normal Danish law (Von Dosenrode, 1998: 55). Third, 
they have a rather close relationship with the European Affairs Committee in 
Parliament. They have rather good access, as all interest groups can present a 
delegation to the EAC. Usually they present their point of view right before a minister 
appears for the EAC. In this way, the committee benefits from their expertise. Groups 
that often make their appearance are the Unions, anti-federalist movements, the anti-
constitution movement, fishermen organizations, and industry representatives. 
Generally, no attempts are made to lobby Parliament during the transposition stage 
(interview). 
9.5  Analysis of instruments  
9.5.1 Advantages and disadvantages of instruments 
As one expert pointed out, the pro-s and con-s of instruments are different depending 
on whom you ask: the opposition prefers using laws so that they get debated in 
parliament, the government prefers administrative orders. 
 Undoubtedly, ministerial orders are faster. They are used much more frequently 
and considered much faster as they do not have to pass through Parliament. It takes 
much longer to get a bill through parliament and ministers can never be quite sure of 
success as linkages with other issues might occur. Still, in general the parliament does 
not make problems at the transposition stage since they have been consulted 
extensively at the negotiations stage. A rare example of a difficult act to pass was the law 
transposing the personal data protection directive where the parliament felt it had not 
received all the relevant information during the first stage of the policy process. 
 However, in terms of speed laws present another problem. Ministries and agencies 
are bound by the regularity of Parliamentary meetings and the preparation of the 
legislative program for the whole year. The way the parliamentary year is organized, all 
bills must be dealt with within one and the same parliamentary year. On the 2nd 
Tuesday in October, the new year starts. All outstanding bills must be withdrawn and 
submitted again in the new year (Mandrup, Thomsen and Pennings, 2002: 6). To deal 
with this civil servants often combine and make a lot of changes in 1 act. 
 As for Ministerial orders, even though in legal terms the government is not obliged 
to go to the Parliament, in practice, since Denmark operates with minority 
governments sometimes there is a political agreement or pressure/imposition from 
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parliament for a draft of the administrative order to be seen by parliament before being 
adopted.  
 As mentioned before, delegation differs from area to area and there are areas where 
one cannot avoid using legislation as they are so politically sensitive. Examples of such 
areas are: Justice and Home affairs, taxation, financial regulation, and financial 
services. 
 There is no difference between amendments and new laws in terms of speed as the 
debates look at the substance. The reason for that is that any piece of legislation, 
whether it is original or an amendment, has a written explanation with comments and 
reasoning by the government, also anticipated impact on the administration and on 
finance. This enables the politicians to focus on the substance. 
 However, another expert points out that sometimes amendments of existing laws 
are problematic because national concerns are re-examined and other issues may be 
added to the list. Ministries and agencies busy with transposition try not to have this 
and limit the discussion to transposition, because it can be a problem when the agency 
is pressed for time.  
9.5.2 Advantages and disadvantages of techniques 
For a long time, re-wording was the preferred strategy, because this is considered more 
user-friendly. Problems of interpretation are solved in an early stage, rather than 
pushed to the end user. The re-worded directives, are therefore evaluated as clearer for 
the citizens. In the words of one official, ‘we try to make it fit the Danish legislation and 
use legal language used here’. Another expert points out that ‘Directives are not 
‘microwave ready’ text. They need to be unpacked and put into our legal order.’ Thus 
re-worded directives are also considered more compatible with national legal 
frameworks rewriting then has the clear preference of the Ministry of Justice. However, 
rewording is considered more difficult, which makes it slower than rewriting. Also, 
according to some, if you re-word there is a risk you may be using the wrong words. 
That’s because there is not so much leeway in transposition as there should be. 
 Copying is seen as faster and according to at least one interviewed expert is used 
increasingly as a way to cope with the growing number of directives. However, it is also 
seen as unfriendly to the end user. Another expert pointed out that copying is done ‘if 
we can’t make up our minds’, when a directive is considered difficult. Again, it is seen 
as undesirable as it transfers responsibility for understanding and interpreting the 
provisions to the next user – local government, businesses and courts. 
9.6  Analysis of national policy process 
The Danish transposition record has been consistently good, one of the best in the EU. 
According to Nedergaard, this is due to the fact that the Danish position in the EU is 
based on domestic consensus which is achieved by a time-consuming process of 
consultation of a multiplicity of interests before a policy proposal is negotiated in 
Brussels (Nedergaard, 1995:114). Similarly, the Asser report attributes the success of 
implementation in Denmark to the attention for internal consultation during the 
drafting of national position phase. In this internal negotiation phase, all stakeholders 
are consulted, including Parliament (Asser Instituut, 2004b: 3; Nedergaard, 1995: 114; 
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interviews). This implies there is no political force attempting to stop transposition and 
implementation later.  
 Parliamentary involvement is generally evaluated rather positively. Even though 
Parliament is said to reject a mandate only rarely77 (Folketing et al, 2002: 10), 
government usually anticipates on the EAC´s stance (Pedersen, 2000: 30). 
Furthermore, its power is boosted by seniority of its members. All in all, the strong role 
of parliament is considered one of the factors ultimately facilitating transposition as it 
‘ensures that sudden surprises do not occur when new legislation is necessary’ 
(Biering, 2000: 959). According to one of our interviewees, the procedure ensures that 
‘the train is set in motion, and it will arrive at the next station.’ 
 Yet, some weaknesses are also reported. It is positioned rather late in the EU 
decision/making process, when the Danish position has already been formulated in 
Coreper (Nedergaard, 1995, 126). What is more, it depends almost fully on the 
government for information, and must trust the latter that it followed its mandate, due 
to the secrecy of Council meetings. The biggest concern, though is that it suffers from 
work overload (Pedersen, 2000: 231). The staff is considered wholly inadequate 
(Eliason, 2001: 201). For this reason, debate has ensued about the role of the sectoral 
committees. For a long time, EU affairs were the sole responsibility of the EAC. EAC 
could forward memoranda to the sectoral committees, or informally hear their opinion, 
but this was completely optional. If it happened, the committees were usually not very 
interested (Nedergaard, 1995: 128; Pedersen, 2000: 231). Therefore, in May 2001, the 
Parliamentary European Affairs committee recommended that memoranda are sent by 
the government simultaneously to the specialized committees and the European Affairs 
committee (Danish Parliament information fact sheet, at http://www.ft.dk/?/ 
samling/20041/menu/ 00000005.htm). This has been effected in the most recent 
Folketing report (2004), which has made EU issues a formal responsibility of the 
sectoral committees. Their instruments for exerting influence are that they can call the 
minister, make recommendations to the EAC, and arrange public hearings, something 
which if often done for Green and White papers (interview, Folketing). 
 On the whole, even though the Danish process of EU policy making at first sight 
seems rather formal and centralized, in reality it is highly informal (interview). It is a 
bottom up approach, starting with the sectoral committees and the individual teams of 
civil servants in Ministries/agencies and then ending up there again for transposition. 
One and the same team is responsible for the whole process of negotiation and 
implementation, which creates a sense of ownership and prevents ´Chinese walls´ 
between those who negotiate and those who implement. Furthermore, the coordination 
style is informal, except for the part where Parliament is involved, but also there the 
stress is on obtaining an oral mandate and not on increasing the paper trail. A final 
important factor seems to be the rule of law, which is one of the fundamental building 
blocks of Danish politics and administration. The basic attitude is that EU laws must be 
implemented properly, even if they go against Denmark’s wishes. 
 Despite the good Danish record, sometimes transposition is delayed. The major 
reason for delay, according to our respondents, is formed by notification problems (also 
                                                 
77  According to Nedergaard (1995) this happens only in some 95 % of the cases. According to one of our 
interviewees, the frequency has increased over the last three to four years, due to the generally Euro-
skeptical stance of the Dansk Folkeparti. It allegedly has been especially difficult in the fields of GMOs 
and food directives. According to our interviewee at the Folketing, however, there are no particular 
sectors in which mandates are hard to obtain. 
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see Von Dosenrode, 1998, 58). Sometimes the European Commission has not 
registered notification, or sometimes it is forgotten by the ministries. Real delays are 
generally said to be very rare. One of our respondents reports that on average once a 
year transposition is problematic for substantive reasons. Other reasons for delays 
reported are a lack of manpower, and the ambiguity and difficulty of some directives. 
9.7 Conclusions 
• The swift transposition of EU directives in Denmark is not a direct result of the use 
of special legal instruments or techniques. In fact, Denmark knows only two legal 
instruments used for transposition. The very simplicity of the legal options seems to 
contribute to swift transposition. Most transposition happens through ministerial 
orders, but this does not diminish the role of Parliament. 
• The extensive involvement of the Danish Parliament at the pre-negotiation stage is 
seen by many experts and civil servants as key to Denmark’s success in 
transposition. Interviewees have all stressed that the process of obtaining a mandate 
from Parliament before negotiations on a proposal have taken place in the Council 
of Ministers is crucial. Parliament takes its task of scrutinizing EU proposals highly 
seriously, which prevents surprises during transposition. 
• Consultation and domestic consensus building at the pre-negotiations stage 
contribute to swift transposition. The extensive consultation not only with 
Parliament but also with interest groups at a very early stage creates awareness 
which also helps successful transposition later. 
• Ministerial powers of delegation are important, but delegation is specific and based 
on sectoral laws. As proposals have been already discussed in parliament, at the 
transposition stage powers can be delegated to a Minister to pass the necessary 
legislation by a Ministerial order.  
• Another reason for Denmark’s good transposition record is that lines of 
responsibility are clear and final responsibility is not in a centralizing authority but 
in the line ministries. On this bottom up basis, administrative coordination is 
maintained throughout the policy cycle. More specifically, the same civil 
servants/teams which negotiate a directive are involved in transposing it, so that 
there are no ‘Chinese walls between negotiation and transposition.’ Teams consist 
of both lawyers and practitioners, drafting of transposing acts is done by the same 
people. This means that those who negotiate are familiar with the domestic 
situation and are aware of the EU policy context in which a decision is made.  
• Flexible consultation mechanisms and an informal manner of coordination save 
time and make the Danish approach highly effective. 
• A culture of obeying the law is credited with ensuring that directives are transposed 
even when they were seen to be to Denmark’s disadvantage. The values and beliefs 
of administrators play a crucial role in this process. Danish civil servants take a 
pride in transposing directives well and on time, and conversely, it is considered 
shameful for ministries to have been late with transposition.  
• The naming and shaming of laggards among ministries in the Special Legal 
Committee based in the Ministry of Justice is a helpful mechanism that reinforces 
the rule of law culture that exists in Ministries.  
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Appendix: List of interviewees 
• Peter Biering, Legal adviser to the Danish government, Law firm Poul 
Schmith 
• Susanne Isaksen, Department of EU Coordination, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
• Peter Riis, European Affairs Committee of the Folketing 
• Klaus Werner, International Unit, Ministry of Economic and Business 
Affairs 
• Leif Thomassen, Senior EU Coordinator, Danish Financial Supervisory 
Authority 
• Christina Toftegaard Nielsen, EU Affairs Unit, Department of Law 
• Nikolaj Aaro-Hansen, EU Affairs Unit, Department of Law 
• Jørgen Molde, EU Law Department, Legal Service, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
• Merete Voetmann, EU Law Department, Legal Service, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
• Lise Wesenberg Jensen, Specialkonsulent Legal Affairs, Danish 
Environmental Protection Agency 
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10 France  
10.1 General overview of the constitutional and political system 
10.1.1 Constitutional characteristics 
France is a decentralised unitary state in which the central government takes the lead 
with regard to the preparation of the French position on new Commission initiatives 
and the transposition of EU directives. Subnational governments do not have their own 
competences for the transposition of legislation even though their cooperation may be 
required for effective implementation at a later stage.  
 In contrast to the United Kingdom, whose constitution does not consist of a single 
solemn document but a multitude of texts, laws, traditions and conventions, France is 
‘attached to the idea of a written, solemn and rigid constitution’ (Mény, 2000: 120). So 
rigid is this attachment, that, if the existing constitution is unable to deal with a 
problem, there is a change in the regime and a new constitution is adopted to deal with 
the questions not resolved by the preceding version. 
 The French constitution makes a clear distinction between legislative and executive 
power and attributes to each of these branches of government autonomous rulemaking 
power. Article 34 of the constitution specifies the issues for which Parliament needs to 
be involved by the executive for the passing of law. These areas, which are labeled as 
législative, include public liberties, the determination of serious crimes and other major 
offences, taxation, the budget and the fundamental principles of national defence, the 
self-government of territorial units, education, ownership issues, labor law and social 
security. In 1996 these areas were expanded to include also the financing of social 
security. All other issue areas are regarded as executive and can be autonomously 
arranged by government using regulations (that is, government decrees and ministerial 
orders). The State Council and the Constitutional Council ensure that the government 
and parliament observe the distinction between ‘legislative’ and ‘executive’ issues. In 
applying this distinction the State Council (Counseil d’Etat) has to assess a proposal and 
decide whether the proposal belongs to the ‘legislative’ or ‘executive’ domain. 
10.1.2 Political characteristics  
France is sometimes characterized as a ‘rationalized’ parliamentary system. In 
principle, France is a parliamentary system in which law has to be approved by 
parliament. At the same time, as indicated above, the French constitution makes a 
distinction between issues that require the adoption of law and those that can be 
directly regulated by the ‘executive’. In this way, the role of parliament in France is 
more limited than in some other European countries.  
 In France, the President has in many respects the advantages and privileges of the 
Head of State in a presidential system. In other respects he enjoys the prerogative 
powers of a head of state in a parliamentary system. This ambiguous combination of 
roles secures for the President an independent and powerful position in the French 
political system, simultaneously giving them ‘complete political irresponsibility and the 
strength to make decisions and pressure other constitutional bodies’ (Mény, 2002: 117-
118). The head of state appoints the prime minister and, conjointly with the prime 
minister, appoints Ministers. The head of state can address messages to both Houses 
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but, in conformity with ‘republican tradition’, cannot speak direct to parliamentarians. 
To these powers belonging specifically to the President are added those shared with the 
prime minister and government, in particular the signing of regulations and decrees, 
appointments to various civilian and military posts and all measures decided in the 
Council of Ministers (Articles 20-23 and 34-51 of the Constitution). While the 
Constitution does not guarantee that the President will be directly involved in the day-
to-day running of the country, he is undoubtedly an integral part of the political 
process. As Elgie (2003: 98) indicates, the President is only an ‘independent and 
autonomous actor of either the first instance or the last resort’. 
 The French party system is characterized by competition between two opposing 
forces: the ‘left’ and the ‘right’. However, the ‘left’ and ‘right’ are not strong and stable 
‘blocs’ but consist of a substantial number of different political parties. The rivalry and 
competition between these different parties makes the French party system rather 
‘fragile, instable and weak and reduces the effectiveness of Parliament with regard to 
government’ (Mény, 2002: 104). 
 Parliament has two chambers: 
– the upper chamber or Senate (331 members, elected for 6 years by indirect suffrage 
(electoral college); 
– the lower chamber or National Assembly (Assemblée Nationale) with 577 members 
elected by direct universal suffrage for five years using majority voting in a two-
categorical ballot. 
The members of the National Assembly (deputies) and the government are entitled to 
initiate legislation. Government bills are called projets de loi; bills introduced by deputies 
are called propositions de loi. Effective parliamentary influence lies almost exclusively 
with the National Assembly.  
 In addition to national lawmaking the National Assembly and the Senate also have a 
role in foreign policy by examining government bills authorizing ratification of a treaty 
or approval of an international agreement negotiated by the President of the Republic 
or on his behalf. Major international treaties—such as peace treaties, commercial 
treaties, treaties or agreements concerning international organizations, state finances, 
status of persons, and agreements that modify statutory provisions—do not commit 
France until passed by a ratification statute.  
 Amendments of the constitution are also matter for Parliament. The amending bill 
has to be passed by both chambers, but does not have effect until it has been approved 
by referendum or, in the case of a government bill, by the Congress (a joint session of 
the National Assembly and the Senate in the Palace of Versailles) if the President of the 
Republic prefers this procedure. Approval by Congress requires a majority of three 
fifths of the votes. 
10.1.3 Political administrative characteristics  
The French government consists of the prime minister and his ministers, who meet 
weekly as part of the Council of Ministers. The prime minister directs the operation of 
the government and has a superior position to the ministers. He is responsible for 
national defense and ensures the implementation of legislation (including the 
transposition of EU directives). Within the government, he has the right to initiate 
legislation (Article 39 Constitution). Moreover, the prime minister has the power to 
make regulations. The regulations proposed by the prime minister are countersigned, 
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where required, by the ministers responsible for their implementation. In addition, 
he/she may sometimes delegate some powers to ministers. During the annual 
budgetary process, the Prime Minister is responsible ‘for arbitrating between the 
conflicting demands of the spending ministers’ (Carcassonne, 1997: 400). 
 Moreover, the prime minister has a special constitutional position towards 
parliament (Articles 34-50 Constitution) and plays, in contrast to the President, a full 
role in the parliamentary process. The Prime Minister is closely involved in setting the 
parliamentary timetable, which is important for the prioritization of discussions on 
legislative proposals (Article 48). He also acts as the government’s main spokesperson 
in parliament, most notably during the weekly session of questions to the government 
in the National Assembly. 
 Within the government, and next to the Prime Minister, there are three different 
kinds of positions: minister: 
– ‘full’ minister (ministre), who is positioned directly under the prime minister and 
have a separate portfolio for which they are within the government responsible. 
Ministers participate in the Council of Ministers; 
– junior minister (ministre delegué), like the Junior Minister for European Affairs, who 
are positioned under a ‘full’ minister; and 
– state secretary (secrétaire d’Etat), are either ‘autonomous’ heading a ministerial 
department or attached to the Prime Minister or a Minister; inferior to the position 
of a minister; they only participate in the Council of Ministers if their portfolio is 
concerned. From a protocol point of view, state secretaries are referred to as 
‘minister’.  
According to the composition of government from 25 February 2005 there are 17 full 
ministers, 13 junior ministers and 10 state secretaries. Junior Ministers and state 
secretaries are allowed to sing all acts falling under the supervision, but government 
decrees (décrets) which require the countersignature by the full minister. 
 An important characteristic of French civil service is a strong linkage between the 
government and the administration (and sometimes the courts). This is reflected in 
political cabinets supporting the Prime Minister and the individual ministers, and the 
membership of various consultative bodies and committees of key actors from the 
highest administrative level. These multiple positions and close personal connections 
are part of extensive political-administrative networks in France. These networks, which 
include members occupying various positions in the administration as well as 
consultative bodies and the courts, affect daily politics and policy. Moreover, these 
networks are partly maintained through training at France’s prestigious public 
administration school (École Nationale d’Administration or ENA), which ‘has been 
attended by most of the currently high-level civil servants and some of the political 
actors’ (Elgie, 2003: 144). 
 The senior officials can be characterized as dynamic, innovative, confident and 
highly trained. In part this reflects the fact that civil servants are often appointed to 
ministerial posts.78 It is still the case that many political leaders, including President 
Chirac, began their careers as civil servants and then moved into politics. Such a move 
can be easily made due to the rather liberal employment provisions, which allow civil 
servants to leave the public service and return to it without losing any seniority. 
                                                 
78  This was made easier by the fact that the 1958 Constitution did not require ministers to be members of 
the National Assembly, but actually forbade it.  
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 French senior civil servants mostly identify themselves as a member of one of the 
‘great corps’. There are several of these services such as the State Council, the 
diplomatic corps and, for instance, depending on their technical vocation, the Corps of 
Roads and Bridges. The members of these services tend to monopolize the senior 
positions in the administration. Each corps is independent from the others and 
provides a separate identity to its members. Senior officials identify themselves as 
being a member of one of these services and will be loyal to his or her corps rather than 
to the civil service as a whole. This feature of French administrative culture may cause 
rivalries between units within a ministry and between ministries. 
 Elgie (2003: 135-139) characterizes the French administration by the following three 
features: 
First, the administration is still ‘top-down’ and centralistic in its nature. Second, the 
administration is characterized by a strong division of labor and a lack of cooperation 
and collaboration. Consequently, it is marked by a profound set of rivalries within and 
between the ministries which can be very difficult to manage and affects the coherence 
of a ministry’s policy. Ministries are split on a functional basis into divisions headed by 
a director, each having responsibility for a particular area of the ministry’s work 
(Rouban, 1995: 42-47).79 Divisions are then split on a functional basis into 
subdivisions, each having responsibility for a separate aspect of the division’s work. A 
subdivision is headed by a sub-director.80 These subdivisions are further split on a 
functional basis into bureaus. Third, the administration is characterized by 
deconcentration instead of decentralization. At the local level French departments have 
a well-developed range of deconcentrated services, which work closely with civil 
servants at the local level. These features make the central administration rather 
powerful in specific policy areas, but at the same time fragmentized and difficult to 
manage, especially if government-wide priorities have to be fulfilled such as the 
transposition of EU directives. 
10.2 Political or public discussion concerning EU directives and their 
transposition 
10.2.1  Discussion of recent reports and their recommendations 
At first sight, there seems to be an increasing awareness in France about its rather poor 
performance with regard to transposition, as indicated by the Commission scoreboards. 
Currently, France has a transposition deficit of 3.2% for the internal market directives 
(European Commission, 2005a: 18) and 1.9% for all directives in force (European 
Commission, 2005b). In addition, a substantial number of infringement cases against 
France have been brought before the European Court of Justice. Until now, none of 
these cases have led to a fine imposed on the French state. There is the possibility that, 
as part of the Merlus case, the French state might be faced with a substantial fine, which 
has increased awareness among parliamentarians as well as the government aware of 
                                                 
79  For example, in 2002 the Ministry for Civil Engineering, Transport, Housing, Tourism, and the Sea 
comprised thirteen separate divisions, such as the Roads Division and the Air Transport Division, as well 
as the ministerial information service which had the equivalent status to a division. 
80  For example, in the Roads Division of the Ministry for Civil Engineering there were four subdivisions, 
including the Subdivision for Motorways and Toll Roads and the Subdivision for Road-Building 
Investment. 
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the need to seek for improving France’s performance. This need has become apparent 
through a number of reports and communications which have been issues over the last 
three of years. 
 The Parliament, for example, has started a debate of the transposition problematic. 
In July 2003 and July 2004 respectively, Christian Philip (2003; 2004), member of the 
Delegation for European Affairs in the National Assembly, issued annual reports on 
transposition to the National Assembly. Whereas the first report focuses on the overall 
evaluation of the French transposition process, the second report also compares the 
national transposition mechanisms in all fifteen member states. Philip summarized the 
major problems in the French transposition process as follows: 
– lack of coordination between ministries; 
– numerous interventions of compulsory advisory bodies; 
– irregular and poor drafting of impact data sheet.  
 Based on his analysis, Philip recommended three main points:  
1. systematic making of the impact assessment studies; 
2. resisting legal perfectionism; and 
3. reinforcement of collaboration with the European Commission.  
Furthermore, he suggested to give transposition a heavier political weight in the overall 
policy-cycle by involving the prime minister because transposition is not only a 
Community obligation, but also a constitutional demand. Second, he suggested setting 
up a new interdepartmental committee. This committee could meet regularly to 
strengthen the political accountability of individual ministries and could be led by the 
Junior Minister for European Affairs ‘empowered’ and explicitly supported by the 
prime minister. Moreover, he recommended for ministries to improve their 
administrative structure towards transposition, by setting up a legal service helping to 
draft the legal texts. He suggested consultation with advisory bodies to be transferred to 
the earlier, negotiation phase. Finally, he argued for a reinforcement of parliament’s 
role in the transposition process by more frequent consultations. 
 The Philip report caught the attention of politicians. It was immediately followed by 
a communication on transposition by Prime Minister, Jean-Pierre Raffarin.81 This 
communication followed an earlier communication from 3 July 2002 in which the 
Prime Minister declared transposition to be high on the political agenda in order to 
catch up with France’s backlog. In view of this declaration, the Junior Minister for 
European Affairs presented a communication to the Council of Minister on 6 
November 2002. In this communication Claudie Haigneré announced the setting up 
of an action plan to clarify the administrative responsibilities and to further involve 
parliament in transposition.  
 In the new communication of September 2004, the Prime Minister again 
underlined the importance of transposition. In addition, he urged ministers to take the 
necessary steps to make up for the delay which could be very costly and 
disadvantageous for French competitiveness and credibility in the European Union.82 
                                                 
81  Communication of the Prime Minister (2004) Circulaire du 27 septembre 2004 relative á la procédure 
de transposition en droit interne des directives et décisions-cadres négociées dans le cadre des 
institutions européennes, J.O. no. 230 (2 octobre 2004): 16920. 
82  The Prime Minister underlines the importance of swift and proper transposition in the last meeting of 
the Council of Ministers before Christmas in 2004; see Communication of the Prime Minister (2004) 
Communication au Conseil des ministres du 20 decembre 2004 sur l’application des lois et la 
transposition des directives et decisions-cadres communautaires. 
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He suggested the following: (1) an improved effort in drafting impact assessment 
studies; (2) a better coordinated transposition planning and process-tracing with a 
regularly updated transposition scoreboard for all the ministries; and the (3) the setting 
up of an interdepartmental committee coordinating transposition (in line with Philip 
report). 
 Based on this communication, high-level officials were given responsibility for 
transposition in each of the various line ministries, including a member of the 
(political) cabinet of each minister. These officials meet regularly to discuss the 
progress on transposition in the newly established interdepartmental committee on 
transposition (réseau interministériel des correspondants de la transposition). In this 
committee the Junior Minister for EU Affairs presents the results on progress, ‘naming 
and shaming’ the laggards. Additionally, the information on progress is also presented 
to the Council of Ministers.   
 On 2 February 2005, the Junior Minister for European Affairs, Mme Haigneré, 
issued a first scoreboard on transposition. She outlined the earlier improvements in 
transposition, but stressed that more needed to be done to consolidate these 
improvements and to improve France’s performance on transposition. She concluded 
with some comments on future strategy and developments and the need to prepare for 
transposition already during the negotiation phase.  
10.2.2  Expectations regarding the process and results of these discussions  
The new measures underscore the political awareness of the rather poor performance 
of France in the various Commission scoreboards. After the communication of the 
Prime Minister in July 2002 the number of delayed directives for which the deadline 
already expired was reduced. The latest scoreboards indicate that France seems to 
succeed in improving its performance. For instance, the absolute number of not yet 
transposed directives is smaller than before (48 compared to 92 in February 2002) 
while the number of directives delayed for more than two years is reduced by half. 
Despite the government communications and proposed changes and reforms, France is 
still not performing that well in relative terms, partly because other EU member states 
are improving their performance as well. Furthermore, France is still far from reaching 
the objective of the 2001 Stockholm European Council to reduce the transposition 
backlog below 1.5% of all directives in force or the zero-tolerance objective of the 2002 
Barcelona European Council. 
 Some observers indicate that the current political interest in transposition could be 
temporary because previous prime ministers already issued communications on 
transposition. Michel Rocard, for example, issued communications in 1986, 1988 and 
1990. Then, in 1998, Lionel Jospin presented a communication to the Council of 
Ministers on the poor French performance on transposition underlining the 
importance of the negotiation process in Brussels for later transposition in France.83 
The communication stresses that during the bargaining process in the working groups, 
COREPER and the meetings of the Council of Ministers, the French delegation should 
prevent directives from including definitions in the introduction which could make it 
very difficult and time-consuming to ensure coherence with the national framework of 
                                                 
83  Circulaire du 9 novembre 1998 relative a la procédure de suivi de la transposition des directives 
communautaires en droit interne. 
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law at a later stage. Negotiation teams for a directive should be involved in the later 
transposition phase and in a timeframe of one month after the adoption of the directive, 
the line ministry should work out an impact assessment study. But in 1988 and 1990 
respectively, Prime Minister Rocard had already drawn the ministers’ attention to 
problematic transposition of EU law.84 He outlined and specified the different tasks of 
the SGCI and the SGG in the transposition process in order to improve coordination. 
In addition, he asked every ministry to take responsibility for the transposition of 
directives falling under their supervision. He stressed the need to keep transposition 
requirements in mind from the moment on a Commission proposal is being discussed 
in the Council’s working groups. 
 Hence, the current attempt made by Prime Minister Raffarin to increase the 
ministries awareness for transposition and to improve France’s performance seems to 
be a recurrent issue on the French political agenda. If these more attempts, like in the 
past, do not lead to structural changes within the administration and the way in which 
transposition is handled, the ‘new policy’ will appear to be a symbolic one. However, if 
these communications are embedded in a well-established belief that France’s 
performance should become better, as part of the notion that France should play an 
important but also exemplary role in Europe, which includes the transposition and 
implementation of the acquis communaitaire, current developments may be more long 
lasting. 
10.3  Description of judicial instruments and techniques 
10.3.1 Instruments 
In France, the choice of an instrument to transpose an EU directive is affected by the 
question whether its contents requires ‘legislative’ or ‘executive’ actions, that is, the 
introduction of law or government regulations. The State Council determines whether 
the contents of a directive fits to the ‘legislative’ or ‘executive’ domain in its advice to 
the government (see also Section 3.4.3). Based on this advice, the preparation of draft 
measures to transpose a directive can be started. Clearly, France does not have an 
integrated vision on the transposition of directives. It does not use, for example, a 
typology of directives. 
The legal instruments used in France in order to transpose directives are: 
– law (loi ordinaire), based on Article 34 of the constitution, which need to pass 
Parliament based on a bill (projet de loi); this instrument includes the possibility of 
an omnibus bill (disposition d’adaptation au droit communautaire or DDAC), which is 
equivalent to law, but transposes a number of directives preferably in the same 
policy area; 
– authorization law (loi d’habilitation) based on Article 38 of the constitution, which 
allows the government to transpose of directives by ordinances (ordonnances); and 
– government regulations (réglement), which includes government decrees (décrets), 
ministerial orders (arrêtés), and communications (circulaires). 
                                                 
84  Circulaire du 25 janvier 1990 relative a la procédure de suivi de la transposition des directives 
communautaires en droit interne. 
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These instruments and their main characteristics are summarized in Table 10.1. We 
will discuss each of these instruments separately. 
 
Law (Loi) 
Based on Article 34 of the constitution, Parliament needs to be involved in issues of 
‘legislative’ nature. For those issues, a law has to be passed. As indicated, before the 
start of any transposition process, the State Council has to determine whether an issue 
is part of the ‘legislative’ or the ‘executive’ domain. If the State Council decides that a 
directive, or some of its elements, requires the introduction of a new law or the 
amendment of existing ones, a bill has to be prepared.  
 The initiative for the making of a new law (projet de loi) lies with the line ministries. 
Depending on the contents of the directive, several line ministries may be involved, 
each starting preparations for the introduction of new legal measures. Although the 
government aims for some coordination by having only one ‘lead’ ministry, it is rather 
common that two and sometimes three ministries jointly have the lead in the 
preparatory process. After consulting the State Council, the proposal is discussed by the 
Council of Ministers. With the Council’s approval, the proposal is submitted to 
parliament for debate. Government bills are debated by both chambers. In each 
chamber these discussions normally start within the standing committees and are then 
followed by a discussion at the floor. The discussion results in amendments of the text 
submitted by the government, which are subsequently sent back and forth between 
both chambers. The aim of this procedure is to arrive at a common text, which can be 
approved by both chambers. However, if this is not immediately possible, there is 
special procedure of conciliation to resolve the differences. If this procedure fails and 
both chambers are incapable of adopting the same text, the National Assembly has the 
last word (Article 45 of the Constitution). 
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Table 10.1: French legal instruments 
Régulations  Loi ordinaire DDAC Ordonnace 
Décret Arrêté 
 
Circulaire 
 Law Law with 
the format 
of omnibus 
bill 
Ordinance Government 
decree 
Ministerial 
order 
Communication 
Main 
features 
Issues for 
which the 
Constitution 
calls for 
settlement 
through law 
Transposes 
a number 
of 
directives 
preferably 
in one 
policy area 
Government 
measure with 
the status of 
law based on 
parliamentary 
authorization 
(loi 
d’habilitation) 
Provisions 
issued by 
government 
without 
explicit 
authorization 
through law 
for 
‘executive’ 
issues, or 
with 
authorization 
for other 
issues  
 
Provisions 
issued by the 
minister 
without 
explicit 
authorization 
through law 
for 
‘executive’ 
issues, or 
with 
authorization 
for other 
issues  
 
Provisions 
issued by a 
minister 
without explicit 
authorization 
through law  
 
Advice State 
Council 
Required Required Required Required Not required Not required 
Parliamentary 
approval  
Required 
 
Required ‘Required’, 
Parliament 
must approve 
the 
ordinances 
after its 
adoption 
n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Procedure Simple 
majority in 
Parliament 
Simple 
majority in 
Parliament 
Emergency 
procedure 
Decision by 
the Council 
of Ministers 
on a 
proposal of a 
minister 
  
Remarks   Temporary 
decree, 
sometimes 
used in case 
of an 
infraction 
procedure  
  As such not 
sufficient to 
transpose 
directives 
  
Omnibus bill (diverses disposition d’adaptation au droit communautaire or DDAC) 
This instrument is equivalent to law, and follows the same procedure as a bill. This 
only difference with a ‘normal’ bill is that this proposal contains a text that transposes a 
number of directives. Normally, these directives refer to related policy areas. 
 The introduction of an omnibus is usually discussed with the presidents of the 
National Assembly and the Senate in order to see whether the list contains issues that 
might be politically sensitive. If that is the case, parliament as well as the government 
prefer to introduce a separate bill for those issues to avoid that the omnibus bill is 
delayed in the parliamentary process. As indicated, if a bill triggers amendments, it has 
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to go through a lengthy and time consuming negotiations process in which both 
chambers first try to find some common text, before the National Assembly can make a 
final decision. Without substantial amendments, the bill can be passed at rather short 
notice. 
 
Ordinances based on an authorization law (loi d’habilitation) 
Based on Article 38 of the Constitution, the government may propose to Parliament the 
authorization to transpose a number of directives by government ordinances 
(ordonnances) for issues that normally would require the adoption of law. Hence, they 
contain detailed provisions that fall within the scope of the legislative purview of the 
Parliament. The authorization, however, is limited in time. Moreover, the ordinances 
need to be ratified by Parliament in a ‘yes-no’ vote. Since these ordinances have the 
status of law, they can only be changed by law (or a new authorization law that again 
provides government this authority). 
 In general, parliament only prefers the use of ordinances in rather exceptional 
circumstances. The main disadvantage of this instrument is that parliament no longer 
has the possibility of amendment. Once the government has adopted an ordinance, 
parliament only has the possibility to approve or reject the measure. 
 The use of authorization law is a derogative and exceptional procedure which allows 
for an expeditious way of dealing with a subset of legal matters that are not overly 
politically sensitive but represents a part of the transposition backlog. So far, the use of 
authorization laws as a way to transpose directives is limited to one or two proposals 
per year. This rather small frequency is not surprising since each authorization law 
includes a list of directives, especially those which are delayed. Most recently, the 
government proposed an authorization law in March 2004, which includes 20 different 
directives.85  
 
Government decree (Décret).  
Based on Article 37 of the constitution, the government can independently adopt 
decrees using its executive power. Decrees can also be based on the delegation of 
authority to government by law. Decrees are not considered by parliament (the 
possibility of call-back is not used for decrees in France). Proposals for decrees have to 
be submitted to the State Council, which considers the legal quality of the draft, its 
consistency with the constitution and other national laws, and its compatibility with EU 
law. 
 
Ministerial order (Arrêté) 
Based on Article 37 and 21 of the constitution, ministers may also issue ministerial 
orders in order to further develop ‘executive’ issues within their ministerial portfolio. 
These orders are approved by a minister without the approval of parliament or the 
Council of Ministers. However, they need an authorization to do so based on a 
government decree or a law. 
                                                 
85  Loi n° 2004-237 du 18 mars 2004 portant habilitation du Gouvernement à transposer, par ordonnance, 
des directives communautaires et à mettre en oeuvre certaines dispositions du droit communautaire, 
JORF 19 Mardi 2004. This law delegates the government to transpose 20 directives, which contain 
‘legislative’ issues, by ordinance. 
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10.3.2 Techniques 
Mostly, EU directives are transposed into the French legal order using incorporation in 
the system (corpus) of already existing laws (rewording). Copying and transposition 
through referencing does not occur. Transposition through incorporation is very time-
consuming. The existing system and concepts of the French legal order are maintained 
as much as possible. This sometimes leads to rather peculiar situations. For instance, 
as one official commented, it is not customary in France to include definitions in a 
legal text. 86 For more recent directives, which start by defining the most important 
concepts, these definitions are not included in the French text. In addition, if a directive 
is transposed through law, the introduction of a new bill is often used to add elements 
of national policy, which are not necessary. These new elements may trigger additional 
discussion, which could cause delay. 
 France also uses two other techniques: 
1. the introduction of an omnibus bill (DDAC), which transposes a number of 
directives, and 
2. transposition through the passing of a law (loi d’habilitation) delegating the 
government to pass measures (ordinances) to transpose a number of directives. 
10.3.3  Character and level of implementing measure 
In France, there is little information available concerning the use of these instruments 
in transposing directives. The SGCI and the various line ministries keep track of the 
directives that still need to be transposed. The moment this has been achieved, the 
information about the transposed directives is no longer preserved. The general 
perception is that about 40% of the instruments used to transpose directives are laws 
(including DDAC and ordinances). About 60% are government decrees and ministerial 
orders. Here it is important to point out that some directives may require both the 
introduction of a law and decrees since they cover both ‘legislative’ and ‘executive’ 
issues. Furthermore, based on the existing French legal system, the transposition of a 
directive may require the change of several instruments due to the hierarchical 
specification of legal norms. A directive may require a change in law, government 
degrees and ministerial orders since it introduces general legislative principles next to 
executive principles, which both have to be further specified by additional decrees or 
ministerial orders.  
 The latter is often referred to as the cascade-model, which is typical for French law. 
The legal system is regarded as a hierarchical system of norms in which similar but 
new norms need to be specified in the same way as already existing ones. This way of 
categorizing legal norms may contribute to coherence, but is, at the same time, rather 
time consuming. 
10.3.4 Specific instruments 
In addition to the ‘regular’ legal instruments mentioned in Section 10.3.1 no other 
specific instruments are used in France. 
                                                 
86  A problem already identified in the 1990 communication of Prime Minister Rocard. 
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10.4 The national policy cycle concerning directives 
10.4.1 General overview of the process 
In the French EU policy cycle, the central government takes the lead. The general 
coordination on EU policy is in the hands of the Secrétariat Général du Comité 
Interministériel pour les questions de cooperation économique européenne (SGCI), which one 
of the interdepartmental coordination units under the supervision of the Prime 
Minister.87 The SGCI is responsible for European Affairs, while other units focus on 
different issues. The SGCI has a staff of about 180 persons. The desire of successive 
presidents to influence European issues has meant that the President has paid close 
attention to the organization and work of the SGCI. On occasions the head of the SGCI 
‘…has been a personal friend and collaborator of the President’ (Elgie, 2003: 111-2). At 
the same time, since 1958 the Secretary General of the SGCI has always been the 
personal adviser for European affairs of the Prime Minister. 
 With regard to transposition, another coordination unit is also important, the 
Secrétariat Général du Gouvernment (SGG). The SGG is in charge of the coordination of 
the making of law and government decrees in the administration. It is an 
administrative partner of the Prime Minister’s cabinet. With regard to both the 
preparation of the French position on new Commission initiatives and the 
transposition of adopted directives, SGCI and SGG have to work together as their 
responsibilities overlap. While SGCI is functionally involved with European issues, 
SGG manages, among others, the national measures to transpose EU directives into 
the French legal order. 
 This ‘dual’ responsibility for EU directives translates into an additional coordination 
structure that has been recently installed as part of the Prime Minister’s 
communication on transposition: the interdepartmental committee. It is a network of 
about 20 people—les hauts fontionnaires de transposition, i.e. civil servants including the 
legal directors and the secretary generals of the ministries, representatives from the 
SGG and the SGCI. 
 Finally, within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs there is a special post of the Junior 
Minister for European Affairs (Ministre Délégué aux Affaires Européennes). This minister 
and her supporting unit are responsible for the horizontal coordination of French 
policy-making in the EU has, however, little power in the transposition process 
whatsoever. 
 The French coordination of the policy process concerning EU directives can be 
briefly characterized as a rather formalized process, which is coordinated by several 
bodies: although the SGCI takes the lead in coordinating the French position on new 
Commission initiatives, SGG is involved since new Commission proposals may have 
consequences for the French legal order. At the stage of transposition, the 
responsibilities of SGCI and SGG become even more interconnected. Furthermore, the 
Junior Minister for European Affairs within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs seems to 
have taken responsibility in presenting overviews of the progress in transposition to the 
line ministries. Finally, the recently installed interdepartmental committee, which 
meets once per two to three months, brings together these different actors as well as 
                                                 
87  Such as the comité interministériel pour la société de l’information or the comité interministériel sur la 
sécurité routiere. 
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the line ministries. Figure 10.1 presents an overview of the French policy process 
concerning directives. 
 
Figure 10.1: Transposition of EU Texts into National Law under Circular 27 September 
2004 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Based on Sauron (2000: 135).  
10.4.1.1   National preparation of Commission initiatives 
There is hardly any systematic and early discussion of Commission initiatives in the 
French political and administrative system. The SGCI, with the help of the Permanent 
Representation, keeps itself informed about major Commission initiatives. This may 
lead to the presentation of important Commission papers to the administration and 
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sometimes Parliament. However, there is no systematic way in which information on 
(all) forthcoming Commission proposals is collected and channeled through the French 
administration. 
10.4.1.2   National treatment of Commission proposals 
In the negotiation phase in Brussels, the SGCI is the supreme coordinating authority. 
Under Article 88-4 of the French Constitution, the SGCI receives draft texts of 
Commission measures from the Permanent Representation in Brussels. When 
agreement on the French position is reached, the SGCI communicates the position to 
the Permanent Representation. Line ministries or bodies such as the SGG do not 
formally communicate with the Permanent Representation. All correspondence is sent 
by the SGCI. The cooperation between the Permanent Representation and the SGCI 
includes the ‘drafting of alternative proposals for the negotiations as part of the Council 
working parties, additional expert advice from the line ministries on technical matters, 
and legal advice on some of the proposals’ (Sauron, 2000: 88-89). In this way, the 
SGCI functions as the linking pin between the national administration and the 
negotiations in Brussels, maintaining consistency in the French position throughout 
the EU legislative process. 
 After receiving the draft texts of Commission measures from the Permanent 
Representation, the SGCI sends these proposals immediately to the State Council and 
the SGG. The State Council has to determine the legislative or executive nature of these 
drafts. It has seven working days from receipt to inform the SGCI and the SGG of its 
findings. The determination of the boundary between legislative and executive contents 
often causes agitated discussions in the State Council, since the reasons to classify an 
issue as ‘legislative’ or ‘executive’ are not fixed and may differ per policy area. The 
distribution of fire arms is, for instance, covered by a law from 1936 which indicates 
that it falls under ‘executive’. 
 The SGCI’s role in the negotiation phase is to achieve the coordination of the 
French position on the proposal among the various ministries involved. The SGCI 
selects the line ministries and starts discussions in ad hoc committees typically at 
middle-management/expert levels which are formed for each Commission proposal. In 
these discussions, the SGCI plays an important role in shaping the French position by 
raising questions above and beyond what Ministries will suggest as possible positions 
and by balancing a range of conflicting arguments in order to achieve a consensus is 
the SGCI primary goal at this stage. If needed, key issues may be brought to the 
attention of the Ministers’ advisers and Prime Minister’s advisers for ‘political’ 
arbitration. The most affected line ministry will act as the ‘leading’ ministry in the 
process, but often this includes two or sometimes three different ministries. The 
leading ministry (or ministries) sends its opinion on the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality (if they apply) to the SGCI. Within one month after dispatch of the draft 
measure to the lead ministry, the latter prepares an assessment of the implications of 
the proposal and how it will affect French law. The results of this assessment together 
with other key data on the proposal are organized as an impact data sheet (fiche 
d’impact).88 This data sheet identifies the difficulties with the proposal including those 
                                                 
88  The impact data sheet as used within the administration is sometimes more detailed than the one sent to 
Parliament. 
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related to the transposition of the current proposal into national law. If the assessment 
suggests that the proposal may raise important transposition problems, the SGCI seeks 
advice from the State Council.  
 Hence, in the early stages of the negotiation, the French representatives to the 
working groups of the Council are often not fully equipped with the detailed legal 
impact assessment of the Commission’s proposal or of possible amendments. 
 Within 24 hours of receiving the advice of the State Council, the SGG sends to the 
presidents of each chamber of parliament the draft text of the Commission proposal 
which has provisions of a legislative nature, together with the opinion of the State 
Council. Parliament lists these proposals in the parliamentary information bulletin 
(Sauron, 2000: 110). After being informed by the SGG, the SGCI also distributes to the 
EU select committees of the two chambers of Parliament the opinions of the State 
Council on those drafts which do not contain provisions of a legislative nature. 
 A reduced version of the impact data sheet or fiche is sent to Parliament for those 
proposals that were labeled as législative. During the negotiations in Brussels start, the 
SGCI checks whether Parliament has indicated an intention to adopt a position on a 
proposal based on the fiche. The National Assembly and the Senate, however, have to 
adopt an opinion if the Commission’s proposal falls under Article 88-4 of the French 
Constitution. Otherwise, it does not have a compulsory mandate. In general, 
Parliament ‘rarely’ discusses new Commission proposals based on the fiches. If 
Parliament, however, has indicated its intention to adopt a position on the proposal but 
fails to react while agreement of a proposal by the Council of Ministers is expected (6 
weeks according to the Treaty of Amsterdam), the minister responsible for the 
negotiations or the Junior Minister for European Affairs can ask Parliament to 
accelerate their examination.  
 During the negotiations in Brussels, the impact data sheet may need to be updated, 
especially if the Commission proposal is substantially amended by the member states 
during the negotiations in the Council working parties. This update, however, is not 
systematically pursued. The updates in quality and never include any financial 
assessment at the negotiation stage.  
10.4.1.3   National transposition  
Until 1986 there had not been a central mechanism for coordinating the transposition 
of EU directives in France. In his 1986 communication Prime Minister Rocard 
transferred this additional task to the SGCI and the SGG which made the coordination 
between these two institutions crucial for swift transposition.89 This coordination of the 
transposition process was fine tuned in the subsequent communications of the Prime 
Ministers Rocard (1990), Jospin (1998) and Raffarin (2004) and is summarized in 
Table 10.2.90 
 The preparations for transposition normally start after the agreement on a new 
measure by the EU and its publication in the Official Journal. 
                                                 
89  Circulaire du 23 janvier 1986 relative a la procédure de suivi de la transposition des directives 
communautaires en droit interne . 
90  Circulaire du 25 janvier 1990 relative a la procédure de suivi de la transposition des directives 
communautaires en droit interne ; Cirulaire du 9 novembre 1998 relative a la procédure de suivi de la 
transposition des directives communautaires en droit interne ; Circulaire du 27 septembre 2004 relative 
a la procédure de transposition en droit interne des directives et décisions-cadres négociées dans le cadre 
des institutions européennes. 
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 The SGCI allocates the task of transposing the directive to the ministries which have 
already participated in shaping the French position. Again preferably one, but often 
several ministries have the lead in this process of preparing legal measures reducing 
the autonomy of the lead ministry. The leading ministry, other relevant line ministries 
and the SGG are informed about the proposal. The leading ministry, and possibly some 
of the other line ministries affected by the directive, start preparing the measures to 
transpose the directive. The way in which the various ministries handle transposition 
varies, however, and is not based on similar rules of procedure. As Sauron (2000: 138) 
indicates ‘no ministry has a central structure with the task of ensuring the sound 
integration of EU law into the positions adopted by the ministry, and attempting to 
prevent legal disputes arising’. In practice, ministries have not reviewed their structures 
with the demands of EU work in mind, but rather they have been concerned not to 
disturb the internal administrative balance between the old central directorates. This 
runs counter to the earlier communications of the prime minister of 9 November 1998 
and 27 September 2004, which state that ‘the central administration should include a 
clearly identifiable structure, specifically responsible for overseeing transposition in all 
the areas for which the ministry is responsible.’ As the communications indicate, ‘this 
role may, for example, be given to the directorate responsible for legal affairs or for 
international affairs.’ However, most ministries do not have a legal affairs unit at the 
level of a directorate or as a staff unit of the minister. The only exceptions seem to be 
the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Economy and Finances (see also 
Sauron, 2000: 140-1) and Agriculture, National Education and the Interior, traditionally 
having direction des libertés publiques et des affaires juridiques which comes close to legal 
affairs units. 
 The SGCI also informs the Junior Minister for European Affairs or the responsible 
minister about how the possible resolutions of the parliament were taken into account 
during the negotiations, if the proposal, or parts of it, were labeled as ‘legislative’.  
 
Table 10.2: Main stages and average time frame for transposing EU directives in France:  
laws, government decrees and ministerial orders  
Stage Actor average 
duration 
law decree order 
1 Allocation of administrative 
responsibility 
SGCI  ● ● ● 
2 Preparation of draft text Lead ministry 3 months ● ● ● 
3 Comments on draft text Other ministries interested 2 weeks ● ● ● 
4 Discussion of draft text Interdepartmental meeting  ● ● ● 
5 Distribution of text SGG  ● ● ● 
6 Advice on delicate legal issues State Council  ● ● ● 
7 Examination of text in SGG SGG 2-4 months ● ● ● 
8 Parliamentary review and approval Committees in National 
Assembly and Senat 
 
6 weeks 
●   
9 Consultation with interest groups Interest groups and 
compulsory advisory bodies 
3-6 months ● ●  
10 Check by interested ministries  Ministries 2- 4 months   ● 
11 Compulsory rule to inform the 
cabinet about a ministerial decree Cabinet 
Several hours 
to a couple 
of weeks 
  
 
● 
12 Reinforcement President of the Republic 15 days ● ● ● 
13 Forwarding of legislative text for 
publication 
  ● ● ● 
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 Then, regular meetings at the SGCI allow for interdepartmental discussion, 
coordination and approval of the proposals prepared by the ministries. The ministries 
must draw up a time-table for the transposition process within 3 months. In choosing 
the ‘type of legal instrument that will be appropriate for the transposition of the 
directive’, the lead ministry must take into account the opinion of the State Council—
which was presented at the beginning of the negotiation process—if the directive is one 
of those on which it has been consulted under the procedure laid down in the 
communication of 21 April 1993 on the application of article 88-4 of the Constitution. 
If there is persistent disagreement on such measures, the prime minister can be asked 
to resolve the dispute.  
 Two activities come together at this point: (1) the impact data sheet, prepared at the 
start of negotiation and containing detailed information on how the new directive 
affects French law and which legal instruments need to be adapted or added in order to 
comply with the obligations based on the new measure; (2) the implementation table to 
be prepared during the transposition process by the SGCI and the Junior Minister for 
European Affairs, i.e. the impact data sheet is reworked into an implementation plan 
for the stage of transposition in which the text becomes more elaborated and precise 
(Sauron, 2000: 136). The circular of 9 November 1998 introduced the procedure 
according to which the SGCI sends a list of all pending directives directly to the SGG 
every six months. The SGG should ‘…draw it to the attention of the relevant members 
of the Prime Minister’s cabinet, and to the director of the cabinet of each minister and 
junior minister concerned.’ The SGCI attends the regular meetings with the directors 
of the cabinets of all ministers to agree on their work programs (including the 
transposition of directives) organized by the SGG. During these meetings SGCI brings 
transposition deadlines to the attention of the cabinets and may resolve some of the 
difficulties. If there are disageements between ministries, the Prime Minister’s cabinet 
can be asked to intervene, and the SGG will arrange a meeting. 
 It is the responsibility of the SGG to send the drafts of the most important national 
legislative texts to the appropriate administrative sections of the State Council. In 
practice the State Council considers all laws and regulations before they reach the 
agenda of the French Cabinet, and also about half of all regulatory decrees before they 
are published (Sauron, 2000: 139). Because of the missing experience and lack of legal 
services, Sauron argues that the quality of work of ministries differs considerably. 
Whereas the drafting quality of the big, old, traditional ministries like justice, 
economics and finances and foreign affairs is high, the drafting quality of the rather 
new, inexperienced and smaller ministries is low (environment). Advice is given in the 
form of a new draft text based on the draft prepared by the government and a note 
explaining briefly the reasons for any disagreement with the text originally proposed. 
The government, then, has to choose between its initial text and that of the State 
Council. The SGG has to be particularly careful to take account of the advice when it 
has concluded that a proposed legal provision is unconstitutional or that a provision 
within a decree is contrary to a law. Normally, the advice is followed, fearing otherwise 
that the text will subsequently be rejected or annulled either by the State Council 
judicial sections or by the Constitutional Court.  
 The circular of 27 September 2004 results in a new simplified structure for the set-
up of the impact data sheet. In order to speed up the delivery of the study, they are 
directly sent to parliament. The SGCI, then circulates it to the other ministries involved 
which have 2 weeks to react. Then, there is a meeting of representatives of ministry of 
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lower-level (international and European affairs civil servants in each ministry) 
conducting a provisional and conservative assessment. In the past the SGCI was very 
conservative in these meetings, addressing only those questions asked by the ministries 
themselves. Then, on the Cabinet-level the instruments are discussed in several rounds 
and more political issues are addressed.  
 Then, normally, the SGG sends the draft text to the Parliament which has to vote in 
both chambers in favor, first, in the permanent committee under which supervision the 
text fall and then in the full plenary. Here, the consultation with interest groups and 
compulsory advisory bodies is important and time-consuming. Although hearings and 
consultations of advisory bodies and interest groups cannot change any text of the 
national legislation, they are compulsory and cause considerable delay: 3 to 6 months 
(Philip, 2004). 
Moreover, the compulsory rules to inform the cabinet of the Prime Minister about 
a ministerial decree before it can be published in the Official Journal causes additional 
delays between several hours and up to 2 to 4 months. 
 Once it has been finally adopted, the Act of Parliament is transmitted to the 
Government. The President of the Republic promulgates the Act within fifteen days of 
its transmittal. Before this period has expired the President may still ask Parliament to 
reconsider the Act or some of its provisions.  
Lastly, an Act of Parliament may be referred to the Constitutional Council, before 
promulgation, by the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the President of 
the National Assembly, the President of the Senate, sixty deputies or sixty senators. Any 
statute or statutory provision, found unconstitutional cannot be promulgated or 
implemented. 
 The transposition process in France may also involve the consultation of French 
representations in the other member states to find out how they transpose the directive, 
and if there have been any difficulties they have encountered (Sauron, 2000: 136). Such 
enquiries yield information on the legal position in the other member states, and thus 
enable the transposition in France. It takes this information into account and avoids 
putting national operators at a disadvantage by comparison with their competitors. This 
procedure may be preceded by consultation with the Commission, either on a voluntary 
basis, or as a requirement of the EU text. In these cases the relevant DG of the 
Commission is asked for advice on the text of the draft national law. 
10.4.2 Bureaucratic consultative and coordinating bodies 
The main administrative consultative and coordinating bodies in the French 
administration on EU law are: 
– the Secrétariat Général du Comité Interministériel (SGCI), which coordinates the 
preparation of the French position during the negotiations in Brussels and the 
transposition of directives in the French administration; 
– the Secrétariat Général du Gouvernement (SGG), which is the general coordinating 
body with regard to the making of law and government decrees; 
– the interdepartmental committee on transposition (réseau interministériel des 
correspondants de la transposition), which has been recently installed based on the 
2004 communication of Prime Minister Raffarin; and 
– the Junior Minister for European Affairs, who plays a role in the monitoring of the 
progress in transposition and supervises whether the line ministries keep to the 
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time-tables made at the beginning of the transposition process. He also cooperates 
with the SGCI on the preparation of the overviews on a quarterly basis which are 
used in the interdepartmental committee on transposition and eventually the 
Council of Ministers for ‘naming and shaming’ the laggards. 
 The most important body with regard to the preparation and the implementation of 
EU policy is SGCI in collaboration with the SGG. SGCI is an administrative unit under 
the prime minister without much political authority, whereas the SGG is the 
administrative arm of the Prime Minister. Coordination of these two institutions is 
important for successful transposition of EU law. The SGCI arranges meetings with 
each ministry two or three times a year to review the progress in transposition of each 
directive. At these meetings line ministries are asked to commit themselves to a precise 
time table for transposition. The SGG scrutinize and delivers draft text back and forth 
to the State Council and the Parliament. 
 Since 1993 the SGCI maintains an overview of all directives requiring transposition 
(implementation table). Regularly updated, this overview allows SGCI to check whether 
line ministries are respecting the time-table for transposition envisaged in each 
directive. This data-base also provides information on how the workload associated with 
transposition is divided between areas in which parliamentary law is required and those 
in which governmental regulations will suffice.  
 Based on the recent communication of Prime Minister Raffarin, a new 
interdepartmental coordination body is installed in 27 November 2004 in order to 
improve the coordination and France performance on transposition.91 It consists of an 
informal group of about 20 people, the hauts fonctionnaires de transposition, i.e. senior 
managers (either the legal director of the Secretary General of the Ministry, the 
Secretary General of the SGG and the Secretary General of the SGCI joined by some 
personal advisers to key Ministers. Stressing that every member of government to be 
responsible for their deficit as from that date92 the interdepartmental committee on 
transposition is in charge of the preparation of transposition. Its members are of the 
line ministries and of the political cabinets of each minister. The committee is jointly 
chaired by the SGCI and the SGG. The committee supervises the implementation of 
EU legislation by regularly discussing detailed overviews on the progress of 
transposition. It aims to ‘coordinate’ the coordinators as well as motivate the line 
ministries in making progress. The relative autonomy of the line ministries, the 
existence of several coordinating bodies, the infrequent meetings of the overarching 
interdepartmental coordination committee, and perhaps the still insufficient political 
backing for introducing more substantial changes within the administration, makes the 
French coordination structure on transposition rather weak.  
 Based on one of these reports presented in the transposition interdepartmental 
committee by the Junior Minister for European Affairs, there are rather substantial 
differences in the performance of individual ministries. Whereas the ministry for 
Agriculture handles transposition quite efficiently, traditionally autonomous ministries, 
such as the ministries of Finances and Economic Affairs lag behind. Based on a recent 
                                                 
91  Circulaire du 27 septembre 2004 relative à la procédure de transposition en droit interne des directives et 
décisions-cadres négociées dans le cadre des institutions européennes, JORF 2004 2 octobre 2004. 
92  Already mentioned in the circular by Michel Rocard from 1990. 
chapter 10 
108 
overview 83 directives93 were not transposed on time. They were distributed over the 
various line ministries as follows:  
– Economy, Finance and Industry: 28 directives 
– Environment: 13 directives 
– Agriculture: 9 directives,  
– Health and Family: 9 directives, 
– Transport and Tourism: 9 directives 
– Justice: 7 directives, 
– Education and research: 3 directives, 
– Interior and Security: 2 directives, 
– Employment and Social Cohesion: 2 directives, 
– Culture and Communication: 1 directive 
So far the committee has met three times, suggesting that it meets once per two to 
three months. The last three meetings could identify 14 directives whose transposition 
problematic was resolved immediately. 
10.4.3 The role of compulsory advisory bodies 
Three compulsory advisory bodies can be identified in the French transposition 
process: the State Council, interest groups and the Economic and Social Affairs 
Council. One of the standard and traditional procedures within the French 
administration is the consultation of the ‘chronically work-overloaded’ State Council by 
the SGG on legislative proposals while they are in preparation. There are two options of 
action: First, the State Council concentrates on determining whether the text will 
require legislative action or can be dealt with by government regulation. And second, 
the State Council gives its opinion in a very short space of time, eight days on average 
(Sauron, 2000: 120). Moreover, an emergency procedure has been established to 
respond very rapidly to the SGG and the SGCI when the latter indicates that a decision 
by the EU Council of Ministers is imminent. It is the responsibility of the SGG to send 
the drafts of the all national legislative texts to the appropriate administrative sections 
of the State Council. In practice the State Council considers all laws and regulations, 
before they reach the agenda of the French Cabinet, and also about half of all regulatory 
decrees before they are published.  
 Although hearings and consultations of interest groups cannot change any text of 
the national legislation, they are compulsory and cause considerable delays (especially 
relevant in the field of health and environment). According to Philip (2004) these 
delays are on average between 3 to 6 months. Philip argues that it would be preferable 
to have consultations with interest groups during the negotiation phase and not 
afterwards. First these interventions come too late and could be held earlier during the 
preparation of the national negotiation position. Second, the institutionalized meetings 
often cause delay due to their low frequency. The Commission spéciale des installations 
nucléaires de base secretes and the Agence francaise de sécurité sanitaire des aliments, for 
example, meet only once a year. The committee of public health meets every three 
months.  
                                                 
93  Communication de Mme Claudie Haigneré, Ministre déléguée aux Affaires européennes sur la 
transposition des directives. 
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 The Economic and Social Council is a consultative assembly. It does not play a role 
in the adoption of statutes and regulations, but advises the lawmaking bodies on 
questions of social and economic policies. 
The executive may refer any question or proposal of social or economic importance to 
the Economic and Social Council. Before adopting statutes, Parliament may consult the 
Economic and Social Council; this body, comprising the whole range of the country's 
economic and social forces, is regularly entrusted with studies on the major economic 
and social issues affecting the life of the nation. According to Articles 69-71, the 
Economic and Social Council, on a reference from the Government, gives its opinion 
on such government bills, draft ordinances or decrees, and Members' bills as have been 
submitted to it. A member of the Economic and Social Council may be designated by 
the Council to present, to the parliamentary assemblies, the opinion of the Council on 
such bills or drafts as have been submitted to it. The Economic and Social Council may 
likewise be consulted by the Government on any economic or social issue. Any plan or 
program bill of an economic or social character shall be submitted to it for its opinion. 
10.4.4 The role of parliament 
The French Parliament has hardly any influence in the bargaining phase whereas 
during the transposition process it can delay the process considerably. Still during the 
bargaining process in Brussels, the French Parliament is immediately informed via a 
fiche of new Commission proposals. The items on the French fiches are presented in 
Table 10.3. Next to information about the background and legal base of the 
Commission proposal, the fiche includes an assessment of the impact of the proposal 
on the French legal order, the relevance of the proposal to France and the initial 
position of the government, based on the discussions between the line ministries and 
the SGCI, on the proposal. 
 The fiche sent to parliament is based on the impact data sheet, which is made to 
assess how the proposal affects the French legal order. Parliament only receives fiches 
for proposals with ‘legislative’ content. The impact data sheet is primarily an 
administrative instrument, which is the basis of the less detailed and more 
concentrated fiche. The quality of the fiches, and the underlying impact assessments, 
however, varies considerably and is sometimes not reliable. Moreover, they do not 
include any assessment of financial and administrative issues related to the proposal. 
Apparently, members of Parliament hardly use the fiches to prepare their opinion on 
the new Commission initiatives. Instead, they meet with representatives from the SGCI 
and the ministries concerned in order to make their recommendation and stay in 
regular contact with the attachés of the National Assembly and Senate at the Permanent 
Representation of France in Brussels. 
 Since 2003 the government aims to intensify the debate in the preparation phase 
with the help of monthly consultations with the parliament. Parliament can discuss 
with the government the French position during the negotiations, but parliament 
cannot impose its will on the government, or presents the government with a mandate 
for the negotiations.  
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Table 10.3: Contents of French fiches  
1 resumé of content, background and objectives 
2 judicial base 
3 assessment of proposed legislation 
4 special France’s interest in the proposal 
5 position of the government 
 
 The government has to comply with a period of one month in which parliament has 
the chance to present its position, before taking its final bargaining position in the 
European Council. The Delegation on European Affairs has 6 weeks to draft 
recommendations on the report sent to parliament by the SGG. The latter sends the 
comments as soon as possible to the SGCI, which on its turn has to ask Parliament to 
present a report. During this period, the French delegation negotiation a proposal has 
to ask for a scrutiny reservation until the recommendation of Parliament is available. If 
the Parliament’s deadline to adopt an opinion passes the parliamentary reserve is lifted 
because its lack of action. 
 During the transposition phase, in most cases bills are transmitted by the SGG for 
consideration to the Parliament. A rapporteur is appointed and after studying the bill 
presents a draft report or opinion. Bills are included on the Assembly's agenda by the 
Chairmen's Conference, which meets each week under the chairmanship of the 
President of the Assembly. Its other members are the Vice-Presidents, the chairmen of 
standing committees, the general rapporteur of the Finance Committee, the chairman 
of the Delegation for the European Union, the chairmen of political groups and a 
representative of the Government. The Chairmen's Conference determines the agenda 
for the following three weeks. Precedence is given to discussing bills in the order 
determined by the Government. The Constitutional Act of 4 August 1995 specifies, 
however, that precedence is given at one sitting per month to business determined by 
the Assembly; by a resolution carried in March 1998 the Chairmen's Conference may 
determine how the items remaining on this agenda are to be debated. 
 After debating the committee adopts the report recommending either adoption of 
the bill or rejection. Government bills are debated on the basis of the text proposed by 
government. After closure of the general debate, the bill is considered clause by clause. 
On each clause, any amendments are first debated and voted upon, and then the clause 
itself, when all clauses have been considered in turn, the chairman puts the entire bill 
to vote. Consideration of a bill on the floor of the Assembly may also be dealt with more 
rapidly. Changes made in the Assembly’s rules of procedure in March 1998 introduced 
the simplified examination procedure. Before it is finally adopted by Parliament, a bill 
must be passed in identical terms by both assemblies. If the Senate amends a bill 
brought from the Assembly, the Assembly has to reconsider the clause amended 
(‘navette’). This shuttle procedure can take up to 3-4 months. 
10.4.5 The role of other, subnational or functional governments 
Subnational governments do not play a role in the process of transposition. 
Transposition in France is an activity in the line ministries of the central government. 
Since France does not have functional governments, they do not play a role either. 
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10.4.6 The role of interest groups  
The interest groups are normally consulted by the lead ministry, i.e. relevant lobby 
groups, unions, employees- and employers organizations (partenaires sociales) and the 
plenary sessions. However, their opinions are not binding on the government. New text 
proposals cannot be considered. This is extremely frustrating for all affected and, 
moreover, cause considerable delays (3 to 6 months according to Philip, 2004). 
10.5 Analysis of instruments  
10.5.1 Advantages and disadvantages of instruments 
Timeliness. The rather slow and often late transposition of EU directives in France is not 
a direct result of the lacking of special legal instruments, which may increase the speed 
of the transposition process. Although a substantial number of directives are 
transposed through lower-level instruments, that is, government decrees and 
ministerial orders, two possibilities exist to adopt legislative measure at rather short 
notice. These possibilities are: 
– an authorization law (loi d’habilitation), which provides the government with the 
authority to adopt ordinances. This instrument helps since it bypasses a length 
political debate in both chambers of Parliament and the shuttling of a proposal back 
and forth between the National Assembly and the Senate. An ordinance only needs 
to be approved by Parliament in a yes-no vote, without the possibility of 
amendment. In 2000 50 directives were transposed using this instrument, in 2004 
an authorization law was approved for the transposition of 23 directives. For 
important political issues like telecommunication and transport the government 
prefers to use ordinances; 
– a package law (DDAC), which includes the legislative measures transposing of a 
number of directives. The use of a package law helps to coordinate the order of the 
day in the parliament. Whereas the National Assembly could be monthly convened 
to vote on legislative measures to transpose EU law, the DDAC procedure 
accommodates the parliament’s organization of the hearing plan. Twice a month for 
half a day the parliament has reserved time to examine package laws, which helps to 
speed up the parliamentary procedure to adopt a new law. In contrast to ordinances, 
the package law follows the normal parliamentary procedure, which also means that 
members of parliament may propose amendments. The package laws are mostly 
reserved for politically non-controversial and often technical directives. In the last 
couple of years about three package laws have been introduced per year. 
 Interestingly, ministerial orders are often adopted at a very late moment despite the 
fact that the preparatory procedure is rather straightforward. Often the delay is caused 
by the obligatory consultations with stakeholders, which is based on the specific, 
national law regulating a policy area. Based on these provisions, the independent 
consultative bodies have to review proposed measures. The ministry or the government 
cannot impose any pressure on them resulting into a rather uncontrollable delay in 
transposition. 
 Completeness. In France the completeness of transposition (that is, are all elements 
from the directive included in the national legal instrument) is not associated with 
specific instruments. At the same time, ministers decide how many different 
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ministerial orders they want to adopt in order to fully transpose. Since these decisions 
are no further assessed, there may exist some omissions. 
 Clarity for those involved and practicability. As such the adoption of specific 
instruments does not have so much an impact on the clarity of the rules to executive 
agencies and courts. The use of several government decrees and ministerial orders to 
transpose a directive is intended to place those elements of a directive there were 
similar national rules are located. It therefore intends to improve the clarity of the 
French legal system. It is difficult to assess whether these intentions have the desired 
effect. 
 Flexibility. When introducing a new directive amending a previous directive in the 
same field, the use of government decrees and ministerial orders provide for more 
flexibility in the sense of being able to change existing rules at, in principle, rather short 
notice (except when extensive consultations with institutionalized stakeholders are 
required). As indicated, the procedure of introducing new law requires more time, 
which reduces flexibility.  
 Ordinances do not lead to more flexibility the moment these rules need to be: the 
initial delegation of lawmaking power to the government applies only for a number of 
specific directives. The moment one of these directives is amended, the amendments 
need to be introduced by law if they involve ‘legislative’ issues. In other words, the 
flexibility of ordinances is, with regard to ‘legislative’ issues, the same as law. 
 Systemic purity of the legal system. Maintaining systemic purity is not so much related 
to the use of the different legal instruments. It is more related to the French method of 
extensively re-writing the text of a directive (See Section 10.5.2). 
10.5.2 Advantages and disadvantages of techniques 
The techniques and methods of transposition in France are best characterized as 
extensively re-writing the text of a directive in order to introduce it as closely as possible 
to existing French law. Sometimes re-writing leads to a complete overhaul of the text 
with the risk that its meaning is affected. Furthermore, the new rules included in the 
directive are located there where similar French national rules are found. This mostly 
requires the adopted of several legal instruments, including government decrees and 
ministerial orders. In addition and due to the existence of linkages between different 
laws or regulations, additional decrees and/or ministerial orders need to be adapted. 
This ‘snowball’ effect in changing French law is often referred to as cascade. A large 
number of new measures may originate from the introduction of only one new 
directive. 
 By re-writing the text of the directive and introducing it there where it best fits to 
existing French law has the advantage of preserving the consistency of the French legal 
order. The disadvantage of this method is, is that the contents or the intensions of a 
directive may change in the process of transposition. Moreover, it also comes at the 
expensive of extensive and foremost time consuming work, including the adoption of 
multiple legal measures per directives, which contributes to the slow speed of 
transposition. 
 As some observers have indicated, the French tradition does not include definitions 
of key concepts in a legal text, which causes problems when directives include rather 
precise and detailed definitions of the main concepts used in the directive. This has led 
to a greater awareness to comment on the text of a proposal for a directive at the stage 
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of the negotiations in Brussels. The impact data sheet, which is made the moment a 
new Commission proposal is released, needs to pay attention to these complications. 
Moreover, the advice of the State Council at this stage could also be used in order to 
renegotiate the text of the proposed directive. This may speed up the subsequent 
process of transposition. 
 Since other techniques are rarely used in France, they are not included in our 
assessment. 
10.6 Analysis of national policy process 
The coordination of the preparation of the French position in Brussels as well as the 
transposition of EU directives is in the hands of the SGCI in cooperation with the SGG.  
 At the start of the preparations for the negotiations, the State Council prepares an 
advice on whether the proposal contains ‘legislative’ and/or ‘executive’ issues. This 
distinction is important to the procedure that will be followed, that is, whether or not 
parliament needs to be involved in the discussion on the directive. If directives refer to 
‘executive’ issues, parliament does not play a role in the shaping of the French position. 
If a proposal contains ‘legislative’ issues, Parliament may issue a recommendation to 
the government, which may affect the French position. 
 The line ministries have to assess the Commission proposal, which results into an 
impact data sheet (fiche d’impact). However, the quality of these assessments varies. 
Moreover, these assessments are not always made, or not on time. As Philip (2004: 52) 
shows, from the 47 proposals sent to the National Assembly between 1 September 2003 
and 18 June 2004 only 26 proposals included an impact assessment. From January 
2002 on the line ministries are obliged to make these assessments within three weeks 
after the release of the new Commission proposal. Here several problems within the 
French administration become appeared: 
– ministries are rather autonomous in France and often there are several ministries 
that are ‘leading’ in the process of preparing (and later transposing) Commission 
proposals; 
– the organization of legal expertise varies substantially within the ministries. 
Moreover, there is sometimes a lack of a central juridical service which could 
support or monitor the legal work. 
These problems are also present at the stage of transposition. Moreover, the civil 
servants in charge of the negotiations are hardly involved in the preparation of the legal 
measures. When finished, the transposition is moved to anther unit within the 
ministry. Moreover, there exists the impression that the French administration hardly 
consults the European Commission in relation to transposition, while consultations 
could help to identify and solve problems. 
 More in general, the transposition process in France is complicated and therefore 
often delayed due to a number of reasons, which all seem to be mutually dependent: 
– the substantial autonomy of the line ministries and the fact that sometimes several 
line ministries take the ‘lead’ in the preparatory and transposition process94; 
                                                 
94  In the cases of directives 2000/53 and 2003/17 two ministries were about taking the lead in the 
transposition process. Being asked Philip, ‘who is in charge of the transposition process?’, none of these 
ministries seemed to take the leading part which does not facilitate swift transposition (Philip, 2004: 52). 
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– the rather unsystematic way in which legal expertise is organized within the line 
ministries; 
– the excessive consultations with stakeholders based on French national law at the 
stage of transposition; 
– the existence of different priorities within the administration, which do not always 
provide high priority to transposition, or lead to the inclusion of additional 
unrelated issues in a legislative proposal that could delay the process due to 
extensive parliamentary discussion; 
– the involvement of different coordinating bodies, like SGCI and SGG, which may 
have different priorities in the process of passing legal measures through the 
Council of Ministers and, in the case of law, through Parliament. Furthermore, both 
SGCI as well as SGG organizes ad hoc meetings with the line ministries to monitor 
the progress of work. These meetings are often ‘doublées pour etre suivies d’effets’ 
(Philip, 2004: 62), which reduces the effectiveness of coordination; 
– the limited political power of the junior minister for EU Affairs, who is involved in 
monitoring the progress on transposition and reports to the Council of Ministers. 
This minister is not in the position to stand up against the line ministries (or their 
ministers); 
– limited involvement of Parliament at the negotiation stage leading to sometimes 
extensive discussions in parliament on legislative proposals transposing directives 
that are labeled as législative. 
Based on these factors France performance remains rather poor despite the fact that the 
SGCI has substantial capacity, the State Council is involved at a very early moment to 
assess how the proposed measures affect the French legal order, and the government 
obliges the ministries to use impact data sheets and implementation plans to guide 
their work on new Commission directives. 
 Recently, the French government has introduced some changes in the coordination 
of transposition. These include  
– the assignment of high-level officials responsible for transposition in the various 
line ministries, including a member of the (political) cabinet of each minister, and  
– regular discussions between these officials on the progress on transposition in the 
newly installed interdepartmental committee on transposition (réseau interministériel 
des correspondants de la transposition). 
The new committee meets one per two to three months to discuss and resolve 
bottlenecks in the transposition process by ‘naming and shaming’. The Junior Minister 
for EU Affairs leads these discussions and presents the results on transposition, which 
also be discussed in the Council of Ministers. At the moment, the work of the junior 
minister seems to be supported by the prime minister. It remains an open question 
whether this system will improve the French performance, especially since the political 
will to improve the performance of the line ministries seems to be crucial. Both the 
European Commission and Philip suggest that France needs to make transposition a 
national political priority, like Spain, Portugal and Ireland (Philip, 2004: 60).  
 As mentioned before, the national parliament is hardly involved in the preparation 
of the French position on new Commission initiatives. First, the distinction between 
‘legislative’ and ‘executive’ in French law means that Parliament’s role is limited to 
‘legislative’ Commission proposals. Second, although Parliament may adopt 
recommendations on Commission initiatives, which could shape the French position 
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in Brussels, the government is clearly in the lead with regard to these negotiations. 
Discussions on new EU measures are concentrated at the stage in which the 
government introduces legislative proposals to Parliament. At that point, and in view of 
the delay in transposition that has accumulated during the preparatory administrative 
phase, the introduction of an authorization law might be necessary to avoid any further 
delay in the process and possible Commission infringements. However, Parliament 
perceives this as a way to avoid discussion on issues that are regarded as important to 
Parliament. 
10.7 Conclusions  
• In France different legal instruments are available, which would allow the 
government to transpose EU directives in a swift and timely manner. First, the 
distinction between ‘legislative’ and ‘executive’ spheres in French law provides the 
government with autonomous power to adopt measures to transpose directives or 
parts of directives that refer to ‘executive’ issues. Second, for ‘legislative’ issues, the 
instrument of authorization law (loi d’habilitation) allows the government, after 
parliament’s approval, to transpose directives through ordinances in areas where 
law is required. Despite these possibilities, the French performance is far from 
impressive. 
• In case of emergency, the government proposes an authorization law in order to 
transpose a list of directives in a short period of time. Based on this law, the 
government is able to adopt ordinances on legislative issues which later have to be 
approved by Parliament (in a ‘yes-no’ vote). A major drawback of the use of this 
instrument is that Parliament feels that it is by passed by the executive on legislative 
issues. 
• Another often used technique is the package law or DDAC, which transposes a 
number of non-controversial directives preferably in a similar or related policy area. 
This package law is often more swiftly passed through Parliament than separate 
laws transposing each directive individually since it only requires the scheduling of 
one projet de loi instead of several. The technique is mostly used for rather technical 
issues which, in the French legal order, need to be introduced by law.  
• The French legal system makes a distinction between ‘legislative’ and ‘executive’ 
issues, that is, issues that need to be regulated by law or by government regulation. 
If directives refer to ‘executive’ issues, they can be directly transposed by 
government independently from parliamentary approval. If a directive contains 
‘legislative’ issues, it requires change in law through a parliamentary procedure and, 
most likely, the adoption of government decrees and/or ministerial orders. 
• The process of drafting the French position in Brussels as well as the transposition 
of directives at a later stage is a detailed, formalized procedure in which the SGCI 
plays a key coordinating role, while is with regard to the development of national 
implementing instruments supplemented with the SGG, which monitors the 
making of national law and decrees. Despite: 
– the substantial capacity of the SGCI; 
– an early involvement of the State Council to present advice on the way in 
which a proposed measure can be transposed in the French legal order;  
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– the use of an impact data sheet (fiche d’impact) in the stage of the negotiations 
in Brussels containing information of the expected effects of the proposed 
measures to France and the French legal order and the development of an 
implementation plan at the beginning of the stage of transposition, which 
presents an overview of the work that needs to be done, including a time 
table;  
 the performance of France remains rather poor. 
• Recent changes in France focus on: 
– the assignment of high-level officials responsible for transposition in the 
various line ministries, including a member of the (political) cabinet of each 
minister; 
– regular discussions between these officials on the progress on transposition 
in the newly installed interdepartmental committee on transposition (réseau 
interministériel des correspondants de la transposition); 
– which meets one per two to three months; 
– to discuss and resolve bottlenecks in the transposition process by ‘naming 
and shaming’; and 
– where the junior minister for EU Affairs presents the results to the Council 
of Ministers; 
– supported, at the moment, by the Prime Minister. 
It remains an open question whether this system will improve the French 
performance, especially since the political will to improve the performance of the 
line ministries seems to be crucial. 
• Complications in the French system, which may delay transposition include: 
– The substantial autonomy of the line ministries, which translates into the fact 
that often more than one ministry takes the lead in the transposition process 
as various legal instruments need to be prepared to transpose the contents of 
one directive; 
– The rather unsystematic way in which legal expertise is organized within the 
line ministries; 
– Excessive consultations with stakeholders based on French national law; 
– The existence of different political priorities within the administration, which 
do not always provide high priority to transposition, or lead to the inclusion 
of additional unrelated issues in a legislative proposal that could delay the 
process due to extensive parliamentary discussion; 
– The involvement of different coordinating bodies, like SGCI and SGG (in 
particular the cabinet of the Prime minister), which may have different 
priorities in the process of passing legal measures through the Council of 
Ministers and, in the case of law, through Parliament; and 
– The limited political power of the junior minister for EU Affairs, who is 
involved in monitoring the progress on transposition and reports to the 
Council of Ministers. 
• The techniques and methods of transposition in France are best characterized as 
extensive incorporation (that is, re-wording of the directive). There is a strong 
preference of maintaining the current structure of French national law and putting 
the contents of a directive there were similar elements are found based on national 
priorities. Moreover, the French legal tradition sometimes goes up against the 
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drafting of some directives leading to a complete overhaul of the text with the risk 
that its meaning is affected. 
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Appendix: List of interviewees  
• Christian Philip, Member of Parliament, National Assembly. 
• Thierry Anjubault, Administrator, Delegation of the European Union, 
National Assembly.  
• Jean-Michel Linois, Cabinet Deputy Director of the Junior Minister for 
European Affairs, Minstry of Foreign Affairs.  
• Jean Maïa, Legal Counselor and maître des requêtes of the State Council, 
SGCI. 
• Serge Lasvignes, Director of the General Secretariat of the Government, 
SGG. 
• Xavier Lapeyre-de-Cabanes, Chargé de mission for defense and foreign affairs, 
SGG. 
• Jean-Luc Sauron, Professor at IEP Strasbourg and maître des requêtes at State 
Council. 
• Isabelle Pingel, Professor of European law, Panthéon-Sorbonne Université 
Paris 1.  
• Philippe Manin, Professor of European law, Panthéon-Sorbonne Université 
Paris 1.  
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11  Spain 
11.1 General overview of the constitutional and political system 
11.1.1 Constitutional characteristics 
Spain joined the European Union in 1986. From this moment, Community law ranks 
above Spanish national law. This is partly an effect of Community law itself, but also a 
result of Articles 93 and 96 of the Spanish Constitution which defines it as a 
comprehensive monistic system. In view of Spain’s accession to the EU the 
relationship between the Constitution and Community law has been extensively 
discussed. Based on this the principles of precedence and direct applicability of EU law 
are well established in the Spanish constitutional order.95  
11.1.2 Political characteristics  
Spain is a parliamentary monarchy. The King is head of state, but has in constitutional 
terms little political power. In accordance to the principle of separation of power, the 
power of the state is divided among parliament, government, and the courts.  
 The national parliament or Cortes has two chambers: 
• the upper chamber or Senate (259 members, of which 208 members are elected by 
provinces, and 51 members appointed by the Legislative Assembly of each 
Autonomous Communities); 
• the lower chamber or the Congress of Deputies (with 300-400 members).96 
Effective parliamentary influence lies almost exclusively with the lower chamber or 
Congress. In particular, Congress alone designates the prime minister, and hence 
indirectly the entire cabinet.97 Although both chambers may be used to initiate 
legislation, Congress ultimately approves legislation and in doing so may override 
concerns from the Senate. According to observers, the Spanish parliament has failed to 
act as an effective scrutinizer of government for much of its recent history.98 It rather 
serves as a compliant channel (Heywood, 1995: 100). The relative dominance of the 
government over parliament, and to some extent also over the judiciary, is shaped by a 
number of factors. First, executive dominance is a result of the Constitution, which 
                                                 
95  As Villiers (1999: 145-6) indicates, the autonomy and precedence of EU law vis-à-vis Spanish law are 
pragmatically founded on (at least) five arguments: (1) the conscious acceptance of the acquis 
communautaire (including the precedence rule) as one of the conditions to Spain’s accession to the 
Union, (2) Articles 93 and 96 of the Constitution, (3) the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, 
(4) the signing and ratification of the EC and EU Treaty by Spain (and the subsequent limits to national 
sovereignty), and (5) the fact that the Community is established for an indefinite period of time. 
96  The law (ley Orgánica del Régimen Electoral General de 19 de Junio de 1985) establishes the number of 
350 deputies. The Congress is based on the d’Hondt system of proportional representation, favoring 
larger parties over smaller ones (Heywood 1995: 165-7; Newton and Donaghy 1997: 46)) The Senate is 
based on a first-past-the post or majority system (Newton and Donaghy 1997: 47). Regardless of the 
population size of the province 208 senators are elected directly by voters (each mainland province elects 
four senators, the island provinces elect three, and the cities of Ceuta and Melilla elect two senators each). 
Additionally each region appoints through its Legislative Assembly one senator, plus one more for every 
million inhabitants living in the respective region, resulting in 51 regional representatives in the Senate 
(http://www.senado.es). 
97  The President of the Government composes the cabinet. 
98  Depending on the prime minister the Congress has one day per week to have a session to control the 
government. See the ‘control instruments’ on their website: http://www.congreso.es.  
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provides the government with regulatory authority to adopt executive measures in 
accordance with the Constitution and existing laws (Article 97). In addition, the 
proportional electoral system developed in the Constitution did not lead to the 
envisaged coalition or minority governments but a succession of single party 
governments.99 Moreover, the discipline within the party in government proved to be 
much stronger than expected, increasing the power of the government. 
 As a consequence, actual political power in the Spanish system is concentrated in 
the hands of the prime minister or, in terms of the Spanish Constitution, the President 
of the Government and the President of the Council of Ministers. Elected by Congress, the 
prime minister enjoys considerable powers and can only be dismissed from office by a 
constructive censure motion or resign if Congress withholds its confidence from the 
government. Nonetheless, political reality leaves some room for varying outcomes: 
Adolfo Suarez, for example, did not succeed in imposing his will on the government, 
while Felipe Gonzalez, who won the 1982 elections, became one of Spain’s most 
dominant figures (Heywood, 1995: 91). 
 The Constitution recognizes and guarantees the principle of autonomy of 
nationalities and regions. As a result three different levels of government exist for 
which the Constitution specifies their domain. These levels are the state, Autonomous 
Communities, and municipalities.100 At the same time, the Constitution stresses the 
un-separable and indivisible unity of the Spanish state. This makes Spain formally a 
unitary state, while the way in which autonomy has been granted to the 17 Autonomous 
Communities and the cities of Ceuta and Melilla suggests materially that Spain is a 
federal system (Schagen and Koelman, 2003: 1). 
 The Autonomous Communities as well as cities have considerable competences in 
areas such as spatial planning, environmental protection management, social 
assistance, public safety, public health, culture, tourism, sports, language teaching, and 
some issues in the area of agriculture.101 The actual authorities of the Autonomous 
Communities and cities are selected as part of their Statute of Autonomy (Estatutos de 
Autonomía), which are adopted by national parliament as organic law. As these statutes 
are developed and adopted on an individual basis, the selected competences of 
Autonomous Communities vary. Navarra and the Basque Country are authorized to 
levy taxes, while Catalunia and the Basque Country have their own police force. 
Moreover, non-endorsed competences remain with the state, and, more specifically, 
central government. Given the type of competences that have been granted to them, the 
Autonomous Communities implement approximately 20 per cent of the rules enacted 
by the European Union (Schagen and Koelman, 2003: 10), which seems a considerable 
amount. Yet, the proportion shows as well that it is the central government that plays a 
major role in the transposition process102. 
                                                 
99 Spain has had a number of minority governments and coalition governments. Spain’s current prime 
minister Rodríquez Zapatero, for example, was elected with the votes of PSOE and a few minor parties. 
100  Four on islands (Canary Islands and Baleares) where the ‘cabildos’ represent the island and are elected 
for a period of four years. 
101  See Article 148 of the Constitution for these competences. Article 149 lists the exclusive competences of 
the state. 
102  Even in cases in which the Autonomous Communities have the exclusive competence to transpose 
directives.  
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11.1.3 Political administrative characteristics  
Central government consists of the prime minister, his deputies (currently two: Maria 
Teresa Fernandez de la Vega who is first deputy prime minister and minister of the 
presidency, and Pedro Solbes, who is the second deputy prime minister and minister of 
economy), ministers, and any other members appointed by real decreto signed by the 
prime minister and the King. Even though the Constitution allows government to 
include members other than ministers, this provision has never been used. 
 The prime minister is the central and most important post in government. 
Ministers are subordinate to the prime minister since their positions depend on the 
prime minister who can propose the appointment and dismissal of his ministers. At 
the same time, they are relatively immune from parliamentary pressures since 
parliament cannot force their resignation by censure motion. Furthermore, ministers 
are not necessarily members of the governing political party. They cannot combine 
their ministerial post with a membership of parliament; when a member of parliament 
becomes minister his/her post goes to a substitute on the list. 
 In contrast to the prime minister and, at times, his deputy, who both may have a 
general political responsibility, each minister is responsible for a specific portfolio or 
policy area. In addition, the Constitution provides for the appointment of ministers 
without portfolio.  
While the ministries prepare draft legislation and government decrees, ministers need 
to submit these proposals to the Council of Ministers, which is the weekly meeting of all 
ministers chaired by the prime minister. The decision making in the Council is 
prepared in various Council committees of which the prime minister and his deputy 
are automatically members. In addition to laws and decrees, which are issued by 
government as a whole, ministers are authorized to issue by themselves ministerial 
orders. 
 EU membership has affected the Spanish political-administrative system, although, 
according to some, these changes have been rather modest (Closa and Heywood, 2004: 
59). Interestingly, Molina (2001) argues that EU membership has lead to a 
reinforcement of the executive’s role in the Spanish political system. First, through EU 
membership, the executive could position itself above parliament, political parties and 
the civil society in Spain. Second, membership has encouraged a further 
presidentialization of the country’s policy style, strengthening the hierarchically 
superior position of the prime minister vis-à-vis ministers. 
11.2 Political or public discussion concerning EU directives and their 
transposition 
11.2.1  Discussion of recent reports and their recommendations 
In view of the rather impressive performance of Spain on transposition, as revealed by 
the Internal Scoreboards of DG Internal Market and the overall scoreboards of the 
General Secretariat of the European Commission, no recent reports have emerged on 
these issues. At the same time, there are some informal and not yet politically visible 
discussions about the way in which Spain is transposing directives. 
 The General Secretary of European Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is 
currently preparing a proposal to introduce a general and unified procedure for the 
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transposition of directives, which includes when to start transposition, what advices 
need to be included on legislative instruments to be used, and which agencies have to 
be consulted. The General Secretary is also trying to establish discussions with political 
parties with regard to laws implementing EU directives. These discussions aim to 
provide parliamentarians more information on their margins with regard to the 
original proposal. Alternatively, an option is to use more often the instrument of 
authorization law (ley de bases) for rather technical directives or directives that do not 
allow for further ‘national’ interpretation. However, parliament has some reservations 
with regard to the government’s use of this instrument. 
 Another discussion is on whether the government should have a broader authority. 
Presently the Spanish Potestad Reglamentaria (Article 23 of ley 50/1997 de 27 noviembre, 
del Gobierno), which indicates in which instances a law is required, is under discussion 
in the State Council. Since the use of government decrees and ministerial orders is 
limited to develop existing law, it cannot be used for incorporating new elements which 
are not covered by existing law. Revision of the Potestad Reglamentaria allowing for a 
broader introduction of autonomous government regulations (autonomos reglementos), 
that is, extending the possibility to use government decrees or ministerial orders in 
transposing EU directives, could increase the power of the government to transpose EU 
directives without further involvement of parliament. This discussion in Spain is 
related to the current discussion in the Netherlands of providing broad and rather open 
delegation clauses to the government in order to transpose directives in the areas of 
telecom, gas and electricity. The reasons for considering this possibility is that some 
directives are very technical and do not offer any possibilities for national 
interpretation. As more and more directives resemble European regulations, it becomes 
questionable whether parliament needs to be involved in the putting into national law 
of these directives. The main advantage of the introduction of such an instrument is 
that transposition can be done in a speedily way. The major disadvantage of the 
proposal concerns the reduction in national democratic legitimacy.  
 Alternatively, the decreto-legislativo offers the government similar advantages, 
although they still require the decision of parliament to delegate its legislative power. In 
the case of a decreto-legislativo delegation has to be arranged in each specific instance, 
which allows parliament to check whether the directive indeed does not lead to any 
national discretion in the national adoption process.  
11.2.2  Expectations regarding the process and results of these discussions  
Current discussions have a rather limited scope and are mainly located in specific 
institutions. It is not expected that under the current circumstances—a rather 
impressive performance of Spain in the Commission scoreboards—much will be 
changed.  
 An additional issue here is that the ministries in Spain are rather autonomous in 
the transposition process. The existing coordination structure, which will be described 
in Section 11.4.2, draws on a high-level, frequently arranged assessment of the 
ministries’ progress in transposing directives. Each line ministry is therefore strongly 
motivated to organize its internal working processes in such a way that the job is done 
on time. The Maritime Marine DG, for example, reformed its organization and working 
processes in 1999, which had a positive impact on the timely transposition of directives 
(Asser Institute, 2004c: 14). More in general, as Molina (1997), Dastis (1995: 349) and 
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Closa and Heywood (2004: 65) suggest, EU membership has encouraged a further 
departmentalization of the Spanish administration. Each line ministry has 
strengthened its functional specialization and developed vertical networks in its policy 
sector. Not surprisingly, the rather different individual efforts and the relative 
autonomy of the various ministries have not yet resulted in the development of a ‘best 
practice’ manual or strict guidelines on transposition in Spain. 
11.3  Description of judicial instruments and techniques 
11.3.1 Instruments 
The Spanish legal system is a hierarchical one, meaning that laws of lower jurisdiction 
cannot conflict those of a higher jurisdiction. Apart from the 1978 Constitution, 
international agreements103 and rules of the Autonomous Communities, the available 
legal instruments are the following (from higher to lower level ones): 
• law (leyes organicas and leyes ordinarias),  
• governmental dispositions ranked as laws (reales decretos-leyes and reales decretos-
legislativos), and 
• government regulations (reglamentos), which include government decrees (reales 
decretos), ministerial orders (ordenes), resolutions (resoluciones), instructions 
(instrucciones) and communications (circulares). 
The main characteristics of the Spanish legal instruments are summarized in Table 
11.1.  
 The extent to which the various Spanish legal instruments are used to transpose EU 
directives that are currently in force is presented in Table 11.2. It appears that 
government decrees are the most popular transposing instrument. With regard to all 
transposing instruments that are used, 42% is of this type. The government decrees are 
followed by ministerial orders, which rank second with 40%. The usage of law is 
limited. Ordinary law ranks third and is used in only 11% of the total number of 
instruments employed for transposition. The table also indicates that organic law 
(0.6%), decreto-ley (0.6%) and decreto-legislativo (2.6%) are rarely used as transposition 
instruments. Similarly, resolutions, instructions and communications are hardly ever 
used in Spain. 
 
Organic and ordinary law (Articles 81-92 Constitution) 
The constitution requires that specific issues including the statutes founding 
Autonomous Communities and electoral issues, as well as fundamental rights and the 
others established in the Constitution, are regulated by organic law. The adoption or 
change of organic law requires an absolute majority in parliament. For ordinary laws, 
that is, all other issues regulated by law, a simple majority suffices. The initiative to 
issue a bill for ordinary law can be taken by government, each chamber of parliament, 
Autonomous Communities, or based on an initiative of 500.000 voters. Governmental 
bills are referred to as proyectos de ley as opposed to proposiciones de ley104, which refers to 
                                                 
103  International agreements become part of Spanish law immediately after they have been officially 
announced in Spain. 
104  The Assembly of the Autonomous Communities can ask to the Government to adopt a ‘proyecto de ley’, 
or it can send to Congress (Mesa del Congreso) a ‘proposición de ley’, which needs to be supported by at 
least three members of the Assembly in order to become a proposal. 
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all other initiatives. More precisely, depending on their status within the administration 
(depending on issues), governmental bills are—before they passed the Council of 
Ministers—labeled as ante-proyecto de ley, while after approval of the Council of 
Ministers the bill has the status of proyecto de ley, and becomes ley, after the approval of 
parliament. 
 Considering government bills, the Senate which as a rule has two months to veto or 
amend a bill, can be called to deal with it within a fixed period of time. Article 90.3 of 
the Constitution authorizes government to label a bill as ‘urgent’, which imposes 
stricter deadlines on its treatment. Congress knows a similar emergency procedure as 
part of its standing order (procedimiente de urgencia), which allows for a reduction of the 
review term by half (Prakke and Schutte, 2004: 814). 
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Real decreto-ley 
Based on Article 86 of the Constitution, the government may issue a special type of 
decree with the status of law in case of extraordinary and urgent need. The provisions of 
this so-called real decretos-ley are directly applicable, but they may not affect the legal 
system of the basic state institutions, civil rights and freedoms of citizens, the 
Autonomous Communities and the general electoral law. Furthermore, the law-by-
decree is temporary since it must be immediately submitted to parliament, particularly 
Congress. Concerning the treatment in Congress the following rules apply:  
• Congress must be convened, if not already in session, and take a decision on the 
decree within 30 days;  
• Congress must ratify the decree or repeal it using a special summary procedure (as 
provided in the standing orders of Congress); 
• Congress may process the decree as a government bill by means of the urgency 
procedure, which implies that the treatment of the bill is delegated to a 
parliamentary committee which decides on the proposal in only one reading.  
The law-by-decree procedure is sometimes used in cases of the start of an infraction 
procedure against Spain. It is however a rather weighty and as such regarded as an 
unlawful instrument for ironing out transposition delays (Nanclares and Castillo, 2003: 
30-1). 
 
Table 11.2: The use of various legal instruments for the transposition of EU directives in 
Spain 
Legal instrument % 
a/ instruments at the level of law  
Organic law Ley organica 0.60% 
Ordinary Law Ley ordinaria 11.41% 
Temporary law-by-decree Real decreto-ley 0.64% 
Delegated law-by-decree Real decreto-legislativo 2.59% 
b/ lower-level instruments  
Government decree Real decreto 42.06% 
Ministerial order Orden 40.31% 
Resolution Resolucion 0.88% 
Instruction Instruccion 0.02% 
Communication Circular 0.80% 
Decree (before 1976) Decre 0.70% 
Total 100% 
Source: Subdirectorate General de Asuntos Juridicos, D.G.C. de Mercado 
Interior y Otras Politicas Comunitarias, Secretaria de Estado de Asuntos 
Europeos (situation on 23 February 2005). 
 
Real decreto-legislativo  
A second type of law-by-decree is based on a clear and preceding authorization by 
parliament. As Article 82 of the Constitution indicates, parliament may delegate the 
government the power to adopt a decree with the status of law. This legislative 
delegation must be granted by the legislator by a  
• authorization law (ley de bases) if the objective is to draw up texts comprising various 
articles, or 
• ordinary law (ley ordinaria) if the objective is consolidating several existing legal texts 
into one (Article 82.2 Constitution); in this case existing laws are put into one 
derogating the old laws. 
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The delegation law has to express the concrete matter and range of delegation and a 
fixed time period within which the government is authorized to adopt a measure 
(Article 82.3 Constitution). In addition, delegation expires as soon as the decrees are 
adopted. 
 With regard to transposition, this instrument has been used in order to transpose a 
large number of directives during the Spanish accession to the EU. Law 47/1985 (Ley de 
Bases 47/1985 de 27 diciembre, para la delegación al Gobierno para la aplicación del Derecho 
Comunitario) made it possible that the government could transpose 68 EU directives 
and 3 EU decisions by changing 36 national laws. This work was done through the 
adoption of 15 decretos legislativos in a period of merely 6 months (Nanclares and 
Castillo, 2002: 31, note 110).  
 This large-scale adoption of directives by using the instrument of a law-by-decree 
has had no successors. The general opinion is that this instrument should only be used 
for rather exceptional circumstances. Parliament is rather reluctant to provide 
government with the power to draft laws since it is no longer involved and it could lead 
to unwanted measures.  
 Moreover, the decreto-legislativo is as an instrument not very suitable for the 
speeding up of transposition in case of a single directive. The passing of a ley de bases 
requires time and effort and will further delay the preparatory process leading to the 
adoption of the acquis communautaire. Furthermore a decreto-legislativo is said to be 
inflexible. Amendments to a directive that has been transposed through a decreto-
legislativo have to be transposed through law or decretos-legislativos, if the relevant issues 
are regulated by law. In this respect, the passing of law is regarded as a preferred 
instrument since it could be adopted within a similar timeframe. With regard to rather 
detailed directives which resemble EU regulations and do not provide for further 
national choices and other adaptations, the decreto-legislativo is considered as the way to 
go. 
 
Reglamentos  
In Spain, the government is entitled to issue provisions of a regulatory nature, which as 
Prakke and Schutte (2004: 796) indicate, provide the government “a general right to 
regulate for the execution of laws”. This is the so-called potestad reglamentaria, which is 
the general competence of the government to issue regulations for the execution of a 
law, also if this law does not ascribe this competence (Article 23 of Ley 50/1997, de 27 
noviembre, del Gobierno).  
 Based on this competence, the government may adopt decrees and ministerial 
orders that further develop issues covered by a law. These measures do not require 
specific delegation within the law in question (or ‘parent’ law). Furthermore, the lower-
level regulations must be in accordance with the Constitution and existing law (Article 
97 Constitution). An ordinary judge, instead of the Constitutional Court, may assess 
the (constitutional) legality of these measures. 
 Due to the existence of a multitude of laws in Spain, the government often has the 
possibility of transposing directives through government decrees (reales decretos) and 
ministerial orders (ordenes). If, however, a directive includes elements that are not 
regulated by Spanish law, or elements that are not consistent with Spanish law, it is not 
possible to transpose the directive through governmental regulations. The government 
has to introduce a new law through a parliamentary procedure. The introduction of law 
is also required if transposition requires the introduction or amendment of crimes, 
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offends, sanctions or fines or other public charges which are not already enforced 
through existing legislation. 
 Depending the importance of the issue, the government may choose to transpose a 
directive either through a real decreto or authorize a minister to regulate certain issues 
by ministerial order, which are hierarchically lower than decrees and typically regulate, 
for example, the dispatch of ships, while the settlement of boundary recognition for 
guaranteeing the ship’s crew’s security, calls for a real decreto. Unlike decrees which 
have to be adopted by the government in a meeting of the Council of Ministers, an 
order may be based on a decision by a single minister. Similar to laws, decrees as well 
as orders that transpose directives require an obligatory advice of the State Council. 
 Incidentally, directives are transposed through lower-level measures while it is not 
clear whether the elements introduced in this way fit to the scope of existing national 
law. This may raise questions about the legality of some of these measures. 
11.3.2 Techniques 
Mostly, EU directives are transposed into the Spanish legal order using the following 
techniques: 
• One-to-one transposition or copying; and 
• One-to-one with some (terminological) adjustments; these adjustments refer mainly to 
the introduction of legal terms that are commonly used in Spanish law and which 
have not been incorporated in the text of the directives as published in the Official 
Journal. These adjustments are regarded as necessary in order to relate the 
requirements of the directive to Spanish law, but the general impression is that too 
often the European Commission is not willing to accept these changes in terms. As 
a consequence, the more literal copying of directives which is imposed on the 
ministries creates potential frictions in Spanish law. Especially, in the case of 
commercial and civil law problems occur since the Spanish legal tradition differs 
strongly from the one embedded in EU directives. 
To a lesser extent the Spanish use: 
• Incorporation in the system (corpus) of already existing laws (rewording), and 
• transposition through the passing of a law (ley de bases) delegating the government 
to pass a number of measures. 
The Spanish rarely use a package law to transpose several directives (the only example 
is Ley de Bases 47/1985 de 27 diciembre, para la delegación al Gobierno para la aplicación 
del Derecho Comunitario). Transposition through reference is rather uncommon in 
Spain. 
 With an average of 1.7 legal measures per directive, the number of transposing 
instruments is limited. Often only one instrument is used. Sometimes more 
instruments are needed, especially if a new law or a change in law is required. The 
introduction of law is often combined with the introduction of a government decree or 
a ministerial order. With regard to the implementing measures mentioned in Table 
11.2, 19% of the government decrees transposing a directive the decree is combined 
with the introduction of law. In a similar way, 14% of the ministerial orders, the order 
is combined with the introduction of law in order to fully transpose a directive. If a 
directive has to be transposed by the Autonomous Communities as well, the number of 
implementing measures often will be at least 18 (a specific law adopted by each of the 
spain  
129 
17 Autonomous Communities and at least one instrument adopted by the central 
government or state).105 
 Spain does not have provisions that prescribe the method of transposing a directive 
‘sec’. At the same time, many officials seem to have a rather pragmatic attitude towards 
transposition. If additional, national regulations do not affect the speed of 
transposition, they do not see the point why these regulations have to be left out. If, 
however, these are controversial, they will not be added. In this respect, the actual 
working practice seems to be more nuanced.  
 According to previous studies, the national additions regularly occur in the field of 
public health and consumer rights (Senden, 2004: 39-40). In those cases it is common 
to explain in the preamble of the legislative measure which parts serve to transpose the 
directive and which parts introduce new national legislation.  
11.3.3  Character and level of implementing measure 
Most transposing instruments used in Spain are of a lower level than law (about 84%). 
Most frequently, a directive is transposed through a government decree (42%), followed 
by ministerial orders (40%). The use of law to transpose directives is limited in Spain: 
only in 12% of the cases of transposition, a law has been introduced (both organic and 
ordinary law). Law-by-decree is even rarer: reales decretos-ley are used in 0.6% of the 
cases and reales decretos-legislativos in only 3%. A complete overview is presented in 
Table 11.2. Ministerial orders are mainly used for the transposition of directives that 
introduce or amend technical norms and standards and as such relate to rather specific 
and detailed elements of national legislation. An example is the introduction of new 
standards and technical requirements of equipment on board of vessels, as mentioned 
in the report of the Asser Institute (2004c: 11). 
11.3.4 Specific instruments 
Spain does not use special instruments for the transposition of directives. Instruments 
such as instructions and communications are only used in very exceptional cases: based 
on all transposed directives currently in force only instructions are used in 0.02% and 
communications in 0.08% of the cases. Most likely, these instruments are used in 
combination with some of the other legal instruments. 
11.4 The national policy cycle concerning directives 
11.4.1 General overview of the process 
In the national policy cycle concerning transposition of EU law, the central government 
takes the lead in Spain. The coordination of this process is in the hands of the ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación). This ministry is 
responsible for EU affairs since the removal of the ministry of EU Relations in the early 
                                                 
105  In our report on transposition we mainly focus on instruments and working practices of the central 
government in Spain. In the section on other, subnational, governments we further discuss the role of 
the Autonomous Communities in Spain. In general, the legislative action of the Autonomous 
Communities is confined to further development of national transposing legislation.  
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1980s (Closa and Heywood, 2004: 62). At the same time, the process is supported by 
high-level administrative and political coordinating bodies: 
- for the preparation of the Spanish position these bodies are the Inter ministerial 
committee for EU Affairs (Comisión Interministerial para Asuntos de la Unión Europea) 
meeting every 2 to 3 weeks and the Delegated committee for Economic Affairs of the 
Council of Ministers meeting on a weekly basis; 
- for transposition and implementation the main body is the Committee of State-
secretaries and Sub-secretaries. 
The Spanish coordination of the policy process concerning EU directives can be briefly 
characterized as a frequently meeting monitoring structure at high administrative level 
with strong political backing. 
11.4.1.1 National preparation of Commission initiatives 
There hardly exists a systematic and early discussion of Commission initiatives in the 
Spanish political and administrative system. With the exception of the Permanent 
Representation, which keeps itself informed about major Commission initiatives, and 
which keeps contact with the civil servants of the ministries, each having members in 
the Permanent Representation, there is no systematic way in which information on 
forthcoming Commission proposals is channeled through the Spanish administration.  
11.4.1.2 National treatment of Commission proposals 
With regard to formulation of the Spanish position, the Secretariat of State for the 
European Union in Madrid, and the Permanent Representation in Brussels are the two 
principal bodies responsible for EU policymaking within the ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (Closa and Heywood, 2004: 62-3). Members of the Permanent Representation, 
sometimes supported by civil servants from Madrid, are engaged in the negotiations in 
Brussels, in accordance with instructions coming from Madrid. Often these 
instructions are drafted by the line ministries which are responsible for 
implementation. 
 The ministry of Foreign Affairs allocates Commission proposals to a first-
responsible line ministry. Only one ministry is responsible. If at this stage problems 
occur since a ministry does (or does not) want to be involved, the issue is discussed in a 
first coordination meeting among the ministries. If this meeting does not lead to a 
solution, advice is asked to the Secretary of State for the EU. If the participants still do 
not agree, the Inter ministerial committee for the EU Affairs is involved. 
 The involvement of other ministries in the shaping of the Spanish position is 
discussed in the Inter ministerial committee for EU Affairs, which is chaired by the 
Secretary of State for the EU of the ministry of Foreign Affairs, consists of high-level 
administrative officials from the different ministries, sometimes even political, and 
meets once per 2 to 3 weeks. At its meetings, the committee discusses which ministries 
need to be involved in the making of the Spanish position in the event that EU 
legislation involves interests of several ministries. In addition, this committee also 
sometimes discusses the progress in transposition and the judgments of the European 
Court of Justice. 
 The first-responsible line ministry prepares the Spanish position, partly in ad hoc 
meetings with representatives from other ministries. In this phase, and depending on 
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the proposal, the line ministry may involve other stakeholders to put forward their 
views on the proposal. Especially when these groups are consulted under Spanish 
national law, the line ministry has to discuss the proposal with them. The State 
Council, which provides legal advice on draft legislation and government decrees, does 
not play a role at this stage. The Autonomous Communities are being consulted by the 
Spanish executive in this particular phase, but only if Commission proposals affect 
their autonomous competencies. Parliament is, at this stage, informed about the 
European legislation by means of a fiche-procedure. 
 The proposed position of Spain as well as unresolved issues are first submitted to 
the Inter ministerial committee for EU Affairs, which is chaired by the Secretary of the 
State for the EU. It confirms the proposed position or tries to find common ground for 
a position on the Commission proposal. If the committee fails, the issue is discussed at 
the weekly meeting of the Delegated committee for Economic Affairs. This committee is 
one of the subcommittees of the Council of Ministers. It includes all ministers involved 
in economic affairs and is chaired by the second deputy prime minister and minister of 
Economic Affairs (currently Pedro Solbes). The Secretary of the State of the EU assists 
the deputy minister. Issues related to the Justice and home affairs pillar are not 
discussed in this committee (and the same holds for issues related to defense and 
foreign affairs), but are directly referred to the Council of Ministers. 
11.4.1.3 National transposition 
After the adoption of the directive and its publication in the Official Journal of the 
European Union, the line ministry that also had the lead in preparing the Spanish 
position, is in most cases also the one responsible for the transposition of the directive. 
Usually, the same policy unit involved in the preparatory process starts the preparations 
for the drafting of a legal measure to transpose the directive. The preparatory work of 
the unit includes: 
- inter ministerial consultations, which are handled through ad hoc committees 
composed on the basis of the earlier decision of the Inter ministerial committee for 
EU Affairs on which line ministries needs to be consulted; 
- consultations with the relevant social and economic stakeholders towards whom the 
directive is directed. The unit also consults, if necessary, academics and particular 
advisory boards; 
- in case of competences that are shared between the central government and the 
Autonomous Communities, also consultations are initiated (see also Section 11.4.5). 
 Before the proposal is submitted to the minister, it is sent for legal advice to the 
General Technical Secretariat (Secretario General Tecnicos) of the line ministry. Although 
variations exist, in most ministries the General Technical Secretariat plays the role of 
the central legislative unit which has to be consulted as part of the preparations within 
the ministry of legal measures. The General Technical Secretariat has to approve the 
proposed measure before it is submitted to the minister and possible the Council of 
Ministers. In the case of proposals for transposing Community legislation, whether it is 
through law, government decree, or ministerial order, the State Council has to be 
consulted and provides ministers with legal advice particularly regarding the issue 
whether a proposal is compatible with the Constitution and other national legislation 
(Ross, 2002; Schagen and Koelman, 2003: 3). 
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 If the proposed transposing instrument concerns a law or a government decree, the 
proposal also has to pass through the General Technical Secretariat of the ministry of 
General Affairs (Ministerio de la Presidencia). This Secretariat plays a more general and 
coordinating role in the government’s decision making process. Its main task is to 
coordinate and monitor the submission of proposals for discussion in the Council of 
Ministers. It forwards proposals to the other ministries for comments. A proposal is 
scheduled for the meeting of the Council of Ministers if no objections are received. If, 
however, substantial differences in view exist between the ministries involved, the 
proposal might be scheduled only if it concerns a politically important issue. Under 
other circumstances, the proposal will be referred back to the responsible line ministry 
with the instruction to settle the differences with the other ministries. An overview of 
this process is presented in Table 11.3. 
 
Table 11.3: Key government meetings on transposition on a weekly basis 
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 
  Ministry send 
proposal 1 to 
General Affairs 
Ministry 
Time for questions 
and answers 
among ministries 
Time for questions 
and answers 
among ministries 
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 
Time for questions 
and answers 
among ministries 
Proposal 1 has to 
be completed 
before 20:00 hrs. 
to go to the 
Committee. 
Committee of 
State-secretaries 
and Sub-
secretaries 
  Council of 
Ministers 
 
 By Wednesday the General Technical Secretariat of the ministry of General Affairs 
sends the available documents to all ministries, which have until next Tuesday (20:00 
hrs) to make comments, while the ministry submitting the proposal may provide 
additional clarification. Depending on the contents of the comments, the leading 
ministry may have to discuss certain issues with the other ministries before it is 
submitted to the Committee of State-secretaries and Sub-secretaries. This committee 
discusses all proposals, which need to pass the Council of Ministers. When the 
committee accepts a proposal in its Wednesday meeting, it will be scheduled for the 
next meeting of the Council of Ministers on Friday. 
 The procedure for transposing EU directives does not differ from the ones used for 
preparing national regulations and law. Each legal initiative, whether it is inspired by 
national interests or EU law, follows the same procedure. The Law of 27 November 
1997 (Ley 50/1997, de 27 noviembre, del Gobierno) provides the general framework. 
Regardless of the kind of directive, its nature (for instance, harmonization, basic 
legislation, amendment or technical standards), or the issues at stake, the Spanish do 
not make an ex ante distinction in procedure.  
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Table 11.4: Main stages and average time frame for transposing EU directives in Spain: 
laws, government decrees and ministerial orders 
Stage Actor average 
duration 
Law decree order 
1 Allocation of 
administrative 
responsibility 
Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
1 month ● ● ● 
2 Preparation of draft text Lead line ministry 2 months ● ● ● 
3 Public consultation and 
inter ministerial 
discussion 
with other ministries 
and relevant social and 
economic stakeholders 
2 months 
and 
sometimes 
more 
● ● ● 
4 Comment and approval General Technical 
Secretariat of the line 
ministry 
1 month ● ● ● 
5 Ministerial approval Sectoral Minister few days ● ● ● 
6 Legal assessment and 
comments 
State Council up to 3 
months 
● ● ● 
7 Executive approval  Council of Ministers ? ● ●  
8 First parliamentary review 
and approval 
Congress (Committee)  
? 
●   
9 Second parliamentary 
review and approval 
Senate 20 days to 
** 
months 
●   
10 Reinforcement King Up to 15 
days 
●   
11 Forwarding of legislative 
text for publication 
 up to 2 
weeks 
●   
Source: the information in this table is partly based on Prakke and Kortmann (2004: 810-7) and 
Asser Institute (2004c: 16-7) 
 
 The main stages of the different procedures leading to law, government decree and 
ministerial order are illustrated in Table 11.4. This table also contains a conservative 
estimate about the time needed in order to conclude the various stages in the process. 
If a directive has to be transposed through law, the average transposition time will take 
about 18 months (Asser Institute, 2004c: 19). It is not so much the parliamentary 
procedure that slows down the process, but rather the political debate. Transposition 
through a government decree or ministerial order takes less time. On average a 
directive using one of these instruments will be transposed within about 12 months 
(Asser Institute, 2004c: 16-7). For the transposition of directives that introduce 
technical norms, for example, approximately 3 months extra time is needed. This delay 
is a consequence of the type of directive and the actors involved in the decision making 
process, that is, depending on the policy area, different consultation practices and 
timetables apply. It is in particular the longer consultation period with sectoral 
stakeholders and with other ministries that causes delay (Asser Institute, 2004c: 16).  
 Table 11.4 briefly indicates the procedure which parliament uses for legislative 
proposals. Once a bill is submitted (see also Prakke and Kortmann, 2004: 812-4): 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Lead 
ministry 
Permanent  
Representative 
Secretariat of  
State for the EU 
State Council 
Council of  
Ministers
Ministry of the 
Presidency 
Instructions 
Lead 
ministry 
Commission 
proposal 
Law 
Ministerial  
order 
Congress 
(committee) 
Senate 
Government  
decree 
Autonomous  
communities 
Other ministries 
involved 
Draft
Line ministries 
Cie State-
secretaries  
Advisory agencies 
European 
Commission 
- Congress forwards it to either its Permanent Committee (Comision Legislativa 
Permanente) or a special committee. A sub-committee, especially appointed for this 
task, prepares the review of the bill for the Committee; 
 
Figure 11.1 Transposition process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- After Congress’ approval, the bill will be submitted to the Senate, which has to 
decide within two months, or, in case of urgency procedure, within 20 days; 
- If the Senate rejects the bill, Congress can overrule the Senate’s rejection 
immediately by absolute majority, or after two months by simple majority of votes. 
Congress can overrule the amendments made by the Senate by simple majority;  
- Acceptance of the proposal by Parliament means that the government is required to 
submit the bill within 15 days to the King for its reinforcement. 
Social & economic 
stakeholders 
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Two possibilities exist to accelerate the decision making process. The first option is 
based on Article 90.3 of the Constitution, which provides the government the 
opportunity to label a legislative proposal as urgent. This offers a shortened procedure 
for parliamentary consideration of the bill. Depending on the urgency of the 
transposition, completion of the parliamentary stages might run faster, yet none of 
these stages can be skipped (Asser Institute, 2004c: 14). The second option is the 
introduction of a real decreto-ley. However, the use of this instrument is not regarded as 
a legitimate one for reducing transposition delays. Finally,  
parliament may decide to delegate its review competence to the standing parliamentary 
legislative committee, which procedure replaces the plenatory meeting of both Houses. 
The standing committee may nonetheless demand the plenatory to debate and vote 
upon the bill. 
 The progress in transposition, independently whether the directives is implemented 
through law, government decree or ministerial order, is weekly monitored by the 
Committee of State-secretaries and Sub-secretaries, which consists of the highest civil 
servants from the different ministries, who are politically appointed by ministers. This 
committee is extensively informed about the state of affairs regarding all directives not 
yet transposed, including actual and projected delays and their causes. As the schedule 
presented in Table 11.4 indicates, the meetings of this committee are well embedded in 
the administration and precede the meeting of the Council of Ministers.106 The 
‘naming and shaming’ as part of this high-level discussion on the progress of 
transposition leads to a setting in which none of the state-secretaries or sub-secretaries 
prefer their ministry to have a problem.  
 Figure 11.1 presents a flow-chart featuring a directive’s course from negotiation to 
transposition among the main parties involved in the Spanish process. 
11.4.2 Bureaucratic consultative and coordinating bodies 
The transposition progress is an item which weekly returns on the agenda of the 
interdepartmental meeting at the highest administrative level: the Committee of State-
secretaries and Sub-secretaries. This committee, chaired by the deputy prime minister—
currently Mrs. Fernandez de la Vega—prepares the Council of Ministers. State-
secretaries are the highest ranked central civil servants at a ministry. Furthermore, 
general-secretaries and sub-secretaries, who are responsible for a specific policy area, 
are rather similar with regard to there rank within the ministry (comparable with DG’s 
in the Netherlands). In some cases, i.e. if on the same ministry several State-secretaries 
are in charge of a specific domain, the sub-secretary may not be involved in the 
transposition process  
 It is the State-secretary for the EU who introduces the first substantive item on the 
agenda of the Committee of State-secretaries and Sub-secretaries, which is the progress 
in the transposition of EU directives. In the board of the SubDG of Coordination of 
European Juridical Affairs at the Secretariat-General to the European Union of the ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, a fulltime position is assigned for the preparation of this item. This 
official receives weekly information from the other ministries on the progress in 
                                                 
106  In case of conflict between ministries about the transposition of a directive, the issue is either referred to 
a standing inter ministerial committee, if it concerns agriculture or health policy or to ad hoc 
committee’s initiated by the ministry of Foreign Affairs. In principle, politically important issues could 
be discussed at the Council of Ministers, but this hardly ever occurs. 
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transposition. A committee member, who is challenged about delay, will mostly see to 
it that his ministry takes the required measures. If nevertheless progress fails to occur, 
the ministry of Foreign Affairs reports directly to the Council of Ministers.  
11.4.3 The role of compulsory advisory bodies 
To assess the quality of draft legislation two different advisory bodies are important, 
which are the General Technical Secretariat (Secretario General Tecnicos) and the State 
Council (Consejo de Estado). 
 The General Technical Secretariats are staff units within each line ministry, which 
have technical or legal expertise. The staff of the General Technical Secretariat assesses 
the quality of a proposal. The policy units within the line ministries, which have the 
lead in the process ending in the transposition of directives, need to call for the advice 
of the General Technical Secretariats before their proposal can be submitted to the 
minister.  
 If the proposed transposing instrument concerns a law or a government decree, 
which requires the approval of the Council of Ministers, the proposal also has to pass 
through the General Technical Secretariat of the ministry of General Affairs.  
 This Secretariat plays a more general and coordinating role in the government’s 
decision making process. Its main task as discussed in Section 11.4.1.3 is to coordinate 
and monitor the submission of proposals for discussion in the Council of Ministers. 
 The State Council evaluates the Spanish legislative initiatives in terms of legality, 
opportunity, quality and legitimacy. The organic law of 22 April 1980 (Ley Orgánica 
3/1980, de 22 de Abril, Del Consejo de Estado, modify by Ley Orgánica 3/2004, de 28 de 
diciembre) specifies which initiatives require the consultation of the State Council. Apart 
from proposals involving constitutional reforms, which are initiated by other bodies 
than the State Council, government is obliged to obtain the opinion of the Council on: 
• proposals for delegated legislation and for decretos legislativos; 
• proposals for law (ley) dictating the execution, completion or development of 
treaties, conventions or international agreements and European Community law; 
• the interpretation or fulfillment of international treaties, agreements or agreements 
in which Spain is part; 
• the interpretation or fulfillment of acts and resolutions emanated from international 
or supranational organizations; 
• issues of special importance recognized by the government; 
• every other issue where, by law, the State Council has to be consulted. 
For the transposition of Community directives the advice of the State is obligatory, 
regardless of the type of instrument used. Hence, apart from laws, and government 
decrees, also rules of a lower order (for example, ministerial orders) are reviewed by the 
State Council. 
Although government is not required to comply with State Council’s opinion, most 
proposals are in conformity with the Council’s advice.  
 In its advice the Council may make two types of observations: essentials and remarks. 
While essentials have to be taken into account, remarks do not need to be addressed. 
Essentials normally refer to problems related to the Constitution or important legal 
principles, which, if they were not taken into account, could lead to the annulment of 
the law when adopted. In preparing legislation, the ministry has to report to parliament 
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on the advice of the State Council. If the State Council has no observations, it gives an 
indication, which is attached to the legislative proposal.  
 The organic law of the State Council does not require government to consult the 
Council when preparing its opinion on Commission proposals. A change is not 
expected since the involvement of the State Council at this earlier stage of the policy 
process is expected to have an unwanted, delaying effect (Tribunal Supremo de España 
2004: 14). 
11.4.4 The role of Parliament 
Parliament receives information on new Commission proposals and documents 
immediately after their release. Since 1994 this information is passed to Parliament 
through a fiche. The main elements of a fiche are presented in Table 11.5.  
 
Table 11.5: Contents of Spanish fiches 
1 area of competence and ministries involved 
2 judicial base, procedure 
3 background, contents and objectives 
4 Assessment of proposed legislation 
5 special Spanish interests in relation to the proposal 
6 position of other EU members 
7 proposals to change or improve the legislative proposal 
8 situation and expected date of approval 
9 contact person within the Spanish administration 
 
 Although parliament occasionally discusses these fiches and presents its views on 
new Commission initiatives, it is not actively involved in the preparation of the Spanish 
position. This observation is supported by Nanclares and Castillo (2002: 32) who 
indicate that parliament is less concerned with the contents of the government’s 
mandate, while its actions are focused on monitoring and commenting afterwards. 
Schagen and Koelman (2003: 10) emphasize that the Spanish parliament does not have 
a direct role or competencies in the European legislative process. Furthermore, 
Parliament’s limited involvement may be partly due to the occurrence of single party 
governments in Spain in combination with strong party discipline. In addition, it may 
be an effect of the “predominant perception of EU policy as being part of Spain’s 
foreign policy”, an area in which government takes the lead (Closa and Heywood, 2003: 
74). 
 Parliament does not have special committees which deal with the preparation of the 
Spanish position on new Commission proposals. There is however a joint committee of 
Congress and Senate—la Comisión mixta para las Comunidades Europeas— There is 
however a joint committee of Congress and Senate—la Comisión mixta para la Unión 
Europea— which maintains relations between the Spanish Parliament and the 
European legislative bodies. During each parliamentary session the joint committee 
reports on its activities to both Houses. These reports include governmental guidelines 
and activities as regards EU policy, information on EU legislation, information on the 
implementation of EU law, and the creation of sub-committees (potencies) which are 
assigned to study and follow-up specific issues (Closa and Heywood, 2004: 77). 
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11.4.5 The role of other, subnational or functional governments 
In the case of competencies shared by central government and Autonomous 
Communities, both central government and the communities play a role in the 
transposition process.107 Shared competences may exist in two different situations 
(Villiers, 1999: 95): 
1. the central government has a legislative competence, while the Autonomous 
Community has an executive competence in the field of one and the same topic, or 
2. on the basis of Article 149.1 of the Constitution, the central government may be 
authorized to issue basic law (framework legislation), while the Autonomous 
Community is qualified to issue or add detailed legislation on the basis of such 
framework legislation. 
This situation of shared competences mostly occurs for directives on issues related to 
the environment protection management. Disputes over the shared competences may 
lead to the involvement of the Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitutional). For 
example, in case CTR 102/1995, the Constitutional Court had to give its judgment on a 
Spanish law (4/1989), which was meant to implement parts of the Habitat directive 
(92/43 EEC), an area which actually belonged to the competences of the Autonomous 
Communities. The jurisprudence on the division of competencies is still developing, 
which is a complicating factor to the transposition and implementation of some 
directives (see also Ross and Crespo, 2003: 227). 
 Mostly the central government and the Autonomous Communities start working at 
the same moment on the transposition of a directive for which they have shared 
competences. This has a positive impact on the period needed to transpose the 
directive, but may lead to substantial revisions at the side of the Autonomous 
Communities depending on the contents of the legal instrument that will be eventually 
adopted by central government. This practice might not be very efficient, but, at least, 
prevents that substantial delays occur in the transposition and implementation. 
 The line ministries may discuss new Commission initiatives, new directives and 
relevant rulings of the European Court of Justice with the Autonomous Communities 
as part of sectorial conferences. These conferences are organized by the line ministry 
involved (Ley 30/92). At these conferences, the government and the Autonomous 
Communities exchange views and, if possible, aim to reach agreement on how they 
want to proceed in transposing a specific directive. The actual transposition is in the 
hands of the Autonomous Communities, which, and depending on their competences, 
may require the introduction of 17 additional laws (one by each Community) if all 
communities have to transpose a specific directive. 
 The central government has a difficult task in directing the implementation of 
directives that are at the core of the competencies of the Communities. Sometimes a 
Community fails to implement legislation, leaving the central government relatively 
powerless to change the situation, although the central government will pass the more 
general, framework legislation. Spain was, for example, held responsible for the 
                                                 
107  See Articles 148 and 149 of the Constitution, which describes the Spanish system of competences 
between the central government and the Autonomous Communities. Furthermore, as indicated before, 
the competences of these communities vary slightly, as laid down in their Statutes of Autonomy. From 
the 17 Communities, 2 have different economic competences and 2 have their own police force. In 
addition, there are some minor differences in competences between the Communities, including 
competences with regard to nature preservation (Basque Country and Navarra). 
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incomplete implementation of directive 96/62 EC (HvJEG case 417/99, Commission t. 
Spain, Jur. 2001, I-6015). The only way that is left under these circumstances is to 
impose accountability measures (including financial incentives) on the Communities 
that failed to correctly implement some directive. 
 Sometimes the reversed situation occurs in which the central government is late in 
transposing a directive. In those circumstances, the Autonomous Communities can 
transpose a directive (Article 149 Constitution) if the directive is concerned with the 
Communities’ exclusive competences (see, for instance, Article 27 Estatuto de 
Autonomía of the Autonomous Community of Madrid). This is what one’s calls ‘a 
directive with direct effect if the central government is late’. For example, with regard to 
a directive on waste management, the Communities started to develop some plans 
before the adoption of a law at the central level. If the Autonomous Communities 
establish a law while the central government is, and the central law contradicts the laws 
adopted by the Communities, the Communities have to change their initial law. 
Normally, this does not happen since the Communities tend to copy the text of the 
directive in their legislation. 
 The Autonomous Communities are not yet in a position to attend the negotiations 
in Brussels, even though they have tried, without success, to get more involved in the 
making of EU law. These efforts failed partly because the Communities were unable to 
formulate a common view (Schagen and Koelman, 2003: 10). Yet, the Communities are 
consulted by the central government in this phase, but only if Commission proposals 
affect their autonomous competencies. Furthermore, they keep contact with the 
developments in the EU through their offices in Brussels. 
11.4.6 The role of interest groups 
Each line ministry determines with whom it will discuss draft measures, which include 
proposals for law, decrees and ministerial orders. Public consultations may become a 
bottleneck in the process especially if directives call for the involvement of socio-
economic stakeholders and other ministries. In those cases, consultations tend to 
become time-consuming, depending on the stakeholders involved (see also Asser 
Institute, 2004c: 20). In general, the government aims for rather swift consultations, 
which may take about 10 to 15 days. At most, ministries may wait for a period of 2 to 3 
months to obtain advice before they are requested by the ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(for instance, in the meeting of the Committee of State-secretaries and Sub-secretaries) to 
move on and speed up the transposition process.  
11.5 Analysis of legal instruments and techniques 
11.5.1 Advantages and disadvantages of instruments 
Timeliness. The swift transposition of EU directives in Spain is not a direct result of the 
use of special legal instruments. In Spain directives are mostly transposed through 
lower-level instruments, that is, government decrees and ministerial orders. 
 As discussed in Section 11.4.1.3 the speed of the legal instruments used in Spain 
depends on whether they need to be approved by parliament or not. The adoption of 
law requires more time than the adoption of a government decree, while a decree 
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requires in principle more time than a ministerial order. Additional stages in the 
procedure leading to the adoption of an instrument increase the risk of delay. 
 The Spanish legal system has a special legal instrument—the real decreto-ley—which 
is only used in situations of urgency or emergency. This instrument is sometimes used 
when Spain is faced with an infringement procedure. In general, this instrument is 
regarded as unsuitable or even unlawful for transposition, since it is intended to deal 
with rather different situations. 
 Another special legal instrument—the real decreto legislativo—is based on a 
delegation law passed by Parliament (ley de bases), which specifies for which purpose 
the government is allowed to adopt a decree with the status of law. Since this 
instrument requires a separate law, its procedure is not much faster than the adoption 
of other laws. In addition, a change of the rules adopted by a real decreto-legislativo 
requires again the adoption of law. The advantage of this instrument is that rather 
detailed and mostly technical legislation can be passed without extensive parliamentary 
discussion. 
 Completeness. In Spain the completeness of transposition (that is, are all elements 
from the directive included in the national legal instrument) is not associated with 
specific instruments. 
 Clarity for those involved and practicability. As such the adoption of specific 
instruments does not have so much an impact on the clarity of the rules to executive 
agencies, legal advisors and the courts. The substantial number of government decrees 
and ministerial orders which have been used to transpose the acquis communautaire 
also do not improve the clarity of the legal system. It has led to a situation in which 
executive agencies, citizens, and the courts are faced with a large number of rules from 
various sources which potentially may challenge each other.  
 Flexibility. When introducing a new directive amending a previous directive in the 
same field, the use of government decrees and ministerial orders provide for more 
flexibility in the sense of being able to change existing rules at rather short notice. As 
indicated, the procedure of introducing new law requires more time, which reduces 
flexibility. The introduction previously of law-by-decree (real decreto-legislativo) will not 
lead to more flexibility the moment these laws-by-decree need to be changed: the initial 
delegation of lawmaking power to the government was only valued for the adoption of a 
decree. Furthermore, if the enacted decree has to be changed, it can only be done by 
law (which could be an new authorization law providing the government the authority 
to introduce yet another decreto-legislativo). In other words, the flexibility of this 
instrument is the same as law. 
 Systemic purity of the legal system. The rather pragmatic attitude towards 
transposition and the strong emphasis to transpose directives on time have led, 
according to some, to a large number of ‘special’ laws next to the more traditional 
‘codes’. This developed is also fed by the European Commission’s insistence that 
national provisions should only include the requirements of a directive and no other 
provisions, including provisions that already exist on the subject matter. This makes, 
according to some observers, the Spanish legal system less clearly organized than one 
would wish. A number of related laws are sometimes consolidated in order to improve 
the clarity of the legal system. As one interview partner commented: “I prefer changes 
in present law and not the addition of yet another new law. The adoption of yet another 
law for the transposition of directives leads to too many laws. Put every article of a 
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directive in its place. This avoids obsolete legal requirements which may otherwise 
remain to exist and require, at a later stage, codification.” 
11.5.2 Advantages and disadvantages of techniques 
The techniques and methods of transposition in Spain are best characterized as 
pragmatic. There is a preference for copying. If the main concepts used in a directive 
differ from the common concepts of Spanish law, one aims to reformulate some of the 
wording of the text of the directives. This has a positive impact on timeliness and 
completeness of transposition. 
 A problem frequently mentioned by civil servants in Spain is that the European 
Commission often insists on copying directives even when some of the terms used in 
the directive have no legal meaning in Spain. The position of the Commission has 
already led to the inclusion of terms in Spanish law, which are ‘foreign’ and have a 
rather dubious status. 
 Since other techniques are not or hardly used in Spain, they are not included in our 
assessment. 
11.6 Analysis of national policy process 
The coordination of the preparation of the Spanish position in Brussels as well as the 
transposition of EU directives is in the hands of the ministry of Foreign Affairs. The 
Inter ministerial committee for EU Affairs (allocation of responsibility for new 
Commission initiatives) and the Committee of State-secretaries and Sub-secretaries 
(discussion of the progress of transposition) play an important role. Still, for the 
discussion of concrete issues, ministries make use of ad hoc committees, which makes 
the overall coordinating structure in Spain rather light and informal. Line ministries 
have the lead in the actual work, both in shaping the Spanish position and the 
transposition of directives. The overarching coordination structures, which are part of 
the regular structure of Spanish government, provide a sufficient incentive to the line 
ministries to deliver on their commitments. 
 The administration aims to maintain a relationship between the preparatory work as 
part of the negotiations in Brussels and the transposition of the directive. The policy 
unit which is involved in the drafting of the Spanish position in the EU legislative 
process is mostly also the unit in charge of transposition. The Spanish line ministries 
regard the fact that they use the same legislative instruments and procedures for both 
national initiatives and EU directives as a positive feature of the Spanish system. Also 
the fact that all proposals of the ministry are assessed by the General Technical 
Secretariat of the ministry leads to a high level of technical uniformity and consistency. 
 The Spanish administration has a highly accurate and detailed monitoring system 
on the progress of transposition, which supports the coordination of the transposition 
of EU directives by the ministry of Foreign Affairs. Connected with  
a. a weekly monitoring of the progress of transposition at the level of each 
directive, 
b. at the highest administrative level, 
c. which includes the ‘naming and shaming’ of the ministries that are delayed in 
transposition (in both the prognosis and the actual passing of the deadline of 
transposition), 
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d. which is backed by strong political will at the highest political level in Spain to 
transpose directives on time, 
this system provides a substantial incentive to transpose directives in a pragmatic way 
and on time. 
 Another factor that may enhance the speed of transposition in Spain is the existence 
of an inexhaustible number of national laws and rules which facilitate a smooth 
integration of EU directives by means of government decrees and ministerial orders. 
These instruments are used in about 82% of the cases of transposition. In addition, the 
administration rarely decides to ameliorate or complicate the text of the directive, which 
means that one-to-one transposition is more or less common practice.  
 The national parliament is hardly involved in the preparation of the Spanish 
position on new Commission initiatives. With regard to transposition, Parliament plays 
a role if a new law has to be adopted or an existing law needs to be changed. Since this 
occurs only for a small number of directives, also at this stage of the policy process 
parliament’s involvement can be regarded as limited. 
 A possible complication in Spain is that in some policy areas, and specifically 
environmental protection, part of the acquis communautaire has to be transposed and 
implemented by the Autonomous Communities. In those cases, the central 
government has to rely on the Communities, which and depending on their individual 
enacting statutes have to take care of part of the work. 
 In recent years Spain’s transposition rates are very high and impressive. But in spite 
of this achievement, the number of Spanish cases for presumed noncompliance in 
terms of insufficient or non implementation of the acquis communautaire is relatively 
high. This requires some further nuance about the effectiveness of Spain’s 
performance with regard to the implementation of EU policy.  
11.7 Conclusions 
• The swift transposition of EU directives in Spain is not a direct result of the use of 
special legal instruments or techniques. In Spain directives are mostly transposed 
through lower-level instruments, that is, government decrees and ministerial 
orders.  
• The Spanish legal system has a special legal instrument—the real decreto-ley—which 
is only used in situations of urgency or emergency. This instrument is sometimes 
used when Spain is faced with an infringement procedure. In general, this 
instrument is regarded as unsuitable or even unlawful for transposition. 
• The other special instrument—the real decreto legislativo—is based on a delegation 
law passed by parliament (ley de bases), which specifies for which purpose the 
government is allowed to adopt a decree with the status of law. The delegation 
expires the moment the instrument has been adopted. Since this instrument 
requires a separate law, its procedure is not much faster than the adoption of other 
laws. In addition, a change of the rules adopted by a real decreto-legislativo require the 
adoption of a law. The advantage of this instrument is that rather detailed ands 
mostly technical legislation can be passed without extensive parliamentary 
discussion. 
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• The Spanish administration has a highly accurate and detailed monitoring system 
on the progress of transposition, which supports the coordination of the 
transposition of EU directives by the ministry of Foreign Affairs. Connected with  
– a weekly monitoring of the progress of transposition at the level of each 
directive,  
– at the highest administrative level,  
– which includes the ‘naming and shaming’ of the ministries that are delayed 
in transposition (in both the prognosis and the actual passing of deadline of 
transposition),  
– which is backed by strong political will at the highest political level in Spain 
to transpose directives on time,  
 this system provides a substantial incentive to transpose directives in a pragmatic 
way and on time. 
• The techniques and methods of transposition in Spain are best characterized as 
pragmatic. There is a strong preference for copying. If the main concepts used in a 
directive differ from concepts common in Spanish law, one aims to reformulate 
some of the text of the directive. 
• The pragmatic attitude towards transposition and the strong emphasis to transpose 
directives on time have as a drawback that Spain has many laws next to its more 
traditional ‘codes’. It makes, according to some observers, the Spanish legal system 
less clearly organized than one would wish. This may cause lack of clarity and 
potentially inconsistency in the daily practice of applying Spanish law, which could 
be a problem to both courts and those who are subject to these laws. 
• An additional complication in Spain is that in some policy areas, and specifically 
environmental protection, part of the acquis communautaire has to be transposed 
and implemented by the Autonomous Communities. In those cases, the central 
government has to rely on the Communities, which and depending on their 
individual enacting statutes have to take care of part of the work. 
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Appendix: List of interviewees 
• Miguel Angel Navarro Portera, General Secretary for the European Union, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State Secretariat for the European Union  
• José Maria Roche, General subdirector of Juridical affairs, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, State Secretariat for the European Union, General directorat 
for coordination and additional Community policies 
• Eleuterio Alcocer García, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State Secretariat for the 
European Union, General directorat for coordination and additional 
Community policies 
• Diego Chacón Ortiz, General technical secretary, Ministry of the Presidency 
• Juan Luis Morell Evangelista, General subdirector for cooperation and 
international studies, Ministry of the Presidency  
• Julio Carlos Fuentes Gómez, General subdirector Legal affairs, Ministry of 
Justice 
• Miguel Herrero y Rodríguez de Miñón, ex Legal advisor, State Council 
• Jesús Avezuela, Legal advisor, State Council  
• Alfonso Moreno Gómez, General technical secretary, Autonomous 
Community Madrid  
• Pedro Baena Pinedo, director of juridical and normative affairs, Autonomous 
Community Madrid 
• Maribel Jimeno, Autonomous Community Madrid 
• Carmen Lopez de Zuaso, regional lawyer, Autonomous Community Madrid 
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12  United Kingdom 
12.1 General overview of the legal and political system 
12.1.1 Constitutional characteristics 
The UK has a parliamentary, bicameral system. Parliament consists of two Houses, the 
House of Commons – the more representative body – and the House of Lords. Both 
Houses are involved in the process of debating, amending, rejecting or enacting Acts of 
Parliament, but ever since the Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949, the influence of the 
House of Lords in the legislative process in the last resort amounts to that of a 
suspensory veto.  
 The British legal system is quite different from the legal systems of some of the 
other Member States of the European Union. Most remarkably, the UK does not have a 
written constitution. This means that there is no established procedure for making 
changes of a constitutional character, but that constitutional conventions and 
constitutional law evolve over time and well from different sources (Craig and De 
Búrca, 2003). As regards the issue of transposition of European directives in the UK, 
two basic principles of the British legal system are important. Firstly, the UK has a 
dualist approach to international law. This means that international treaties, which are 
signed by the UK, do not automatically become part of the British legal system, but they 
need to be transformed into the national legal system by an Act of Parliament in order 
to become applicable. Secondly, there is the principle of the sovereignty of Parliament. 
Once this principle held – as some feel it still does – that no Parliament can bind a 
future Parliament. Another aspect of Parliament’s sovereignty is that its will ranks 
above the will of government, the administration or – for that matter – the judiciary if 
parliamentary will has been enshrined into legislation. These connotations of 
Parliamentary sovereignty of course sometimes run contrary to the idea of the 
supremacy of EC Law. 
 The European Communities Act 1972 and its subsequent Amendment Acts 
reconcile the potentially conflicting interests of the UK dualistic tradition, the principle 
of sovereignty of Parliament and the supremacy of EC Law. The Act transfers sovereign 
powers to the EC, establishes the supremacy of Community law, and makes 
Community law directly applicable in the UK (Craig and De Búrca, 2003). The Act also 
makes it possible to implement European directives by means of delegated legislation 
(so called ‘Statutory Instruments’) on a wide scale. This might seem inconsistent with 
the principle of the sovereignty of Parliament. However, this is less contradictory than 
it appears, since Parliament can exert influence through an extensive process of 
parliamentary scrutiny during the negotiation of e.g proposed EC directives.  
12.1.2  Political characteristics 
The political institutions in the UK are characterized by a parliamentary government 
with the power centralized in the Cabinet supported by a majority in the House of 
Commons. Due to the mechanics of the parliamentary majority system, and the 
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absence of a written constitution108 substantially limiting the scope of the UK 
government, UK governments, supported by the majority in Parliament, are very 
powerful. The party mandate and party discipline system give government a strong 
position vis-à-vis Parliament. The relation between government and Parliament is 
monistic to a high extent. In addition it is extremely rare that government legislation is 
challenged in the courts. However, there are practical limits to the power of the 
government. Most importantly, the government does not have deconcentrated, local 
administration branches of its own, but must largely rely on other, not subordinated, 
bodies for the implementation of its policies. Furthermore non-governmental 
organisations, like trade unions, interest groups etc. are able to influence policies. 
Nonetheless, the UK government is one of the most powerful in Europe. The relative 
autonomy of the government is justified by the party mandate doctrine, according to 
which the government has received a mandate from the electorate that entitles it, or 
even requires it, to implement its party program. This severely limits the importance of 
the Parliament, and it also secures strict party discipline (Budge 1996).  
 As a result Parliament is not a strong constraint on government power. However 
intense the debates in Parliament maybe, they do not often have an unforeseen 
outcome, nor do they frequently succeed in tackling or changing government policies. 
The debates in the Houses do not only aim to change the minds of Members of 
Parliament (MPs) but also try to influence public opinion. The official opposition, the 
main party not in possession of government power, has a recognized role independent 
of the government. However, its aim in the parliamentary debates is often not to 
provide constructive criticism of government policy, but to win the next elections. This 
explains the adversarial quality of the debates.  
 Faced with an authoritative and powerful government it is difficult for MP’s to really 
scrutinize government policies. So called ‘official secrecy’, which substantively restricts 
government and the bureaucracy to communicate information on government 
business and policies (see sections 22 through 44 of the Freedom of Information Act 
2000), adds to these restraints. For example members of the civil service are not 
allowed to give certain information to parliamentary committees investigating 
government policies. These problems have, to a certain extent, been overcome by 
investigative journalism and select committees of the House of Commons that, for 
example, specialise in investigating the work of a specific ministry in a specific area. 
However, their work is held back internally by party loyalty and externally by official 
secrecy. Select committees in the House of Lords often work better, since they are less 
troubled by adversarial politics, and they are able to rally cross-party support. However, 
their influence is diffuse. Their non-elective base works to their disadvantage, and they 
have no final veto power over primary legislation, but can merely delay it (Budge 1996).  
12.1.3  Political administrative characteristics 
Both the operation of the cabinet government and the work of the UK civil service are 
formed by two fundamental constitutional principles, namely the principle of collective 
responsibility and the principle of ministerial responsibility. These two principles 
necessitate extensive coordination between the government and ministries (Kassim, 
                                                 
108  The UK does have a number of statutes on discrete constitutional issues, it does however not have a 
written constitution in the sense of an overarching, consolidated and written Constitution. 
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2000). The principle of collective responsibility involves that decisions taken by the 
Cabinet are agreed to by all members, and as a consequence, a dissenting minister 
should resign from the government. The principle of ministerial responsibility means 
that ministers are responsible for the actions of their officials. Loyalty and consistency 
are therefore important. Officials function as servants to ministers, and once an issue is 
settled, the professional task of the official is to implement it as efficiently as possible. 
In this context, neutrality is very important, and a good civil servant should be able to 
adapt to changes in policy easily (Wallace 1996; Kassim, 2000).  
 The central bureaucracy is grouped into fairly autonomous ministries and 
departments. There are about 15 centrally important ministries, which are represented 
by their political heads in the Cabinet, and about 70 fairly important ministries and 
offices. There are usually two or three junior Ministers in each ministry who are 
appointed by the government, and the government is exceptionally dependent on 
independently appointed bureaucrats for policy implementation and advice. A minister 
spends on average two years at a particular department, and he or she is dependent on 
the civil servants for information and guidance. This opens up possibilities for the 
department to influence the minister into supporting the departmental view in cases 
when the government has no clear line on the policy in question (Budge 1996). 
 Over the years, an extensive network of cabinet committees and subcommittees has 
developed in order to handle the increased scale and complexity of government 
responsibilities. The administrative procedures in Whitehall are organized to support 
the far-reaching requirements of coordination, and the administration is obliged to 
ensure that all interested departments are consulted. The Cabinet Office has a central 
role in monitoring progress and stepping in as a coordinator when necessary. This 
system of coordination has amounted to an administrative culture with norms and 
values that support information-sharing, instinctive consultation, cross-departmental 
contact, a spirit of mutual trust, group loyalty and corporate endeavour (Wallace 1996; 
Kassim, 2000).  
 At the top of the civil service hierarchy, the policy-making level, about 6000-10000 
people are employed. Although there have been some changes in recent years, this 
group is still dominated by ‘Oxbridge’ graduates. One consequence of this is that the 
top of the civil service have a shared ethos. They are resistant to change stemming from 
the government, have a preference for shutting off discussions from ill-informed 
intervention and they have a generalist approach to policy-making. The civil servants 
perceive their roles as advocates of the interest of their department, which is partly 
formed in the interaction with interest groups (Budge 1996). 
 The UK administration has traditionally been characterized by homogeneity of the 
higher civil service, loyalty to the government (rather than to the administrative corps or 
individual departments), high morale and a strong sense of professionalism. The 
interviews confirmed this impression.  
 These characteristics have been somewhat weakened in the past 25 years, since 
changes have been made to make the conduct of the government more businesslike 
and to privatise some public functions. Because of these changes, managerial skills 
have become more valued in the definition and implementation of policy (Wallace 
1996; Kassim, 2000). One important part of this process of change is the ‘Next steps 
initiative’, which was initiated by the government of Mrs Thatcher in 1984. This 
process of restructuring the civil service was based on criticism of British civil servants 
for being inefficient, particularly regarding the delivery of services, and Thatcherite 
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ideas about modelling the delivery of services on the free market. The reform was 
aimed at reducing the scope of government and to render it more efficient while 
limiting the costs, and basically it has involved reducing the government departments 
in size. The idea is that they focus on policy-making and handling legislation in 
Parliament, while the implementation of policy is transferred to autonomous agencies 
(Budge 1996). It is also important to note that this initiative has had as one of its 
consequences that about half of the British civil servants currently work at semi-
independent agencies, and this is of course a challenge to the traditional administrative 
culture and procedures of Whitehall (Christoph 1993). 
 It is possible that membership in the EU has also led to changes in the British civil 
service. Bulmer and Burch (1998) have argued that adapting to membership in the EU 
has been possible within Whitehall’s established approach of handling policy, and that 
the formal, informal and cultural characteristics of the British civil service have 
remained intact. They also argue that the machinery put in place before and in the 
process of acceding to the EC for handling European business has remained largely 
unchanged. On the other hand, Christoph (1993) argues that changes in attitudes of 
British civil servants who participate in European Union policy making has added to 
the domestic pressure for change, which is present for example in the ‘Next steps 
initiative’. For example, some of the civil servants belonging to the European ‘cadre’ are 
more open to limiting the secrecy in policy-making and the hierarchical structure of the 
civil service.  
 According to the respondents in the interviews civil servants are encouraged to work 
for some time in Brussels in one form or other. Although off late it has proved to 
become more difficult to recruit stagiaires or ‘temporaires’ for posts in Brussels there is 
an ongoing exchange of – interested – staff between Brussels and London. There is, on 
the face of things, no official policy to encourage and accommodate staff exchange. E.g. 
a temporary Brussels’ position is not a fixed career requirement. The London-Brussels 
staff exchange however does blend in quite well with the system of job-rotation in the 
British civil service. Changes in position every three or four years are customary the 
civil service. Life long positions are very rare. A stay in Brussels is certainly not a career-
disadvantage. 
12.2  Political or public discussion concerning EU directives and their 
transposition 
12.2.1  Discussion of recent reports and their recommendations 
The UK takes implementation of EC legislation very seriously, and it is the stated goal 
of the government that directives should be transposed according to the Community 
goals of effectiveness and timeliness. It is also important that the measures used for 
implementation should be in accordance with UK policy goals, including minimising 
the burdens on business (Cabinet Office, 2005). This policy, combined with the high 
level of professionalism and loyalty in the civil service and the skills of government 
lawyers, has resulted in a good implementation score in the past and present. The 
actual debate on the implementation of EC directives however is not focussed on the 
implementation score, but rather on better regulation policies. The policies aim to 
avoid administrative burdens for economic operators and excessive bureaucracy, so-
called red tape. Current topical questions are whether or not the British government is 
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over-zealous when implementing EC directives both in respect to the speed of 
transposition as well as to the substance of it. There are two distinct strands in the 
discussion. The first one has to do with speed of transposition. At this moment – some 
of the respondents tell us – the UK is looking to its implementation score from a new 
angle: are we not doing too much? In a cost-benefit equation timely implementation is 
not always per se beneficial to British businesses. A second strand relates to the way in 
which the UK transposes EC directives. At this moment there are concerns regarding 
over-implementation (Cabinet Office, 2005). Present government policies favour 
transposition by way of copying-out (i.e. sticking as close to the wording of a directive as 
possible, as opposed to the technique of elaboration i.e. reshuffling or translating a 
directive text in order to get a better fit with British legislation). These new policies also 
frown on ‘gold-plating’ i.e. implementation that goes beyond the minimum necessary 
to comply with a directive. 
12.2.2 Expectations regarding the process and results of these discussions 
The ambitions of the UK government policy seem to be successfully followed in 
practice, since the UK has one of the best transposition records in the EU. In May 
2003, for example, the UK was one of only five member states that reached the goal of a 
transposition deficit of 1.5% or smaller (European Commission, 2003b). On the other 
hand, there are signs that the transposition record of the UK is getting worse (van den 
Brink, 2004). Respondents in the interviews confirm this, but note that the UK until 
recently was not really preoccupied with the transposition record since it had a 
respectable performance. In the run up to the Barcelona summit in 2002 the 
transposition record slacked to a 3.3% deficit (12th position) and was made more or less 
on strategic grounds an issue. A high level project was set up to ‘sweep up’ the backlog 
and did so with considerable success. Some of the respondents think that a similar 
project is needed in the advent of the upcoming British EU presidency. 
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Table 12.1: British legal instruments used for transposition 
 Act of Parliament Order in Council Ministerial orders, 
regulations or rules 
(Statutory Instruments) 
 Law  Ministerial order 
Main features Used for transposition 
when the European 
Communities Act cannot 
be used as delegating 
legislation, and when 
there is no other suitable 
delegating legislation, or 
when there is an already 
existing tradition in the 
specific area concerned 
of using primary 
legislation for 
transposition 
A ‘Designation Order’ is 
used to decide which 
minister or state 
secretary is competent to 
adopt Statutory 
Instruments in order to 
transpose directives in a 
certain area 
Statutory Instruments 
used for transposition 
are usually based on 
delegation by the 
European Communities 
Act, but can also be 
based on more specific 
Acts of Parliament 
Advice State Council Not required (The UK 
has no State Council) 
Not required (The UK 
has no State Council) 
Not required (The UK 
has no State Council) 
Parliamentary approval Required Required In principle required (the 
parent act determines) 
Procedure Proposed by government 
and passing through 
both Houses of 
Parliament 
Proposed by government 
enacted by the Privy 
Council 
Negative resolution 
procedure (most 
common): the 
Parliament can pass a 
motion to annul 
(a’prayer’) within 40 
days 
Affirmative resolution 
procedure: Parliamentary 
approval is needed 
 
12.3   Description of judicial instruments and techniques 
12.3.1  Instruments 
In the UK EC directives can be transposed either into primary or secondary legislation. 
Primary legislation in the UK is called ‘Acts of Parliament’. A common term for 
delegated or secondary legislation, i.e. legislation that is based on an Act of Parliament, 
is ‘Statutory instruments’. Examples of this type of legislation are ministerial rules, 
orders or regulations. No clear hierarchy among these instruments exists (House of 
Commons Information Office, 2003). There is also a tradition in the UK of using 
‘quasi-legislative’ devices, for example administrative circulars and codes of practice. 
These instruments, however, are unsuitable for the transposition of EC directives 
containing rights and obligations (EC Court of Justice, C-102/79 Commission v. 
Belgium and C-29/84, Commission v. Germany) (see section 12.3.3 for further 
reference).  
 In the UK the bulk of all EC directives (80-90%) is – most of the time by virtue of 
section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972 – implemented in statutory 
instruments, but on occasion directives are transposed using an Act of Parliament. 
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There may be various reasons to take the long route. For instance if directives – e.g. for 
reasons of consistency – have traditionally been transposed in Acts of Parliament new 
directives in the field will be implemented in primary legislation as well. This is for 
instance – the respondents tell us – the case in the field of British company law. 
Another reason to implement by way of primary legislation can be the situation in 
which the use of a statutory instrument is impossible. Schedule 2 of the European 
Communities Act of 1972, for instance, resists transposition into subordinated 
legislation when EC directive provisions for instance impose or increase taxation, 
attribute legislative power, or create substantive new criminal offences. 
 In Table 12.1, the main characteristics of the legal instruments that are used in the 
UK for the transposition of directives and the procedure by which they are adopted are 
briefly presented. In order to get an accurate insight in how the system works both the 
processes for adopting Acts of Parliament and statutory instruments are described in 
more detail below. 
 
Procedure for adopting Acts of Parliament 
Before an Act of Parliament is adopted, the proposed legislation is called a bill. In order 
to become an Act of Parliament, a bill has to go through different stages in both 
Houses of Parliament, and it can start in either House. Typically, it takes weeks or 
months for a bill to pass through all the stages, but if the Government finds it 
necessary and the Parliament agrees, the process can be accelerated. As the 
respondents in the interviews made clear, the actual passage of a bill through 
Parliament does not take all that much time. It is the bidding for a timeslot for 
parliamentary debate on a bill that can truly be time consuming. Bills are not debated 
in order of their arrival. The Government determines the order of business in the 
Commons, with some consultation of the opposition parties. In the different 
circumstances of the House of Lords, the Government’s management of business 
needs to be more accommodating. Other priorities can and do prevail over 
transposition issues, which can tie up the transposition for months. 
 There is a distinction between public bills and private bills. A public bill seeks to 
alter the general law, and a private bill relates to a matter of individual, corporate or 
local interest. The term public bill includes both Government bills, which are initiated 
by the government and Private Members’ bills, which are initiated by individual 
Members of Parliament. Below, the stages of a Government bill that starts in the House 
of Commons are described. 
 The preparatory stages of a bill involve drafting by lawyers in the Parliamentary 
Counsel Office (PCO), which is part of the Cabinet Office. The drafting is performed on 
instructions of the Government department concerned. During the drafting, there is 
consultation with other departments and interested parties, and sometimes use is made 
of green (consultative) or white (policy statement) papers.  
 The first formal step takes place at the beginning of each session of Parliament, 
when the sponsoring minister presents the bill to the Commons. The bill then receives 
a formal first reading and is then printed and published.  
 The next step is the second reading, when the House debates the general proposals 
contained in the bill. The House considers the principle of the bill, and there is usually 
widespread debate. Some non-controversial bills are dealt with in a special second 
reading committee instead of the whole House. Usually the second reading takes place 
in the second week following the printing of a bill. 
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 After the second reading, the bill enters the committee stage. Usually the bill is 
referred for consideration to a standing committee, but sometimes it is considered by a 
committee of the whole House. Examples of bills that were considered by a committee 
of the whole House are the European Communities Act 1972, and the European 
Communities (Amendment) Act 1993, which approved the Treaty of the European 
Union (TEU). The name standing committee is a little misleading in this context, since 
a new standing committee is appointed for each bill. The committee must consider 
each clause and Schedule of the bill, and agree or disagree. It may also make 
amendments. Short bills may pass through this stage in a single sitting, but long and 
controversial bills may take many weeks. 
 Next, the bill enters the consideration or report stage, and is reported as amended to 
the whole House. The House may make further amendments and reverse or amend 
changes made by the Standing Committee, but otherwise it does not consider clauses 
and schedules not amended in the committee stage. 
 The final stage in the House of Commons is the third reading. This stage usually 
commences directly after the conclusion of the report stage. No amendments may be 
made, and if there are debates, they are usually very short. For controversial bills, the 
opposition may wish once more to vote against it.  
 After the third reading, usually on the next sitting day, the bill is sent to the House 
of Lords where a broadly similar process is followed. The House of Lords may amend 
the bill, and the bill as amended is then considered by the House of Commons. The 
Commons may agree to these amendments, agree to them with amendments or 
disagree. If the Commons agree to the Lords amendments with amendments, the 
Lords will be asked to agree to the amendments. The bill may travel back and forth 
between the two Houses several times, and the Lords and Commons must agree on a 
text. However, in a case of deadlock, an identical bill may be passed the following year 
without the consent of the House of Lords. This means that the House of Lords may 
delay a piece of legislation that has started in the House of Commons, but it cannot 
block it indefinitely. 
 Finally, the bill will need the royal assent, by which the bill becomes an Act. An Act 
can enter into force immediately, at a date specified in the Act, by Commencement 
Orders or by a combination of the three (House of Commons Information Office, 
2001).  
 
Procedure for adopting Statutory Instruments 
The legal department in a ministerial department concerned usually drafts statutory 
instruments itself. The departmental drafters do not have the same level of skill or 
experience as the senior drafters of the PCO. To monitor and review some aspects the 
of the technical quality of the statutory instruments (SIs) the parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Statutory Instruments (sometimes called the Scrutiny Committee) 
scrutinises SIs. The Scrutiny Committee does not consider the merits of SIs, but only 
tests whether a Minister’s powers are being carried out in accordance with the 
provision of the enabling (parent) Act (House of Commons Information Office, 2003a). 
Because the Scrutiny Committee has a limited scope of review, and some scrutiny on 
the merits of SIs was felt necessary, on 17 December 2003 the House of Lords 
appointed the Select Committee on the Merits of Statutory Instruments. The 
Committee functions quite satisfactorily. A Special Report of the House of Lords of 
united kingdom  
153 
2004, reviewing the work of the Merits Committee, recommends that the Merits 
Committee should be made a regular ‘sessional’ committee (House of Lords, 2004).  
 Which minister or state secretary is competent to draft and enact SIs, such as 
ministerial orders, rules or regulations, whatever the case may be, is decided by an 
Order in Council made by the Privy Council, the so called ‘Designating Order’. The 
Privy Council however does not have the lead in attributing the designation, nor does it 
decide on issues of conflicting competence. The Council mechanically takes the 
requests for new designations – submitted by the different ministers or state secretaries 
– on board. Since the Privy Council only meets every three months it requires some 
strategic planning on behalf of the departments when they need to draft a ministerial 
order or regulation for which no designation exist as of yet. The Cabinet Offices 
organises regular trawlers within the departments to see whether new designating 
orders are needed. 
 As a rule of good practice interested bodies and parties are often consulted during 
the process of drafting statutory instruments. When the drafting is finalised, the 
instrument is either made in the name of the responsible minister or secretary of state, 
or it is issued in draft requiring the approval of both Houses of Parliament. Statutory 
instruments apply to the whole UK or to some of the individual countries.  
Frequently used terms in the context of statutory instruments are ‘laid’ and ‘made’. 
When an instrument is laid before the House of Commons, a copy of the instrument is 
placed with the Votes and Proceedings desk in the Journal Office. A statutory 
instrument is made when it has been signed by the minister with authority under the 
Act. When an instrument has been made, it is no longer in draft.  
 The parent Act determines whether or not an instrument is subject to parliamentary 
procedure. If it is subject to parliamentary control, either the negative resolution 
procedure or the affirmative resolution procedure is followed. The instrument can 
either be laid in draft or laid after making. Instruments based on the European 
Communities Act 1972 are subject to parliamentary procedure, and the government 
decides upon whether the negative or affirmative resolution procedure is followed. The 
negative resolution procedure is the most commonly used one.  
 The most common procedure is the negative resolution procedure. Instruments 
subject to the negative procedure are usually laid after making. They come into force on 
the date stated on them, but are subject to annulment if a motion to annul, known as a 
‘prayer’, is passed within 40 days. Any Member of Parliament can put such a motion, 
but the chance that it will be dealt with is greater if it is tabled by the Official 
Opposition or if there are a large number of signatories. Prayers are exceptionally rare 
when it comes down to (draft) statutory instruments implementing EC directives. It is 
the experience of the respondents that it virtually never happens that a statutory 
instrument is actually rejected as a result of a prayer with a negative outcome. 
 A very small number of instruments are laid in draft under the negative procedure. 
These instruments cannot be made if the draft is disapproved within 40 days.  
 The affirmative resolution procedure provides more efficient parliamentary control, 
since the instrument must receive the approval of Parliament. Most commonly, 
instruments subject to the affirmative procedure are laid in the form of a draft Order, 
and cannot be made unless both Houses approve the draft. If an instrument is laid 
after making there are two procedures. Either, it cannot come into force unless and 
until it is approved, or it will come into effect immediately, but cannot remain in force 
unless approved within a certain period (usually 28 or 40 days). 
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 Statutory instruments cannot, except in rare cases when the parent Act provides for 
it, be amended or adapted by either House. Thus, Parliament can only accept or reject 
the instrument in its entirety.  
12.3.2  Techniques 
In principle, there are two methods that are used for transposition, namely ‘copy-out’ 
and ‘elaboration’. If the copy-out method is used, domestic legislation merely 
reproduces provisions contained in directives. 
 Elaboration means ‘coming down on one side or the other of choosing a particular 
meaning, in accordance with the traditional approach in UK legislation, according to 
what the draftsman believes the provision to mean’ (Cabinet Office, 2005). Depending 
on the contents of a directive one of them or combinations of two are used. The 
importance of not over- or under-implementing directives is emphasised by the 
Transposition Guide. Recent better regulation policies are especially critical of gold 
plating, i.e. transposition that goes beyond the minimum necessary to comply with the 
directive. Gold plating is to be avoided since it could lead to extra administrative 
burdens for businesses. In much the same way so called double-banking, i.e. the 
situation in which EC legislation covers the same ground as domestic legislation, is 
burdensome. It is preferable to prevent double regimes and aim for some form of 
consolidation e.g. by merging EC and domestic legislation into one piece of legislation 
(Cabinet Office, 2005). 
 The technique of ‘copy out’ is becoming increasingly popular in the UK, since it 
means that judges and lawyers can focus on one instrument instead of two (Association 
of the Councils of State and Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions of the European 
Union, 2004). The Bellis report makes a connection between the use of copy out and 
the fact that directives are becoming more and more detailed (Bellis, 2003). In the past, 
the British need for detailed legislation that leaves the judge with little room for 
interpretation, has proved to be a problem in the process of implementation. When the 
directive contained many vague expressions, ‘elaboration’, i.e. a more precise 
expression of the content of the directive, was often used as technique for 
implementation. This – in some cases – inevitably led to more detailed regulations that 
sometimes went beyond the goal of the directives, or led to over-regulation (‘gold-
plating’). However, that does not mean that copy-out is exempt of any risk of over-
regulation. Copy-out also runs the risk of over-regulation, if stake-holders interpret the 
regulation in a burdensome way due to the lack of clarity of the source (directive) text. 
 The growing popularity and government endorsement of the copy-out technique 
does however not mean that is has become the most commonly technique. According 
to the experience of some of the respondents, elaboration and rewriting are still the 
prevalent approaches to transposition, at least in relation to directives that do not 
merely contain a few amendments of legislation already in place. In this respect 
Cabinet Office Guidance encouraging copying-out is one thing, drafting practice is 
another. 
12.3.3  Character and level of implementing instruments  
The bulk of EC directives is transposed into statutory instruments. These statutory 
instruments are either based on the European Communities Act 1972, which then 
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functions as a general basis for delegation, or any other act, which provides appropriate 
powers. This delegated legislation, which is adopted by a rather swift procedure, can 
amend and in some cases even diverge from existing primary legislation (R v. Secretary 
of State for Employment exparte Unison (1997) 1 CMLR). The European Communities 
Act 1972 contains an explicit so-called Henry VIII power, i.e. a provision that enables 
primary legislation to be amended or repealed by subordinate legislation (House of 
Lords, 2002). This is a strange feature of British law in continental eyes. Powers like 
this, enabling subordinated legislation to override primary legislation, are called Henry 
VIII powers. In a special report on these Henry VIII powers the House of Lords in 
2002 takes the view that there are occasions that the use of these powers is justified for 
instance when amendments to primary legislation would disproportionate increase of 
the length of a Bill or when it is very difficult to anticipate the full extent of necessary 
(future) amendments. When Henry VIII powers are used according to the House of 
Lords parliamentary scrutiny is called for, preferably the affirmative procedure (House 
of Lords, 2002).  
 Both Houses of Parliament, indeed, must be informed of all statutory instruments 
based on the European Communities Act 1972, but it is left to Ministers drafting the 
statutory instruments to decide whether the affirmative or negative resolution 
procedure applies. In most cases the negative resolution procedure is used (see 
paragraph 12.3.1).  
 The powers that the European Communities Act 1972 creates for lower level 
legislators does not affect the power of the formal legislator to adopt (parallel) 
legislation (Usher 1995).  
 Concerning statutory instruments used for the transposition of directives that are 
based on the European Communities Act 1972, Section 2(2) and Schedule 2(2) of the 
Act are the relevant parts. Section 2(2) provides for the implementation of Community 
obligations, and makes it possible to implement Community obligations by delegated 
legislation. No new Act of Parliament is needed, but the delegated legislation used to 
transpose directives can be based directly on the European Communities Act. Section 
2(2) also states that the responsible minister or department is to be designated by an 
Order in Council. Paragraph 1 of Schedule 2 provides exceptions when it is necessary to 
use an Act of Parliament to transpose a directive. For example, this is the case when 
taxation is being imposed and for provisions with retrospective effect. Apart from these 
exceptions, there could also be other reasons for using primary rather than delegated 
legislation for the transposition of directives. One example of this is if the UK 
government wishes to do more than the minimum requirements of a directive (Drewry 
1995; House of Commons Information Office, 2003). In addition, primary legislation 
is used when the issue is of great importance or if important policy change is necessary 
(Van den Brink, 2004), or when directives in a certain policy field traditionally have 
been transposed into primary legislation (e.g. Company Law, see Section 12.3.1) 
 Section 2(2) is frequently used as basis for delegation, either alone or in 
combination with sector specific legislation. It is widely acknowledged (Association of 
the Councils of State and Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions of the European 
Union, 2004) that the construction for delegation of the European Communities Act is 
a useful and even essential method in order to implement European law on time. 
Judges have seldom or never accepted arguments based on constitutional 
considerations against the use of section 2(2) in legal procedures. Detailed guidance is 
available to government lawyers on the use of section 2(2).  
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 Initially, ‘quasi-legislative’ instruments were used for the transposition of some 
directives. However, in the early 1980s rulings by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
signalled that this was inadequate. The ECJ stated that the ambiguous status of quasi-
legislation ‘may create uncertainty about the nature of legal obligations, and its use may 
also deprive those adversely affected of effective legal redress in the courts’. Although 
administrative means are currently only used for transposition of directives in certain 
limited circumstances, they are still often used as a complement to the legal 
instruments (Drewry 1995; House of Commons Information Office, 2003). 
12.3.4  Specific instruments 
Aside from the instruments discussed above we have not come across any other special 
instruments. Most of the instruments based on the European Communities Act 1972 
are not unique to transposition. Ministerial regulations, orders, etc. are also used as a 
result of normal domestic delegation.  
12.4  The national policy cycle concerning directives 
12.4.1  General overview of the process 
The UK system of co-ordination of EU policy is considered very efficient, and it has 
been widely admired. UK representatives are reputed to be well briefed and able to 
present the common position of the government. The European Secretariat (placed in 
the Cabinet Office), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the UK 
Permanent Representation are together responsible for EU policy co-ordination. They 
communicate on a very regular basis and keep each other well informed. There is no 
real secret or elaborate co-ordination procedure between London and Brussels, apart 
from the fact that both London and the Brussels-UK-representation are plugged in very 
well in European processes, and that they react very quickly to European initiatives 
(‘when the glimmer is in the eyes of the Commissioner’). 
 The UK system for co-ordinating EU policy has many things in common with the 
domestic administrative system, among them mechanisms for ensuring horizontal and 
vertical co-ordination. The norms and values of the domestic system are also reflected 
in the way the UK handles EU matters (Kassim, 2000; Kassim, 2003).  
 The main actors involved in EC business are ministers and civil servants in the 
ministries. Other actors are Members of Parliament, especially those involved in 
scrutiny of EC proposals in one of the European Committees, UK members of the 
European Parliament, and personnel of other public sector bodies (local authorities, 
public corporations etc). The last category are involved in EC business in a variety of 
ways, for example as agents of implementation and as lobbyists (Drewry, 1995).  
 The UK goals for co-ordination are ambitious, and involve ensuring for any EU 
proposal that agreement is reached on a UK policy well in advance, and that account is 
taken of affected interests and overall government policy. It also involves that the policy 
agreed upon is pursued consistently in the negotiations, and that, once the decision is 
taken in Brussels, it is put into effect in the UK. The UK has a broad co-ordination 
ambition, which is not only focused on particular policy areas as in many other 
member states, and the co-ordination system is centralised (Kassim, 2001; Kassim, 
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2003). The effective transposition of EC directives is an important part of the UK co-
ordination ambition (Bulmer and Burch, 1998).  
 In the UK, there are various internal guidelines concerning the implementation of 
European legislation. The two most important documents are the Cabinet Office 
Transposition Guide, and the Regulatory Impact Assessment Guide (Cabinet Office, 
2005; Cabinet Office, 2003). The Transposition Guide expresses the policy and goals of 
the government concerning transposition and contains recommendations on how to 
handle Commission proposals, the use of options contained in directives, and how 
domestic legislation should be drafted. The Transposition Guide is a tool for policy-
makers and lawyers across the government, although some requirements only apply to 
those laying legislation before the UK Parliament. It is not legally binding, like 
legislation, but rather consists of a collection of best practices.  
 Parliament is actively involved in the adoption of European legislation, in a 
threefold manner: a. through scrutiny of proposed EC legislation, b. scrutiny of 
Statutory Instruments transposing EC directives, or, c. as the co-author of primary 
legislation if EC or EU legislation is implemented by way of Act of Parliament. We will 
elaborate on the negotiation, preparation and transposition as well as on Parliament’s 
role in it, in the upcoming sections. 
12.4.1.1 National preparation of Commission initiatives 
The transposition process in the UK starts very early on. From the moment ‘the 
glimmer is in the eyes of the Commissioner’ – the respondents say – the UK tries to 
influence EU policies and legislative proposals in the making. This ‘glimmer’ may be 
read from expert meetings that the EU Commission organises to consult experts and 
interested parties prior to initiatives. The UK has a tradition of monitoring EU policies 
very closely and ‘upstreaming’ its influence. During this embryonic phase the UK tries 
to assess the possible impacts of the EU plans and tries to organise informal 
consultations. UK based stakeholders are, by their government, encouraged to engage 
directly with the EU institutions too in this stage in order to transmit their views early 
on (Cabinet Office, 2005; Cabinet Office, 2003). 
 The UK transposition process officially commences when the Commission issues 
its draft proposal for a directive and the process by and large proceeds parallel to the 
process of negotiation of the EC directive. When a draft proposal is published two 
subsequent processes start. The first process aims to arrive at a common British 
negotiation strategy on the basis of an impact analysis and consultations on the 
proposal, and the second aims to put together a project plan for the transposition of the 
directive once it has been enacted. The processes of negotiation and the preparation of 
the transposition are closely interlinked and – according to some of the respondents in 
the interviews – ideally the team of policy-makers, lawyers and other civil servants that 
worked on the preparation and negotiation-strategy on the draft EC directive should 
also work on the actual transposition. Continuity is considered good practice. Due to 
job-rotation – a change of position every three to four years is quite common in the civil 
service – this ideal is very difficult to achieve given the length of European legislative 
processes.  
 Once the draft Commission proposal is published a lead department is charged with 
the treatment of the dossier. Sometimes more than one department is involved. The 
assignment of the dossier to the lead department is a relatively informal process 
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supervised by the cabinet. Judging from the interviews the assignment hardly ever 
causes major problems. In our view two factors account for that. First of all the British 
system is based upon the system of collegial responsibility or prime ministerial 
responsibility (Prakke Kortmann, 2004; 879-880) which to a certain extent prevents 
adversarial departmental entrenchment. Secondly there is a tradition of strong co-
ordination from the Cabinet Office.  
Table 12.2: Information regarding EU proposals presented to the British parliament 
Document Contents 
Legal and procedural issues  
 
Policy and financial implications of the proposal 
 
Explanatory memorandum 
Timetable for transposition 
 
Examination of the economic, social, 
environmental and legal effects of the proposal 
 
Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) 
Negotiation strategy 
 
 
12.4.1.2 National treatment of Commission proposals 
This stage in the process starts, as we noted in section 12.4.1.1, with the presentation of 
a proposal for a directive by the Commission. The lead department provides the 
Cabinet Office with an ‘explanatory memorandum’ (a formal communication to 
Parliament) and a partial ‘Regulatory Impact Assessment’ (RIA) as soon as possible. 
The Cabinet Office in its turn passes it on to Parliament. The explanatory 
memorandum includes information on legal and procedural issues and policy and 
financial implications of the proposal and a timetable for transposition. In principle 
separate memoranda – each dealing with a separate aspect – are prepared for each 
document. This is also the case when the original proposal is substantially amended. 
The partial RIA, in which the (economic, social, environmental and legal) effects of the 
proposed directive for the UK are examined, is developed on the base of the initial RIA 
prepared before the proposal was presented. The RIA, which is updated as the 
negotiations proceed, serves to inform the relevant minister of the negotiating line, to 
seek agreement with other departments, and to inform the parliament of the 
negotiation strategy. Table 12.2 gives an overview of the information that is presented to 
the parliament. 
 Before the Common Position by the Council is adopted, a project plan for the 
transposition should be put together by the responsible department in agreement with 
Ministers, other departments, Cabinet Office and, where appropriate, with the 
Devolved Administrations (Cabinet Office, 2005). Informal consultation is also 
initiated.  
 At this stage, in most cases, a project team consisting of policy officials as well as 
lawyers and sometimes technical specialists from Whitehall, agencies, devolved 
administrations or local government is created. A project team (or ‘bill team’) does not 
necessarily have an interdepartmental composition: its composition varies according to 
the specifics of the directive at hand.  
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 The tasks of a project team is twofold: a) to forge a negotiation strategy and b) to 
make a transposition plan, including the identification of provisions in the directive 
that will require transposition, division of tasks, timetable, and risks connected with the 
coming transposition. In interviews conducted with officials in the Cabinet Office and 
the Department of Transport in the course of a study by the Asser Institute, it was 
confirmed that those teams have been created since 2001 and that they form an 
efficient tool securing timely transposition of directives. The use of project teams is 
encouraged, though, as some of the respondents pointed out, not always feasible or 
practical. Some departments like the Department of Trade and Industry pool staff 
members in order to be able to allot sufficient personnel power to different project 
teams over time. 
 The project team – or civil servants within the lead department – take the lead in the 
formulation of the negotiation line. Depending on the nature and contents of the 
proposal this may require the involvement of various authorities. In cases of inter-
departmental conflicts the European Policy Committee at the Cabinet Office acts as co-
ordinator. This may also involve resolution of conflicts with the devolved authorities, 
although this sometimes may prove difficult because they are not hierarchically 
subordinated to the Whitehall authorities.  
 Before a negotiation line is decided the lead department will have – as a result of the 
so-called scrutiny reserve (see section 12.4.4) – to consult Parliament, the fellow 
ministers (via the European Policy Committee of the Cabinet) and relevant interested 
parties, governmental and non-governmental alike. Consultation is considered very 
important in the UK. After initial informal consultations in most cases formal 
consultations on more important directive proposals are initiated. In January 2004 the 
Regulatory Impact Unit of the Cabinet Office issued a Code of Practice on Consultation 
laying down some important do’s and don’ts as regards consultation (Cabinet Office, 
2004). The Code of Practice advocates wide consultations, and requires a minimum of 
twelve weeks for a written consultation. Respondents in the interviews reported the 
threat of consultation fatigue. At this moment (spring 2005) the Cabinet Office is 
considering more dynamic and less time consuming forms of consultation.  
 In spite of its efficient co-ordination of EU policy, the UK has for the most part not 
been very successful in securing favourable outcomes in the negotiations. The UK has 
been the most successful in the area of economic policy, and particularly in the 
development and implementation of the single market programme. However, for other 
policy types, for example constitutional and institutional reform, and social policy, the 
UK has not been able to shape policy outcomes according to its preferences. One 
explanation for this lack of success could be that the preferences simply have not 
converged with the preferences of other member states. Inability to form coalitions 
could also stem from the fact that the administrative culture among British civil 
servants is different to the administrative culture in most other member states. While 
the EU policy environment is characterised by accommodation and consensus building, 
the British civil servants are schooled in the tradition of neutrality and are used to 
single party government in an adversarial party system. Also, the co-ordination system 
itself could have adverse effects, since the focus on a centralised strategy severely limits 
the flexibility of the UK in the negotiations (Kassim, 2000). 
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Figure 12.1: Main features of the UK transposition process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12.4.1.3 National transposition 
The second task of a project team, or – if no project team was set up – the lead 
department is to examine the directive proposal with respect to its transposition 
implications. In order to secure timely transposition the Transposition Guide of the 
Cabinet Office recommends that – after the European legislative procedure on the 
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directive proposal has reached the stage of the Common position – a Transposition 
Project Plan is formulated. Important elements of this plan are the relationship of the 
proposed directive to the existing legal UK framework, the choice of enforcement 
regime, transposition deadlines, and the clarity of the proposal and its impact on future 
domestic legislation. The main features of the process of transposition in the UK in 
relation to the timing of the decision making process at the European level is outlined 
in Figure 12.1. 
 Best practices concerning the options for transposition are elaborated on in the 
Chapter 3 of the Transposition Guide. The Guide calls for particular attention to the 
margins of discretion that are left to the Member States in implementation. Other key 
issues to be discussed and resolved at this stage are enforcement regimes, including 
sanctions, (if appropriate) the monitoring and administrative regime and the legal 
remedies along with the possibility of producing practical guidance for the economic 
operators. The RIA covering the economical, social, environmental, and legal costs and 
benefits of the directive is, at this particular stage, refocused to include options for 
implementation. Once the draft domestic implementation legislation is considered this 
upgraded RIA and the draft of the implementing regulations is used for open 
consultation on the different implementation options. Again, in principle, at least 12 
weeks need to be provided for a written consultation on the implementation options.  
 While this may slow down the process of transposition, it can – according to the 
Code of Practice on Consultation – lead to better solutions, especially when the 
directive in question leaves some discretion to the Member States. On the face of things 
implementation consultation does not seem to seriously hamper timely transposition 
in the UK. The aforementioned ‘consultation fatigue’ seems, judging from the 
interviews, to be more of a concern. 
 When the consultation is concluded, the final draft of the legislation is prepared. At 
this stage, the final RIA is presented and attached to the draft legislation. In the next 
step the proposal is submitted to the Minister for approval and subsequently for 
approval by the Parliament (Asser Institute, 2004d). 
 When the transposition of a directive in the UK is completed, a letter of notice is 
sent to the Commission by the responsible department, and the transposing measures 
are laid before Parliament. Since November 2001, UK legislation laid before Parliament 
that transposes a European directive, must be accompanied by a so-called Transposition 
Note. In the Transposition Note, it is explained how the main elements of the relevant 
directive has been or will be transposed into UK law. Exceptions can be made for 
situations in which the costs of producing such a note outweigh the benefits (Cabinet 
Office, 2003). The Transposition Notes allow MP’s to check instantly whether or not a 
directive was gold-plated (see Section 12.3.2). 
 Reducing bureaucracy, avoiding administrative burden and cutting red tape are the 
pinnacles of the Better Regulation policies. In order to reduce the burdens of – quickly 
changing – EC directives and national legislation implementing it for – chiefly – 
economic operators, the UK has of recent resorted to the concept of ‘common 
commencement dates’. The idea of common commencement dates is that only twice a 
year new legislation pertaining to businesses or other economic operators in a certain 
sector enters into force. Common commencement dates also offer opportunities to 
improve and focus the guidance on sets of forthcoming legislative measures. Guidance 
is, some of the respondents tell us, becoming an increasingly critical factor to policy 
success.  
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12 4.2  Bureaucratic consultation and coordinating bodies  
Individual departments play—as was pointed out in Section 12.1— the leading role in 
the co-ordination system, and each department deals with Community matters that fall 
within their area of responsibility. Experts within the technical divisions of the 
department concerned take the lead in formulating the UK’s position, and consult 
other departments. How this is organised differs between the departments, but many 
departments have set up special units to co-ordinate European activities internally. The 
two departments that are most extensively involved in EU affairs are the Department 
for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) and the Department of Trade 
and Industry (DTI). They have created respectively an EU Division and a European 
Directorate, which oversee EU related work and implementation of EC law. DEFRA and 
the DTI also encourage their officials to build a ‘European’ career (Drewry, 1995; 
Kassim, 2000).  
 Although the initiative lies with the individual departments, all directives in 
negotiation must be commented upon by the European Secretariat and the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO). However, the domestic departments feel that they have 
the necessary expertise, and therefore the co-ordinating function of the Secretariat is 
seen more as a formality (Siedentopf and Hauschild, 1988). Still, the machinery that is 
set up is rather efficient, and it plays an important role in helping the government form 
a common position.  
 In the UK, in contrast to most other member states where the main co-ordinating 
role is played by the Foreign Ministry, the key role in co-ordination of EU policy is 
played by the European Secretariat of the Cabinet Office. One advantage of this is that 
the Cabinet Office is a more neutral body than the FCO, which has interests over a wide 
range of issues. A second advantage is that the Cabinet Office has an important role in 
coordinating domestic policy as well, and it presides over a large network of 
Committees. The role of the European Secretariat is therefore a natural extension of 
this role (Drewry, 1995). One of the main tasks of the European Secretariat is to oversee 
that European directives are transposed properly into domestic law (Bulmer and Burch, 
1998). It also makes sure that other departments with an interest in a particular issue 
are consulted in the process of negotiation. The officers keep in close touch with the 
experts in the responsible departments and with the UK Permanent Representation 
(Kassim, 2000). The head of the European Desk of the Cabinet Office meets with the 
Permanent Representation on a weekly basis in the so called Grant Darroch meeting. If 
problems occur within or between departments handling European dossiers the 
Cabinet Office will intervene. If the European Secretariat is not able to resolve the 
differences informally, formal procedures follow in one of the committees. The 
subcommittee on European questions is divided into three levels. Routine policy 
matters are handled on official level by EQO, which meet at least 100 times per year. 
All departments are entitled to send representatives to meetings. The committee at 
senior level is called EQO*, and at the ministerial level (E)DOP. Legal aspects of EC 
business are dealt with in the EQO(L), an offshoot of the EQO. This committee also 
coordinates legal advice across departments (Drewry, 1995; Kassim, 2000). In some 
respects the Cabinet Office is the nerve centre of British European policies. It acts as an 
intermediary between the Permanent Representation in Brussels, the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office and other departments during the very early stages of a directive 
proposal, it takes the lead on proposals for directives that are considered very important 
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to UK interests or policies, it monitors whether good practice (e.g. the implementation 
of the Better Regulation targets, legislative quality) is observed by the lead departments, 
(implementing) agencies or regulators. To this last end a Regulatory Impact Unit was 
set up within the Cabinet Office offering advice and guidance to government 
departments e.g . to help them conduct impacts assessments and more generally make 
them aware of notions of better regulation (i.e. aiming for fair and effective regulation 
and reducing bureaucracy and red tape to the bare minimum) (Cabinet Office, 2002). 
In order to give better regulation a more permanent foothold, all departments have set 
up a Departmental Regulatory Impact Unit (DRIU), which acts as the first point of 
contact within Departments on regulatory issues. Although there are no formal, 
procedurally engrained, relations with the Better Regulation Taskforce during the 
negotiation (or transposition for that matter) of EC directives, the spirit of Better 
Regulation is – at this moment – very much present at all levels of government. The 
Blair administration is trying to convince the relevant stakeholders of the benefits of 
Better Regulation rather than to impose it. This is illustrated by the example of the 
Scrutiny Team. This Team acts as an independent promoter of Better Regulation 
policies and – in order to convey the message – it works together with the Cabinet 
Office Units, other departments, regulators and the regulated, focusing on those 
regulations which impact on business, charities, and the voluntary sector. 
 The strong position of the Cabinet Office is both beneficial to effective negotiation 
and timely transposition, respondents in the interviews feel. The Cabinet Office keeps 
close track of the transposition processes and results and can therefore spot bottlenecks 
and act upon it. This however does not prevent transposition backlogs from occurring 
every now and then. Raising the game of the transposition results and reducing backlog 
– often felt necessary in the advent of a UK presidency or an important EU summit – 
needs – as in most member states – strong political backing.  
 Although the European Secretariat of the Cabinet office plays the key role in 
coordination of EU matters, the FCO also still plays a central role. The FCO has set up 
three European Union Divisions, one external (EUDE), one internal (EUDI) and one 
for bilateral relations (EUB). The divisions report to the Director for Europe who has 
the general responsibility for EU policy. The main roles of the EUDI are adding a FCO 
perspective to dossiers going through the EU legislative process, keeping the Foreign 
Secretary up to date with EU developments, taking the lead on broad issues and 
organizing coordination on these issues together with the European Secretariat. It also 
operates the communications infrastructure connecting London with Brussels and 
other capitals, distributes EC documents to other departments, provides briefings for 
European Council meetings and is the main link with the UK Permanent 
Representation. The role of the EUDE is more like the roles of divisions in other 
departments, and it takes the lead in issues dealing with the foreign policy of the EU 
(Drewry, 1995; Kassim, 2000). 
12.4.3 The role of compulsory advisory bodies 
The UK does not have a overall system of mandatory consultation on draft legislation. 
Scrutiny is exercised by both Houses of Parliament, the House of Lords acting as a 
Chambre of reflexion. Parliamentary scrutiny of statutory instruments implementing 
EC directives is intensifying over the last years.  
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 Consultations during negotiations are conducted at the government’s discretion, but 
are considered ever more important and best practice. During the negotiation and 
transposition of EC substantive EC directives even double consultation is encouraged 
(Cabinet Office, 2004) (see for further reference section 4.1). Sometimes legislation 
makes consultation mandatory. E.g. Section 5 (1) of the Regulatory Reform Act 2001 
does oblige ministers to consult interested parties before they make an order on the 
basis of the 2001 Act.  
 The Cabinet office serves as a go between for the co-ordination and an observer of 
good form as regards these consultations. There is no distinct compulsory advisory 
body nor is there a form of formal review during the negotiation or implementation 
phase in the UK.  
12.4.4  The role of the parliament 
As mentioned above, the parliamentary scrutiny of EC legislation is underpinned by the 
understanding that ministers should not normally agree to EC legislation without 
giving Parliament an opportunity to scrutinise the legislation (House of Commons 
Information Office, 2003). This principle is called the ‘scrutiny reserve’ and it is 
enshrined in the Scrutiny reserve resolution passed by the House of Commons in 1998 
(House of Commons, 1998).  
 Upon the adoption of a Commission proposal, the British government presents the 
proposal, including an ‘explanatory memorandum’ to the Lower and Upper Chamber, 
which can then debate the proposal and can in principle disagree and push for certain 
amendments. The negotiator in Brussels should then respect the mandate of the 
parliament. However, due to overload, differing timetables and difficulties for the 
Parliament to access information about the governments position in the negotiations, it 
is far from always the case that Parliament has a say in negotiations on European 
legislation (Miers and Page, 1990). The lack of the technical knowledge necessary to 
sufficiently understand certain issues further limits the influence of the Parliament. 
The problems of parliamentary scrutiny could also be explained by underlying 
weaknesses in the position of the Parliament, the most important of which is that the 
Parliament is, for the most part, politically dependent on the government. However, the 
UK Parliament has a more prominent role in EU business than parliaments in most 
other member states, with the Danish Folketing as an outstanding exception (Drewry, 
1995; Kassim, 2000).  
 The parliamentary scrutiny of EU proposals is supervised by the European 
Secretariat. Among other things, the Secretariat makes sure that the departments 
supply the scrutiny committees in the Parliament with information about Commission 
proposals accompanied by explanatory memoranda (Kassim, 2000). However, it is also 
of great importance that the UK Parliament, as opposed to the national parliaments of 
many other member states, asks for EC documents on its own accord and does not sit 
and wait for EC material to be forwarded by the government. In addition to traditional 
methods for scrutiny, for example the tabling of parliamentary questions and the 
holding of debates, special procedures and mechanisms have been developed. In the 
House of Commons a select committee, the European Scrutiny Committee, has been 
established. The European Scrutiny Committee is informed on EU issues, including 
legislative proposals. It focuses on matters of political importance, and decides on 
which proposals (about 1100 per year) should be considered by the Parliament. The 
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Committee receives an explanatory memorandum on each document from the relevant 
Minister. All documents deemed politically or legally important are discussed in the 
Committee’s weekly Reports. Debates recommended by the Committee take place 
either in a European Standing Committee or (more rarely) on the Floor of the House. 
There are only three EU standing committees: A. which includes Agriculture, B. which 
includes Home Affairs and C. which includes Trade. Some of the respondents feel that 
these committees have too broad a scope which results in lukewarm interest for the 
debates. 
 Documents that are not selected for debate can be negotiated by the government. 
The scrutiny reserve involves that the scrutiny procedure should be finished before the 
minister agrees in the Council. However, if it is urgent, the reserve might be breached. 
This happens about 20 times a year, and the reason can be that otherwise the UK 
would not be able to vote because of the time schedule. 
 In the House of Lords, there is a Select Committee on the European Union, which 
mainly evaluates Community policies and proposals. The Committee publishes reports 
on any area of EU business, and the reports are extremely well respected. However, the 
Committee has not escaped criticism, and it has been argued that the reports have little 
effect on government policy (Miers and Page, 1990; Kassim, 2000).  
 Paragraph 2 of Schedule 2 of the European Communities Act contains provisions 
for scrutiny of delegated legislation used for the transposition of EC law. There are two 
possibilities. Either, a draft of the implementing measure has to be approved by 
Parliament (‘affirmative resolution procedure’), or otherwise, the implementing 
measure can be annulled by either House of Parliament (‘negative resolution 
procedure’). In the ‘affirmative resolution procedure’ approval by both chambers is 
required. In the negative resolution procedure, which is the most commonly used, the 
implementation measure is presented to both chambers of parliament. They then have 
40 days to adopt a resolution against the regulation, which, partly because of the tight 
time schedule, very seldom occurs. Statutory instruments used for the implementation 
of EC law can thus be annulled by either House of Parliament. However, this is more 
or less a formality, since statutory instruments used for the implementation of EC law 
are seldom effectively scrutinized and almost never obstructed by Parliament (Drewry, 
1995).  
12.4.5  The role of other, subnational of functional administrations 
European integration has been important for emerging challenges of the unitary 
British state. Scotland, Northern Ireland, Wales and the English regions have all seen 
new opportunities that European integration has brought with it, for example inter-
regional alliances (Bulmer and Burch, 1998). Perhaps partly because of European 
influences, important constitutional changes were made in 1997, which lead to the 
devolvement of certain areas of government to different parts of the UK. Based on 
referendums in Scotland and Wales, a Scottish Parliament and a Welsh Assembly were 
created. In Northern Ireland, there already was an Assembly, but it was not in 
operation. The Northern Ireland Assembly is currently suspended through the 
Northern Ireland Act 2000 (Suspension of Devolved Government Order, 2002).  
Although the power over important policy areas such as agriculture, fisheries, 
environment and structural funds has been transferred to the devolved administrations, 
this has, at least not yet, brought about a transformation of the system for coordinating 
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UK policy. A Scottish Executive EU Office and a National Assembly for Wales EU 
Office have been set up in Brussels. However, the UK Permanent Representation has 
maintained its central position in the coordination of EU policy at the European level. 
On the domestic level, there are three territorial ministries, the Scotland Office, the 
Wales Office and the Northern Ireland Office, which participate in the coordination of 
EU policy. However, they do not take the lead in any policy area, but remain dependent 
on the sectoral departments (Kassim, 2000; Kassim, 2001).  
 Traditionally the process of transposition is highly centralized, and the county 
councils are not consulted. However, for Scotland and Northern Ireland, separate 
transposition measures have often been used (Butt Philip and Baron, 1988). The 
Government of Wales Act 2000 makes it possible to transfer rights of implementation 
of EC law to the National Assembly of Wales. The Scotland Act indicates that some 
implementation rights should be transferred to Scotland. It seems that whether 
transposition is done on a central or regional basis depends on the policy area. For 
example, food, agricultural and environmental measures seem to be transposed on a 
devolved basis, i.e. England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Transport 
measures are transposed on a UK basis. Several measures are transposed on a parallel 
basis in Great Britain and in Northern Ireland. Since devolvement is a quite new 
phenomenon the way devolved government partake in the implementation of EC 
directives is only now settling in. It proves quite difficult to manage the different 
responsibilities. The UK government handles most of the negotiation, but for some 
areas – like fisheries – transposition of EC Directives is a joint responsibility. Some 
devolved governments have some trouble with timely transposition, which in its turn is 
a problem for the UK government that is at the end of the day responsible for 
transposition deficits. 
12.4.6  The role of interest groups 
Each department has its own ‘policy network’, on which they rely for information and 
for gaining compliance for policies. The policy preferences of the departments are 
influenced by these networks. There are advantages for both sides. The interest groups 
have opportunities of influencing policy and legislation before it is adopted, and the 
departments, partly due to their generalist nature, are dependent on advice from the 
interest groups. The process of interaction is not open, but in order to influence policy, 
interest groups need to obtain insider status with the department. As mentioned above, 
the department responsible for the transposition of a directive usually consults affected 
interests during the process of drafting and adopting the necessary transposition 
measures (Drewry, 1995). 
12.5  Analysis of instruments and techniques 
12.5.1  Advantages and disadvantages of instruments 
The obvious benefits of the use of statutory instruments are speed and flexibility. The 
system of the European Communities Act 1972 allows the UK government to transpose 
EC directive very quickly, since transposition by way of SIs is less time-consuming than 
transposition by way of Acts of Parliament. An additional benefit is that the EU origin 
of the legislation is clear, since there is a mandatory reference to the directive in the 
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Explanatory Memorandum attached to each statutory instrument. The downsides are as 
obvious too. The disadvantages are that the degree of parliamentary scrutiny is at best 
modest, that the level of public transparency is low and that the quality of the 
instruments is generally is of a different standard than is the case with Acts of 
Parliament.  
 Parliamentary scrutiny on statutory instruments is in most cases only really possible 
after the SIs have been made. The volume of the instruments, almost all of them 
subject to the negative resolution procedure, is such that it is very hard for Parliament 
to keep track. Consequently it almost never happens that a proposal for a statutory 
instrument is blocked by Parliament. Prayers are seldom successful. When we combine 
that with the aloof scrutiny exercised by the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments 
– even with the Merits committee in place – the transposition and the resulting 
instruments are very much government centred and controlled.  
 At least there is a systematic review of statutory instruments to check whether or not 
they are ‘ultra vires’, since the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments scrutinises all 
statutory instruments. 
12.5.2 Advantages and disadvantages of techniques 
The debate on copying-out (merely reproducing provisions contained in directives in 
British law) or elaboration (trying to integrate EC provisions in British law by bending 
and twisting the text somewhat) has definitely turned out in favour of copying-out as 
the default option, although there are circumstances where elaboration is still 
necessary. Still in the recent past a lot of British lawyers felt that copying out would 
confuse English judges, since the style and system of EC legislation differ from that in 
British law. This argument is countered by the judges themselves who – as the ones 
having to apply and interpret EC legislation – increasingly prefer to consult the ‘raw’ 
text of EC directives in order to see what was actually meant.  
 In the wake of the Better Regulation policies the present-day focus in the UK is on 
preventing gold plating, i.e. transposition that goes beyond the minimum necessary to 
comply with the directive, and double banking.  
12.6  Analysis of the national process  
There are at least two characteristics of the UK transposition process that account for 
speedy transposition. The first is the fact that the European Communities Act makes it 
possible to implement EC obligations with statutory instruments without the adoption 
of a new Act.  
 The second characteristic is that the departmental lawyers, who also draft the legal 
texts for statutory instruments, ought to be involved in the transposition process from 
the very start and should therefore be able to indicate at an early stage in the 
negotiations if there will be problems with introducing certain provisions into national 
law. Since these lawyers tend to circulate among the departments and have a culture of 
their own, it is unlikely that the drafting styles differ between the departments. 
However, a technicality, which could make transposition more difficult, is that the 
drafting style of British lawyers differs from the style used by draftsmen in the EU.  
 Administrative culture also seems to play a role, and Kassim (2000) suggests that 
the efficient transposition and implementation in the UK, which seems to be 
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unaffected by the substance of the directive, reflects deeply entrenched values in the UK 
administration. 
 As mentioned above, the coordination effort of the UK is very ambitious. This can 
partly be explained by the principles of the domestic system of government in the UK. 
Another explanation could be derived from the facts that the UK entered the EC/EU 
late, and that the attitude in the UK towards membership has been rather sceptical in 
nature. This could explain the adoption of a system that ensured that the UK interests 
are carefully safeguarded (Kassim, 2000). Yet another explanation could be found in 
the legalistic attitude of the UK towards the implementation and enforcement of 
directives. Since directives are implemented and enforced in the same way as domestic 
law, it is important that the directives are acceptable and possible to implement (Butt 
Philip and Baron, 1988). 
12.7 Conclusions  
• In the UK, most directives are transposed by Statutory Instrument (delegated 
legislation). While specific legislation is sometimes used as the basis for delegation, 
an important feature in the UK is that it is possible to base delegated legislation that 
aim to transpose European directives on the European Communities Act 1972. 
While this certainly is important for speedy transposition, it cannot in itself account 
for the good transposition record of the UK. 
• Another factor that facilitates prompt transposition is the efficient system for 
coordination of EU affairs in the UK. The central position of the Cabinet Office in 
this system is also of importance for transposition, since its central position can be 
used to put political weight behind efforts to reduce the transposition backlog. 
• A third factor that is important for timely transposition is the link between the 
stages of negotiation and transposition. In the UK, project teams responsible for the 
negotiation strategy and the transposition plan are set up when appropriate. 
According to good practice, the same officials should be involved in both stages. 
While job-rotation makes this difficult in practice, the teams provide a certain 
degree of continuity throughout the process. It is regarded as important to ‘think 
transposition’ already at the negotiation stage. 
• An important feature of the UK system is the so called ‘scrutiny reserve’, which 
gives the Parliament a possibility to be involved already at the negotiation stage. The 
‘scrutiny reserve’ involves that ministers should not agree to EC legislation before 
the Parliament has had an opportunity to scrutinise it.  
• Legislation that transposes European directives is subject to an open consultation 
procedure, and in principle at least 12 weeks should be provided for this. It is 
possible that this could slow down the transposition process, but on the other hand, 
it could lead to better solutions for transposition. 
• One possible cause for transposition delays is the recent devolvement in the UK. In 
some cases, it is necessary to adopt separate transposition measures for the devolved 
administrations. Since this is a relatively new phenomenon, difficulties could arise 
in managing the different responsibilities.  
• The debate on transposition in the UK is not so much about timely transposition. 
Since the UK score is usually good, there rather seems to be a concern that the UK 
is too zealous in transposing on time. The debate is more about ‘gold-plating’ or 
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‘elaboration’, and it is generally regarded as important that the UK does not do more 
than is required by the directive.  
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Appendix: List of interviewees  
• Lady Justice Arden, Royal Courts of Justice 
• Philip Bovey, DTI 
• Natasha Coates, Cabinet Office 
• Alison Rose, Cabinet Office 
• Liam Laurence Smyth and Gunnar Beck, House of Commons 
• Stephen Parker, Treasury Department 
• Frances Nash, Treasury Solicitors 
• Clive Fleming, DTI 
• Simon Manley, Foreign & Commonwealth Office 
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13  Germany  
13.1 General overview of the constitutional and political system 
Germany is a federal republic in which political parties and interest groups play a 
central role in national policy-making. Like other federalist systems Germany’s political 
system is far more complex than the structure of a centralized unitary state, such as the 
UK, France, and the Netherlands. It is a country with seventeen governments. Each of 
the sixteen constituent states of Germany’s federalism has the full outfit of 
government. A minister-president heads each state and is elected in the state 
parliament. Each state has its own constitution, government, legislation, and 
administration. Most of the states have a constitutional court. In contrast to the pre-
unification period, in which Germany comprised ten economically relatively 
homogeneous states and West Berlin, the post-1990 federalism has been characterized 
by sharp economic disparities between the poor states in the eastern part of the 
country, and wealthier states in the western part. The difference between the poorest 
and the richest state is ‘twice the difference between the poorest and the wealthiest state 
in the USA’ (Schmidt, 2003: 57). 
13.1.1 Constitutional characteristics 
The codified character of German law means that there is little judge-made or common 
law. The judge in a codified system is only to administer and to apply the codes. He fits 
the particular case to the existing body of law as found in them, i.e. the judge may not 
set precedents and thus make law, but he must be only a neutral administrator of the 
existing codes. This lies at the base of the ‘dominant philosophy of legal positivism, or 
analytical jurisprudence’ (Conradt, 2001). Legal positivism contends that existing 
general law as found in the codes sufficiently encompasses all the rights and duties of 
citizens. Judicial review is not necessary. Politics, accordingly, must be kept strictly 
distinct from law. 
13.1.2 Political characteristics  
One key feature of the political system in Germany is the Kanzlerdemokratie. Article 65 
German constitution says that the Federal Chancellor determines and is responsible for 
the general guidelines of policy. Federal Ministers are appointed and dismissed by the 
Federal President upon the proposal of the Federal Chancellor. Within these limits 
each Federal Minister conducts the affairs of his department independently and on his 
own responsibility. The Cabinet resolves differences of opinion between Federal 
Ministers. It is the Federal Chancellor who conducts the proceedings of the Federal 
Government in accordance with rules of procedure adopted by the Government and 
approved by the Federal President. 
 The second key feature is Germany’s federal structure. The power of the states is 
institutionalized in the Bundesrat, the collective representation of the states at the 
federal level. Here the states play a key role in the lawmaking process. This largely 
reflects the central position of the upper house in federal legislation, which turns 
Germany into a ‘case of strong symmetrical bicameralism’ (Lijphart, 1999: 214, 314). 
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Although legislative power is mainly concentrated in the federation109, the Länder have 
conferred a considerable number of legislative competences to the federal state to 
ensure equal living conditions in the whole republic. They have kept competences in 
particular in cultural matters, police law, local government, construction law and 
commercial law, but also in transport, social policy, food, and utility policies. 
 Furthermore, Germany is a densely organized society. Interest groups are a ‘vital 
factor in German policy making process’ (Conradt, 2001: 131). Germany is a ‘neo-
corporatist’ state (Lehmbruch, 1979: 147-188), i.e. there is a strong corporatist tradition 
of institutionalized cooperation between government and industry, regulator and 
operator 110. These associations become in effect ‘quasi-governmental groups, training, 
licensing, and even exercising discipline over their members with state approval’ 
(Héritier, Knill and Mingers, 1996: 59). In addition to parliamentary recruitment and 
extensive consultations between government and interest groups, the practice of 
appointing group representatives to the many permanent ministerial advisory 
committees and councils affords the interest groups still more input into the 
lawmaking process. 
 Another key feature is the role of parties in Germany. Germany has been notorious 
for the dominant part played by the political parties on all levels of government. 111 
However, the role played by parties differs from one policy area to the other. In some of 
these areas the role of political parties is strong, for example in social and transport 
policy, in others moderate or weak (Schmidt, 2003: 49). Examples of the latter include 
mainly policy domains governed by experts, such as monetary policy and competition 
policy.   
13.1.3 Political administrative characteristics  
German administrative units are very hierarchical but not centralized. The bureaucratic 
pyramid is very steep, but there is little actual direct control from the top of the 
activities in the middle and at the base. It is highly fragmented and ‘discourages 
comprehensive policy planning or major reform initiatives that require extensive 
interdepartmental, interministerial, or federal-state cooperation’ (Mayntz and Scharpf, 
1975: 69-76). Because the top political officials in each ministry have little staff, they 
cannot exercise the control in practice they have in theory. However, the small size of 
each section and the practice of making the section head personally and legally 
                                                 
109  First, it enjoys exclusive legislative powers according to Art. 73 German Constitution (foreign affairs, 
citizenship, immigration, currency, air transport). Secondly, it has exercised legislative power in almost 
all fields of concurring legislation according to Art 74 German Constitution which can only be exercised 
by the Länder, as long as the Federation does not legislate. Concurring legislative powers include most 
legislative subjects, such as civil law, criminal law, court organization and procedure, the legal profession, 
foreigners’ residence, public welfare, economic affairs, labour relations, land law, and road traffic. 
Thirdly, the Federation has the right to enact skeleton or framework legislation carried out in detail by 
the Länder according to Art. 75 German Constitution which includes general principles of higher 
education, legal status of the press, nature conservation, regional planning. Once the Federation has 
exercised its power to legislate relevant law of the Länder becomes void. 
110  Corporatism is an old term in social and political thought, referring to the ‘organization of interests into a 
limited number of compulsory, hierarchically structured associations recognized by the state and given a 
monopoly of representation within their respective areas’ (Schmitter, 1981: 300). 
111  One indicator of the important role played by political parties is the attention given to the parties in the 
German constitution (Art. 21 I German constitution). A second indicator of the major part played by the 
parties is that they are entitled to receive subsidies form public budgets of up to one-half of their total 
annual revenue. A third indicator of powerful role for the parties can be derived from the weakness of 
plebiscite institutions at the level of the federation. 
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responsible for the section’s decisions make success or failure highly visible (Schmidt, 
2003). 
 Despite the decentralized structure of the state, civil servants generally share a 
common background and training. Recruitment to the service is closely tied to the 
educational system. The higher level, still the monopoly of the university-educated, was 
once restricted in that a legal education was required. Today lawyers still dominate the 
upper ranks, and surveys have shown that they remain the ‘most privileged of the 
privileged’ (Brinkmann, 1973: 150). A recent comparative study shows that over 60 
percent of top German civil servants have been lawyers, as compared to approximately 
20 percent of high-ranking American bureaucrats (Aberbach et al., 1990: 7). But there 
are no graduates of elite schools whose members are distributed throughout the 
various ministries, as in Britain and France since there are no elite schools. 
 Given the background of German civil servants are a status-conscious group of 
people committed to the Republic and the EU and to the values and processes of them 
respectively (Pag and Wessels, 1988; Anderson, 2005). The civil servant’s perception of 
the political character of the job, however, has increased. In a comparative study of top 
administrators, German respondents were found to be as equally conscious of the ways 
in which work affects the stability and effectiveness of the democracy, as are civil 
servants in Britain, and more aware than Italian bureaucrats (Putnam, 1973: 257-290). 
A study of assistant section heads in the Economics Ministry found that most 
recognized and accepted the political character of their job. 67 percent perceived that 
they were involved ‘in politics’ and were not merely administering the laws as ‘neutral’ 
agents of a state above society, parties and parliament (Conradt, 2001: 217). 
13.2 Political or public discussion concerning EU directives and their 
transposition 
In August 2002, the European Commission stated that Germany had only transposed 
95.2% of EC directives. According to the 2004 Internal Market Scoreboard from 13 
July, Germany has not notified 3.5% of directives, placing it close to the bottom of the 
transposition league. Moreover, Germany is considered to be the second worst 
‘offender regarding the number of directives whose transposition is over two years late’ 
(Asser Instituut, 2004e: 19).  
 In 2004, a federal government committee (Kommission von Bundestag und Bundesrat 
zur Modernisierung der bundesstaatlichen Ordnung) has been discussing the reform of 
the German federal legal system, including issues related to speeding up the processes 
of to implementation of EC directives, as well as making the negotiations in Brussels 
more effective. The main aim of this committee, however, has been to disentangle the 
relations between the Bund and the Länder. This committee, however, was dishonored 
in December 2004. A remake is currently under consideration. 
13.3  Description of judicial instruments  
In Germany EC directives are implemented in accordance with constitutional law and 
the legal procedures relation to national law and ministerial orders, as set out in the 
German constitution, or the state constitutions. The draft laws and ordinances are 
developed by the Ministry which is competent with respect to the subject matter of the 
EC directive and they are then agreed with the relevant Ministries (Asser Instituut, 
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2004e: 6) There is no specific ‘implementation act’ (Asser Instituut, 2004e: 6). The EC 
directives are either implemented as laws (Gesetze) or ministerial orders 
(Rechtsverordnungen).  
 
Law (Gesetz) 
More than 75 percent of all EC measures requiring further transposition into national 
law fall within the competence of the federal state (Winkel, 1997:116; Brinkmann, 
2000), i.e. fall under the exclusive competence of the federation (Bund).  
 The draft law formulated by a civil servant in a ministry is circulated within the 
Ministry and then a consultation process starts which involves other federal Ministries 
which are concerned in the specific case, the Länder ministries and also associations 
concerned. Then the lead Ministry redrafts the law and again consults with the other 
federal ministries concerned, among them always the Ministry of Justice and the 
Ministry of the Interior (Asser Instituut, 2004e: 13). These constitutional ministries 
(Verfassungsressorts) scrutinize all draft bills drawn up by the other Federal Ministries as 
to their compatibility with the German federal constitution of the Bund (Grundgesetz). 
Then the cabinet votes on it and submits it to the chamber of the Länder (Bundesrat). 
 
Table 13.1: German legal instruments 
 Gesetz Verordnung Verwaltungsvorschrift 
 Law Ministerial order Circular 
Main features Issues for which the 
Constitution calls for 
settlement through 
law 
Provisions issued by 
government with explicit 
authorization through 
law (Ermächtigungs-
grundlage) 
 
Provisions issues by a 
minister without explicit 
authorization by law 
Advice 
constitutional 
ministries 
Required Required n.a. 
Parliamentary 
approval  
Required 
 
Not required n.a. 
Procedure Simple majority in 
Parliament 
  
Remarks  Fastest instrument  
  
 
 The Government thus has an opportunity to take the counterproposals of the 
Bundesrat into consideration or attach to the draft a written statement of its position on 
these proposals. The comments of the Federal Government on any objections the 
Bundesrat may put forward are known as a counterstatement; like the comments of the 
Bundesrat, which have to be submitted within 6 weeks, this counterstatement is 
attached to the original bill. Thus the following documents are submitted to the 
Bundestag: the draft bill drawn up by the Federal Government together with an 
explanatory memorandum; the comments of the Bundesrat; and the counterstatement 
of the Federal Government on the comments of the Bundesrat. The documents 
submitted to the Bundestag at the beginning of the legislative process thus already 
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reveal important aspects which may possibly give rise to conflict between the 
Federation and the Länder at a later stage. 
 Once copies of the bill have been distributed, the bill is considered by the 
parliamentary groups. As soon as the parliamentary groups have given the bill their 
initial consideration, the Council of Elders of the German Bundestag decides the date 
on which the bill will be given its first reading in the plenary. 
 The Bundestag generally deals with bills in three readings in the plenary. During 
the first reading, a debate is only held if this is recommended by the Council of Elders 
or demanded by one of the parliamentary groups. Debates tend to be held on bills of 
topical interest or political significance if the Government wishes to state its reasons for 
introducing them and if the parliamentary groups wish to make public their initial 
position. 
 The bill is always referred to one or more committees of the Bundestag at the end of 
the first reading. If a particular bill covers different subjects, it is referred to one or 
more committees in addition to the committee responsible. These committees submit 
their comments and proposed amendments to the committee responsible, which is 
required to take these into account in its report to the plenary. The deliberations of the 
committee responsible conclude with the submission of a report and recommendation 
to the plenary, on the basis of which the bill is given a second reading. 
 Often bills cannot be dealt with conclusively during committee discussions even if 
the preparatory work by the parliamentary groups has been very detailed. If the subject 
matter of the bill is very complex, and the bill concerns a politically controversial piece 
of legislation, then a public hearing of experts and representatives of interest groups is 
held. This is now almost always the case when a bill of any importance is introduced. 
 Once the committee has discussed the bill the rapporteurs begin the second part of 
their work. They submit a written report to the plenary of the Bundestag in which they 
present the course the discussions have taken in the committee responsible and the 
committees asked to give their opinions. In their report, the rapporteurs focus in 
particular on reasons why the committee may have deviated from the Government's 
bill.  
 Once the committee has completed its work, the parliamentary groups must decide 
what position to take on the bill in its present form. Although the experts from the 
parliamentary groups are thoroughly familiar with the bill, it is important that all 
Members now have an opportunity to form an opinion on the bill. Further discussions 
are held if necessary by the relevant working groups or working parties, and after the 
executive committees of the parliamentary groups have been informed, the topic is 
placed on the agenda at a full meeting of each parliamentary group.  
 As a matter of principle, the Bundesrat participates in the passage of every law 
adopted by the Bundestag. The extent of its participation, however, depends on whether 
the bill in question is one to which the Bundesrat may lodge an objection or one 
requiring the Bundesrat's consent. 
 The Bundesrat may therefore exercise an absolute veto in cases a bill requires the 
consent of the Bundesrat. If it refuses to give its consent, then the bill has failed. The 
Bundestag cannot override this veto, no matter how large a majority of its Members 
supports the bill, and even if support for the bill is unanimous. A bill is considered to 
require the consent of the Bundesrat if it substantially affects the interests of the 
Länder. A bill may fall into this category if it affects the finances of the Länder or if it 
has a particular effect on the Länder's implementation of legislation, the organization 
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of the Land administrative authorities or the implementation of any other measures by 
the Länder. As most federal laws are not implemented by the Federation itself but by 
the Länder ‘in their own right’ (Art. 83 of the German constitution), the Länder put in 
place the necessary authorities and administrative procedures for this purpose; if 
federal lawmakers wish to adopt specific provisions in this regard, they must first seek 
the consent of the Bundesrat. In practice, approximately half of all the laws passed 
require the consent of the Bundesrat (Binkmann, 2000). 
 
Figure 13.1: Federal law making process (Art. 76-78 Constitution) 
 
 
 The purpose of the mediation procedure, which is convoked in case of disagreement 
between upper and lower chamber, is to amend the bill in question in such a way that 
the Bundestag and the Bundesrat are equally satisfied with the final result. The 
Mediation Committee is a body composed of Members of the Bundestag and members 
of the Bundesrat. It comprises 16 Members of the Bundestag, who reflect the relative 
strengths of the parliamentary groups in the Bundestag, and 16 members of the 
Bundesrat, one for each Land. When the deliberations are over, the Mediation 
Committee submits a compromise proposal to the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. 
 In keeping with Article 82 of the German constitution, the above law was sent to the 
Federal Government to be signed by the appropriate Federal Minister and the Federal 
Chancellor. This procedure, referred to as countersignature, is laid down in Article 58 
Initiation of legislation 
Involvement of Bundesrat 
First reading 
Committee work (hearings, report) 
Second and third reading 
Passage of legislation to Bundesrat 
Mediation procedure 
Signing and promulgation of laws 
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of the German constitution and ensures the validity of orders and directives of the 
Federal President. Following countersignature, the law was sent to the Federal 
President to be signed. Finally, it is promulgated in the Federal Law Gazette 
(Bundesgesetzblatt) and takes effect according to the relevant provisions. 
 
Ministerial Order (Rechtsverordnung).  
Ministerial orders have statutory status and have the status of laws in a material sense. 
The major difference from laws made by parliament is that they can be declared void 
due to illegality not only by the constitutional court, but by any court. A ministerial 
order is normally passed by the government executive. An explicit legal authorization, 
specified in the law as to contents, end and extent, is required. Article 80 of the 
German constitution states that a ministerial order must be based upon an enabling 
power set out within an existing law (Ermächtigungsgrundlage) in order to be passed into 
German law for a minister or the government of the federal state as a whole or a 
government of a Land to legislate by way of ordinances (Streinz and Pechstein, 1995: 
136). It ‘ranks’ lower than a law. A ministerial order simplifies legislation and keeps 
laws free of individual provisions, thus enabling the executive to ‘carefully rule on 
technical and practical items and to use the administration’s expert knowledge’ (Pag 
and Wessels, 1988: 170). This method of ministerial order is, in fact, to a certain extent 
indispensable for transposing EC directives in time (Scheuing, 1985).  
 To note, administrative instructions (Verwaltungsvorschriften) have been used as a 
third kind of instrument to transpose EU directives up to the early 90s. Two kinds of 
such instructions could be differentiated: those ruling internal organization and 
procedures and those forming the higher executive to subordinated bodies regarding 
the interpretation of laws and the use of discretion. Several ECJ ruling in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, however, have made clear that these administrative instructions (also 
known as circulars) were not adequate for transposition of EU directives. 
 
Techniques 
In exceptional cases, clauses have been included in laws which provide for the 
automatic transposition of EC directives at the moment that they enter into force in the 
EC. In rare cases where EC law must be implemented word for word, ‘automatic 
implementation’ allows the smooth implementation of a directive (Asser Instituut, 
2004e: 15). An automatic implementation clause has been included, for example, in the 
Road Traffic Ordinance (Strassenverkehrs-Zulassungs-Ordnung).  
13.4 The national policy cycle concerning directives 
13.4.1 General overview of the process 
The coordination of EU policy making in Germany is ensured at different levels of 
government by a set of institutions in the broad meaning of the term. Although the 
different coordination mechanisms have not been officially established by law, they 
have a long tradition and have influenced the structure of the federal government’s 
decision making process to a considerable extent. 
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13.4.1.2  National treatment of Commission proposal 
In general, the negotiations at the EU level are lead by the Federal Government. The 
lead Ministry which is responsible for a given issue will conduct the German 
negotiations. If more Ministries are concerned, the joint procedure rules of the Federal 
Government (Gemeinsame Geschäftsordnung der Bundesregierung) provides the 
distribution of responsibilities between the relevant Ministries. The subsidiary Ministry 
will agree with the lead Ministry with respect to the position on given provisions of the 
EC directive.  
 The principle of ministerial responsibility would suggest that all ministers are equal 
in the face of the EU. But because of the evolution of EU policy fields, but also results 
from the historical evolution of the ministries in the Federal Republic some are more 
equal than others. 
 Due to the original ECSC and EEC treaties with their concentration on a few 
economic policy areas, only the Ministry for Economics had established a European 
affairs division. In absence of a foreign minister until 1955, the Federal Ministry for 
Economics took on the lead-role in the day to day policy management for the European 
Coal and Steel Community (Maurer, 2003). These original arrangements established 
the Ministry of Economics in a strong position on matters of functional – economics – 
integration, although there had been no formal agreement on the division of labour 
with the Chancellor’s Office. The entry into force of the Rome Treaties ‘ pushed the 
Ministries of Economics and Foreign Affairs to an agreement on European policy 
responsibilities, reached in 1958’ (Koerfer, 1988: 553-568). The Ministries for 
Agriculture, Finance and Foreign Affairs created European departments and 
directorates during the 1960s. In 1993, after the entry into force of the Maastricht 
Treaty, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a separate European affairs division. 
In addition, the Ministries of Justice and of the Interior provide legal expertise to the so 
called ‘Musketeers’ (Fisahn, 2001). The involvement of other ministries only became 
relevant within the context of the SEA and – with regard to the creation of divisions 
dealing with substantial aspects of co-operation in the fields of justice and home affairs 
– with the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty. 
 With a view to instructing the Permanent Representation of the German position in 
Brussels, the Ministry of Finance – until 1998 the Ministry of Economics – coordinates 
the meetings in relation to COREPER I, whereas the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is 
responsible for the management of the Berlin based work in relation to COREPER II 
(Bulmer, Maurer and Paterson, 2001).112 In order to give instructions to COREPER I 
and its subsequent working units, every ministry has a European Delegate (Europa-
Beauftragter). They meet on a monthly basis. Since October 1998 the location and the 
chairmanship have been transferred from the Ministry of Economics to the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs. Below this level, there are regular contacts between the heads of 
division (Referatsleiter) in order to settle disputes between the ministries concerned on 
issues related to the Council’s working group meetings. 
 The Chancellor claims a certain ‘domaine reserve’ within the European Council. He 
disposes of a so called ‘guidance competence’ (Richtlinienkompetenz), which can be 
                                                 
112  There are exceptions: COREPER II meetings with regard to the Councils on ECOFIN, Budget, Finance 
and Tax policy are coordinated by the Ministry of Finance. The same rule applies to the instructions for 
the German COREPER II. 
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defined as a capability to set the strategic guidelines of the federal government in 
general, to resolve inter-ministerial disputes, and to determine the final governmental 
approach on a given issue (Scheuing, 1989). 
 Although according to Art 32 German constitution external relations are the 
exclusive power of the Federation at national level, the Länder gradually could make 
their voice heard in European law making. During the negotiations on the Rome 
Treaties, the Länder and the federal government also agreed on the institution of a 
‘Länder observer’ (Länderbeobachter), who is located in Berlin as well as in Brussels, to 
provide information to the Bundesrat and the Länder. The Länder observer is entitled to 
participate at each meeting of the Council of Ministers and to report on the latter’s 
proceedings to the Länder and the Bundesrat (Bulmer, Maurer and Paterson, 2001). 
However, due to its rather modest administrative support, until 1998 there were only 
two full-time and one part-time civil servants working in its Berlin and Brussels offices, 
the Länder observer did not become a key position in the decision making process 
between Brussels and the Länder governments (Dette-Koch, 1997:169-175). 
 The principle of subsidiarity, as provided in Art. 5 of the EC Treaty was an important 
demand of the German Länder. A new version of Art. 23 German constitution, allows 
the Länder to act as German representatives in the Council when their exclusive 
competences are concerned in the legal act in question. The direct participation of the 
Länder in the external representation of Germany in European affairs has been made 
possible through the amendment of Art. 146 (Art. 203) TEC at Maastricht that allows 
Länder ministers to be representatives in the Council. 
 These provisions were complemented by two Acts, one of which is the Act on 
cooperation of the Federation and the Länder regarding European affairs113, the other 
one is the Act on cooperation of the Federal Government and the Bundestag114, and by 
an Agreement between the Federal Government and the Governments of the Länder.115 
The involvement of the Länder is now as follows (Maurer, 2003): 
– the Länder have to be informed through the Bundesrat by the Federal Government 
in matters concerning the European Union,  
– the Bundesrat has to be involved in the decision making process of the Federation 
in so far as it would have to be involved in a corresponding internal measure or in 
so far as the Länder would be internally responsible,  
– in case of federal legislative power, if Länder interests are affected the opinion of the 
Bundesrat has to be taken into account, 
– if Länder legislative powers, the establishment of their authorities or their 
administrative procedures are essentially affected the opinion of the Bundesrat shall 
revail while, at the same time, the responsibility of the Federation for the country as 
a whole shall be maintained, 
– if Länder exclusive legislative powers are essentially affected the exercise of rights of 
Germany as EU member is transferred by the Federation to a representative of the 
                                                 
113  Gesetz über die Zusammenarbeit von Bund und Ländern in Angelegenheiten der Europaeischen Union 
(EuZBLG), BGBl 1993 I S. 313. 
114  Gesetz über die Zusammenarbeit von Bundestag und Deutschem Bundestag in Angelegenheiten der 
Europäischen Union (EuZBBG), BGBl 1993 I S. 311. 
115  Vereinbarung vom 29. Oktober 1993 zwischen der Bundesregierung und den Regierungen der Länder 
über die Zusammenarbeit in Angelegenheiten der EU in Ausführung von Paragraph 9 des Gesetzes 
über die Zusammenarbeit von Bund und Ländern in Angelegenheiten der EU, Bundesanzeiger No. 226 
of 1993, p. 10425; supplemented by the Vereinbarung of 8 June 1998 in order to deal in future with 
framework decisions of Art. 43(2) (b) TEU as adopted in Amsterdam. 
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Länder while, once again, the responsibility of the Federation for the country as a 
whole shall be maintained. 
 As a response to the growing amount of EC legislation after the entry into force of 
the SEA, the Länder also opened information or liaison offices in Brussels between 
1985 and 1987. Initially being criticized by the federal government as instruments of an 
‘competitive foreign policy’ (Nebenaussenpolitik), they quickly became a necessary tool 
for the Länder to secure and pass on information from the European Commission and 
the German Permanent Representation during the decision preparation phase. 
Compared with the Länder observer, the Länder offices have far more administrative 
staff. In autumn 1997, there were 141 civil servants working in the offices of which 90 
belonged to the higher service. Lander offices in Brussels have the following tasks: 
information gathering, attention for the special interests for each Land and 
presentation (Bulmer, Maurer and Paterson, 2001). 
 Besides the special cooperation between the Länder which have established a joint 
office in Brussels, all Länder are interested in coordinating as much as possible their 
activities in Brussels. They have therefore installed working parties on special topics. 
There is also a common interest in taking into account the workload on the information 
sources (EC authorities) and in asking them once only for information, not sixteen 
times (Streinz and Pechstein, 1995: 152) 
 The participation of the Bundestag in the elaboration and negotiation of European 
legislation is nearly non-existent. This is firstly a consequence of the system of 
separation of powers organized by the German constitution, which assigns external 
power to the government and not to the legislature. Secondly, the fact that even the 
information of the Bundestag is not systematically organized seems to be the 
consequence of neglect on the side of the Bundestag itself. Only in the last years have 
two parliamentary committees of the Bundestag been established: on EC matters, and 
on EU law (a branch of the law committee). 
13.4.1.3  National transposition 
The decisive actors in the German implementation of EU directives are the same as in 
the preparation and making phases of the EC policy cycle. Winkel (1997: 116), however, 
states that these actors tend to be ‘more concerned about the first two stages of 
European decision-making and are less sensitive to what comes after a given 
agreement’. To underline is that the coordination ministry shifts from the Ministry of 
Economics/Finance to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs with the government change in 
1998.  
 Commission drafts of proposals for new or amended EC legislation are transmitted 
from the Permanent Representation to the Ministry of Economics and, since October 
1998, to the Ministry of Finance. At the ministerial stage of policy development, a 
complex process of bargaining and negotiation takes place among the experts at the 
base, the section head, the department and subdepartment chiefs, and the executive. 
Any policy matter is attributed to one department of a ministry (the Referat, the basic 
working unit, roughly corresponding to a division of the Commission), as well as to the 
Bundestag and Bundesrat. Thus, for each directive there is a head of a department who 
is responsible for implementation. The competent department works out the draft of 
the legal act. If several departments or ministries are concerned, the principle of 
‘Federführung’ is applied, i.e. one department is assigned the leadership and the final 
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responsibility for the preparation. A civil servant responsible for the preparation and 
negotiation of a draft legislative act is also likely to draft the implementation measure 
(Referentenentwurf) (Maurer, 2003).  
 The influence of interest groups, parties and consultants is most directly felt at the 
executive and departmental levels. The sections are relatively insulated and secure in 
the knowledge that they have as much expertise, if not more, as anyone else in the 
ministry. 
 Technical issues are dealt with in one or two meetings per month of the so-called 
Group of European Specialists presided by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Here, 
technical policy issues are discussed and exchanged by officials in charge of the 
transposition of the EU legislation. 
 Where certain sections lag behind the time schedule required by a EC directive, 
these cases are discussed at high-level in regular meetings within the ministry but also 
within the federal government. These meetings take place about twice every month, 
attended by the relevant directors and subsequently, monthly meetings of the 
secretaries of state for Europe (Europastaatssekretäre) (Bulmer and Paterson, 1987). 
Currently, a new database is being put in place in order to better deal with the 
administrative challenges. The average implementation duration of the individual 
ministries is not documented. 
13.4.2 Bureaucratic consultative and coordinating bodies 
The bulk of the political coordination is carried out by the Interministerial Committee 
of State Secretaries on European Affairs (Europastaatssekretäre). Table 13.2 provides an 
overview of the various committees in Germany, including this committee. It was set 
up in 1963 in order to deal with ‘controversies in relation to European Affairs’ (Sasse, 
1977:12). Meeting approximately on a bi-monthly basis, it brings together the State 
Minister dealing with European Affairs in the Chancellary and the Permanent 
Representative of Germany in Brussels. Other ministries participate in the meetings 
when the chair considers it as appropriate. 
  
Table 13.2.: Interministerial coordination bodies for EU policy-making including 
transposition: 
Body Level Frequency Chair Nature of issue 
Cabinet Ministerial Agenda items as 
needed 
Chancellor  Important 
political matters 
Committee of 
State Secretaries 
for European 
Affairs 
State permanent 
secretaries 
Approx. monthly Minister of State 
for Europe, AA, 
BMF 
Political 
Group of 
European 
Specialists 
European 
specialists 
Approx. 1-2 
months 
AA Exchanges on 
policy by officials 
Preparation of 
COREPER I 
Section heads weekly BMF Instructions to  
COREPER I 
Source: Bulmer, Maurer and Paterson (2001). 
 
 In October 1998 the secretariat shifted from the Ministry of Economics to the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs underlining the latter’s strengthened role in coordinating 
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German EU policy. The minister’s main task is to settle controversial questions and to 
prepare dossiers of a political and strategic nature with regard to the Council of 
Ministers meetings. Decisions taken by the Council of Ministers are taken by common 
accord and are politically binding for the ministries. 
 o coordinate European policy making between the federal state and the Länder more 
efficiently, every Land government nominated its own European affairs Commissoner 
(Europabeauftragter) or European affairs delegate (Europabevollmächtigter) occupying a 
post either as a minister or as a state-secretary. Such delegates act a s a ‘bridge’ between 
their Land and the other levels of European policy making by representing their Land 
in the ‘Europe chamber’ of the Bundesrat, a special institution for the coordination of 
the Bundesrat’s European policy, and vis-a-vis the federal government (Maurer, 2003). 
For this reason, most of these posts have been located at the Representation of the 
Länder at the federal state level in Berlin. 
13.4.3 The role of compulsory advisory bodies 
The only compulsory advisory bodies in the transposition process are the so-called 
constitutional ministries: Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Interior. The lead 
ministry in the transposition process drafts the law or the ordinance and consults next 
to the other federal ministries concerned always the Ministry of Justice and the 
ministry of the Interior. They scrutinize all draft bills and ordinances as to their 
compatibility with the German federal constitution of the Bund (Grundgesetz). 
13.4.4 The role of parliament 
Originally, the Bundestag disposes of very limited scrutiny powers (Schmidt, 2003). 
The federal government has to inform the two parliamentary chambers before any 
decision that would become binding law in Germany. These general rules have been 
never applied effectively for three reasons: First, the Art. 2 EEC procedure focused on 
information of parliament about European affairs but has not foreseen a right of 
consultation. Consequently, the parliament can not affect the federal government’s 
stance in the Council of Ministers. Second, both houses have only informed about 
relevant EC documents at a rather late stage. ‘About 65 per cent of EC documents 
debated on the Bundestag’s floor between 1980 and 1986 were already in force at the 
time of debate’ (Ismayr, 1992: 330). Consequently, scrutinizing the government in EC 
affairs has been limited to some kind of ‘ex-post’ control and has not provided 
parliamentarians with an effective involvement in EC policy making. Third, the 
Bundestag has been shown little interest in scrutinizing European affairs. 
Furthermore, the first parliamentary institution for dealing exclusively with EC affairs – 
the EC Committee set up in 1991 – faced almost the same structural problems as its 
predecessors,116 since it was not empowered to give the Bundestag a central voice vis a 
vis the government. The EC Committee has been only rarely nominated as committee 
in charge (Brinkman, 2000). 
 In clear contrast to the Bundestag, the Bundesrat adapted its institutional structure 
and instruments at a rather early stage of the European integration process. The 
European Union Affairs Committee (EUAC) (Ausschuss für Fragen der Europäischen 
                                                 
116  Integrations-Ältestenrat, and the Sub-Committee on European Affairs of the Foreign Affairs Committee 
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Union) was established on 1 Nomber 1993, though its general tasks and structure date 
back to 20 December 1957 when the Bundesrat created the first parliamentary 
Committee for European issues. Unlike in the Bundestag, the members of the 
committee can be replaced by civil servants. The EUAC normally holds a meeting every 
three weeks to prepare the decisions of the Bundesrat. If a decision must be made on 
an EU document before the next Bundesrat plenary session is scheduled then the so 
called ‘European chamber’ (Europa Kammer) will be convened. If operating, the 
chamber replaces and acts on behalf of the Bundesrat’s plenary.  
 As a general rule, the EUAC is always nominated as committee in charge. 
Consequently, it exercises much more power in setting the Bundesrat’s EU agenda 
than its counterpart in the Bundestag. 
13.4.5 The role of other, subnational or functional governments 
According to the ECJ the duties and obligations flowing form the EC Treaty in a federal 
state not only bind the federal level but the federation as a whole, i.e. including the 
Länder or other entities such as local authorities.117 This EC law position is in line with 
German legal doctrine according to which the Länder are under a constitutional duty to 
implement EC law if they have the power for a given subject according to the German 
constitution. This follows from Art 23 German constitution the duty of the Länder to 
federal loyalty (Bundestreue). This unwritten legal principle derived directly and 
explicitly form the notion of federalism. It is meant to establish for the Länder, in their 
relations with each other and with the ‘greater whole’, respect with regard to the whole 
interest of the Federation and the concerns of the Länder.118  
13.4.6 The role of interest groups 
In principle, the relevant subject matter association or unions are already informed 
when the EU plans to put in place a new EC directive. This will provide them with an 
opportunity to already present their position and interest in Brussles during 
negotiations at the EU level. During the law-making procedure, they participate in 
accordance with the usual procedures defined by German law. 
13.5 Conclusions 
• Since implementation in Germany depends to a large extent on previous 
involvement in the decision-making process of the law to be implemented, 
involvement of the Lander as regards the rules and practices of decision-making at 
national and European level are crucial. Transposition of EC legislation by up to 
seventeen governmental actors is certainly more complicated, cumbersome and 
time-consuming than by only one central governmental actor.  
• Germany has been notorious for the dominant part played by the political parties on 
all levels of government. An often reoccurring picture is that the first and second 
                                                 
117  ECJ Case C-8/88 Germany v Commission (1990) ECR I-2321 at 2359; Case 9/74 Casagrande (1974) ecr 
733 AT 779. To a considerable extent in Germany the local authorities are in charge of application of EU 
law such as of provisions of freedom of movement of migrant workers and of federal legislation; the local 
authorities issue residence permits and decide on social benefits. 
118  BverfG 92, 203 
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chambers consists of different political majorities, which leads often to deadlock or 
the so-called Politikverflechtungsfalle (Lehmbruch). Political or public discussion 
concerning, among other things, EU directives and their transposition fail because 
of strategic positioning of political parties in those chambers leering with one eye to 
the next regional elections. In 2004, a federal government committee (Kommission 
von Bundestag und Bundesrat zur Modernisierung der bundesstaatlichen Ordnung) has 
been discussing the reform of the German federal legal system, including issues 
relating to speeding up the processes relating to implementation of EC directives, as 
well as rending the negotiations in Brussels more effective. But since this 
discussion was combined with a discourse about disentangling the relations 
between the Bund and the Lander, the committee did end up in stalemate and was 
dishonored in December 2004. A very sensitive issue here was higher education, a 
policy field that falls under the concurrent legislative authority of the Bund and the 
Lander. Powerful minister presidents of the Länder lurking to at least preserve if not 
further increase existing legislative competences could not cooperate on the 
proposal put forward by the federal government. Party politics further aggravated 
the situation considerably. 
• The lead in the negotiation phase and the transposition phase is performed by 
different coordinating ministries. With a view to instructing the permanent 
representation of the German position in Brussels, the Ministry of Finance – until 
1998 the Ministry of Economics- coordinates the meetings in relation to COREPER 
I, whereas the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for the management of the 
Berlin based work in the relation to COREPER II. However, there are exceptions: 
CORPER II meetings with regard to the Council on ECOFIN, Budget, Finance and 
Tax policy are coordinated by the Ministry of Finance. The same rules applies to the 
instructions for the German COREPER II. Adopted texts are then transmitted from 
the permanent representation to the Ministry of Economics, and since October 
1998, to the Ministry of Finance. But the major part of the political coordination, 
then, is carried out by the interministerial committee of State Secretaries on 
European Affairs. Meetings are only bi-annual and furthermore, the secretariat 
shifts continuously from one ministry to another. In October 1998, with the new 
socialist government the secretariat shifted from the Ministry of Economics to the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The 1-2 meetings per months by the Group of 
European Specialists headed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to discuss technical 
issues concerning the transposition of EU legislation are also not very frequent. 
• Interdepartmental and interministerial meetings are not very frequent. Political 
coordination meetings carried out by the interministerial committee of State 
Secretaries on European Affairs take place only bi-annually. Technical coordination 
meetings by the Group of European Specialists headed by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs only 1-2 per months.  
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14  Italy 
14.1 General overview of the constitutional and political system 
The Constitution sketches the main features of a bicameral parliamentary system, 
which is to be a unitary state, though it also prescribes the division of the national 
territory into 20 regions (Putnam, 1993). In October 2001 the Italian constitution was 
modified providing Italy with a federal framework. Article 5 of the constitution 
enshrines both the principles of national unity and autonomy.  
14.1.1 Constitutional characteristics 
Since 2001, after the amendment of the Italian constitution, Italy has shifted from a 
unitary state to a decentralized state with more independent provinces and regions. The 
regions have gained a considerable number of legislative competences following Article 
117.3 of the Italian constitution.119 Article 117.4 of the Italian constitution mentions the 
areas that fall exclusively under the legislative competence of the regions. This is a rest 
category including everything which does not fall under the central government’s 
authority. As long as the regions and provinces do not act in these fields, however, the 
central government has still the right to act. 
14.1.2 Political characteristics  
Italian parliamentary regime shows three main political institutions: the Parliament, 
the Government and the President of the Republic. While legislative and executive 
powers are in the hands of the first two institutions respectively, the President of the 
Republic is symbol of the nation and guardian of the Constitution.120  
 The Italian Parliament is made up of two chambers: the upper chamber is called 
Senato della Repubblica (315 members), the lower Camera dei Deputati (630 members). 
Both chambers are elected every five years and they present some internal articulation, 
as MPs can sit in permanent as well as in ad hoc commissions. 
 Until the mid-1990s, the Government and its leader were in a weak position in 
front of the Parliament and political parties: political competition between the 
numerous parties was in fact not limited to specific situations (elections) but it was an 
ever-lasting and pervasive attribute of domestic politics. Institutional barriers to 
‘insulate’ government from the encompassing political struggle were weak so that the 
former was continuously exposed to threats coming from the parties forming 
                                                 
119  The areas include: International and European union relations of the regions; foreign trade; protection 
and safety of labour; education, without infringement of the autonomy of schools and other institutions, 
and with the exception of vocational training; professions; scientific and technological research and 
support for innovation in the productive sectors; health protection; food; sports regulations; disaster relief 
service; land-use regulation and planning; harbours and civil airports; major transportation and 
navigation networks; regulation of media and communication; production, transportation and national 
distribution of energy; complementary and integrative pensions systems; harmonization of the budgetary 
rules of the public sector and coordination of the public finance and the taxation system; promotion of 
the environmental and cultural heritage, and promotion and organization of cultural activities; savings 
banks, rural co-operative banks, regional banks; regional institutions for credit to agriculture and land 
development. 
120  The President of the Republic detains some power in the legislative process that will be analysed in the 
related section. 
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governmental coalition. The Constitution designed ‘weak institutions and strong 
parties’ (Bindi and Cisci, 2005: 146). This penetration of political institutions by 
political groups (partitocrazia) was thus a typical feature of the Italian political system 
during the First Republic (Giuliani and Piattoni, 2001). The consequences have been 
the very short duration of cabinets and the high level of conflict within the latter. In the 
1996-2000 legislatures, some forty different political groups were represented in 
parliament, with an eight party coalition in government. As a consequence, the ‘over 
fifty –five cabinets of the republic have been large and unstable four-five party coatlions, 
with some of the parties further subdivided into influential streams, each one with its 
own agenda and leaders’ (Bindi and Cisci, 2005: 147). 
14.1.3 Political administrative characteristics  
The executive power belongs to the Government, which is formed by the Council of 
Ministers (Consiglio dei Ministri) led by the Prime Minister (Presidente del Consiglio). The 
latter is appointed by the President of the Republic after lengthy consultations with 
party leaders. The lack of a direct investiture of the Chief of the Executive in a ‘polarized 
pluralist system’ (Sartori, 1982) determined a situation in which for a long time – i.e. 
since 1948 to the transition from the so called ‘First’ to the ‘Second Republic‘ during 
the 1990s – the Prime Minister did not emerged as an actor able to firmly lead the 
cabinet and the related majority in Parliament towards the accomplishment of 
governmental program, being much more devoted to conciliate the different interests 
of the numerous parties represented in governmental coalitions (Gallo and Hanny, 
2003). The latter were in fact usually made up of more than three parties, due to the 
high number of competing political formations and to proportional electoral rule. 
However, after the crisis of traditional parties in the early-1990s and the modification 
of the electoral system in 1993, such a situation has started to change so that in recent 
years the Chief of the Executive has acquired a more prominent and effective role 
(Bindi and Cisci, 2005).121 
 The Council of Ministers is a collegial body but is often referred to as an ineffective 
centre for policy coordination. The ‘level of collegiality has usually been low’ (Bindi and 
Cisci, 2005: 146), while interministerial competition has always been predominant. 
 According to the revised constitution of October 2001 every Italian region has a 
directly elected assembly (Consiglio regionale), provided with legislative powers and an 
executive body (Giunta regionale). All regions have legislative and administrative 
powers, but only the Regioni a Statuto speciale (Val D’Aosta, South Tyrol, Friuli, Sicily 
and Sardinia) enjoy exclusive legislative competencies as compared to the concurrent 
legislative competencies characterizing the other regions (Bindi and Cisci, 2005: 148). 
 Giuliani and Piattoni (2001: 120) characterize Italian bureaucracy as bureaucratic 
and particularistic, ‘coupled with a low level of professionalism and its crisis-driven 
approach stand in clear contrast to the technical and ‘impartial’ problem-solving 
approach of the EU’. However, bureaucratic inefficiency is not only an Italian 
peculiarity. 
                                                 
121  This change was also induced by the reform of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers in 1988 (Law 
400/88). 
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14.2 Political or public discussion concerning EU directives and their 
transposition 
From 1987 onwards the Italian government started preparing systematically for the 
preparing and implementation of European legislation.122 The reforms started with the 
legge Fabbri and the legge La Pergola which both strengthen Italian participation and its 
coordination in the EU policy-making process and the national actors involved 
including ministerial, regional and local administrations and parliamentary bodies. A 
decree of the Prime Minister No. 150 of 1990 deals with the organization of the prime 
minister’s administrative infrastructure and the tasks for the department for the 
coordination of European affairs in the prime minister’s office. In 1997, the leggi 
Bassanini introduced a ‘kind of administrative federalization of the system’ (Gallo and 
Hanny, 2003: 276) changing the relationship between the regions in EU affairs 
considerably. Moreover, the constitutional reform in 2001 further increased the power 
of Italian regions. 
 Although, in 1992 the minister responsible for the coordination of Community 
policies, Mr Costa stated in an article in the daily paper Il sole 24 ore of 17 September 
1992 that Italy had to prepare itself to be among the leading European countries when 
it comes to the transposition of Community directives into domestic law, current 
figures show that this is still an ambitious aim to meet in the early future. After the first 
reform package was adopted in the late 1980s, Italy has still a considerable 
implementation deficit. 
14.3  Description of judicial instruments  
To address the implemention deficit in Italy, there are a handful instruments to 
transpose national legislation. Laws and legislative decrees represent 60% of all Italian 
implementing measures whereas ministerial orders are applied in about 40% of the 
cases 123. 
 
Law (legge) 
In Italy there are two kinds of law: constitutional and normal law. According to Article 
138 of the Italian constitution the procedure of a constitutional law is cumbersome, i.e. 
has two readings.124  
 In practice the process of adoption of a normal law usually starts with the draft of a 
governmental bill (disegno di legge) or a law proposal formulated by a MP (progetto di 
legge). 
 After the bill has been presented in one of the two chambers, the ordinary 
procedure for approval is defined as follows: the Assembly passes on the bill to 
pertinent committees to be analyzed and evaluated. In this case committees are asked 
to formulate an opinion about the law proposal before returning it to the assembly. To 
become law, a bill must be approved – article by article – in the same identical form by 
the two chambers; if one of the chambers modifies the legislative text, it must be re-
transferred to the first assembly for a further vote on the amended text. At the end of 
                                                 
122  In 1992 there were 78 directives waiting for transposition. 
123  In 2004, for example, out of 87 notified Italian transposition measures 52 were ministerial orders; 31 
ordinances and 1 law. 
124  Applicable to amendment of constitutions, amendments of statues of regions, boundaries of regions etc. 
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legislative process the bill must undergo the final approval by the President of the 
Republic that, in case of constitutional or formal irregularities has the possibility to 
send the bill back to chambers. However, this may not be considered as an actual veto 
power in the hand of the Head of the State as Parliament can overcome its act by 
approving the bill again, even without changing any part of the text. 
 
Table 14.1: Italian legal instruments 
 Legge  Decreto 
legislativo 
Decreto 
legge 
Decreto 
ministeriale 
 Law Law with 
the format 
of omnibus 
bill 
Ordinance Government 
decree 
Ministerial 
order 
Main features Issues for 
which the 
Constitution 
asks for 
settlement 
by law 
Transposes 
a number 
of 
directives 
covering 
different 
policy 
areas 
Government 
measure with 
the material 
status of law 
based on 
parliamentary 
authorization 
(legge 
delegata) 
Provisions 
issued by 
the cabinet 
before 
approval by 
parliament 
to become 
law 
Provisions 
issued by the 
minister  
Legal scrutiny  required required required required  
Parliamentary 
approval  
required required required required n.a. 
Procedure      
Remarks Long and 
cumbersome 
Rarely used Complex 
matters 
Urgent 
matters 
 
 
 However, in reality things are more complicated and the legislative process can 
assume different forms, as legislative burden on the Parliament together with the 
complexity of many law proposals made the transferal of the latter to committees a 
frequent practice, with the commissions playing diversified roles. In fact committees 
can perform three different tasks (Bindi and Cisci, 2005). As just illustrated, 1) they 
may be asked to formulate an opinion about a law proposal (Commisione in sede 
referente) or 2) they can draft the final version of a bill and submit it to chambers 
(Commissione in sede redigente): in these two cases the adoption of a bill follows the 
ordinary procedure once it returns to the assembly. In the last case, however, the 
legislative process is substantially modified as 3) committees can pass themselves a bill 
(Commisisione in sede deliberante), which has not to be further approved by the whole 
assembly.  
 
Omnibus bill 
This instrument follows the procedure as a bill. Whereas a law normally only covers 
one European directive, this omnibus bill transposes a number of directives covering 
different policy areas. One example is the omnibus bills in the late 1980s through 
which transposed ca. 100 directives of different kind in once.125 
                                                 
125  Law 42/87 transposed 97 directives and law 183/87 100 directives.  
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Ordinance (decreto legislativo) based on an authorization law (legge delegata)  
Parliament may delegate the Government to legislate, especially in case of very complex 
issues specifying in the delegation law (legge delegata) the limits of legislative power of 
the cabinet as well as the main lines to be followed by the latter in the preparation of 
subsequent legislative decrees (decreti legislativi). Ordinances contain detailed provisions 
that fall under the legislative authority of the parliament. They need to be ratified by 
parliament 
 
Government decree (decreto legge) 
When urgent action is needed, a decree (decreto legge) may be issued by the cabinet, and 
such decree is immediately in force though it has to be later approved by Parliament to 
become ordinary law. Moreover, government decrees normally are issued to authorize 
ministers to draft a ministerial order. 
 
Ministerial order (decreto ministeriale) 
Ministers may issue ministerial orders. These orders are approved by the lead minister 
without approval of the Council of Ministers. But, they need an authorization to do so 
via government decree (decreto legge). 
 
To note Pasquino (2002: 149) underlines that the law-making process in Italy is very 
unreliable. The structural reason here lies in that all legislation must as a first step be 
referred to rather powerful parliamentary committees. Sometimes those standing 
committees are given the power to pass legislation without even going through the 
floor vote. Another reason why the Italian law-making process is somewhat erratic is 
that there is too much legislation that comes before the parliament for approval. ‘This is 
due largely to the nature of the Italian legal and bureaucratic system’(Pasquino, 2002: 
150). Even minor decisions have to be translated into laws, or small specific laws 
(leggine). 
 Apart from formal rules, legislative process is usually made up of interactions 
between members of cabinet (ministers), their administrative agencies and the social 
groups involved in the proposed regulation. 
14.4 The national policy cycle concerning directives  
14.4.1 General overview of the process 
In the post-Maastricht period, the Italy’s coordination of administrative and political 
actors in the preparation, making and implementation of European legislation has been 
shaped by a set of regulations: legge Fabbri, legge La Pergola and leggi Bassanini. 
14.4.1.1  National treatment of Commission proposals 
In the process, both at the level of the cabinet and of the interministerial bodies, the 
two most important ministers are the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister for 
the Coordination of European Union policies. On the one hand, the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs is heading a structure specifically appointed to examine EU policy and has the 
responsibility for the relations with third countries and international organizations. The 
Italian system is organized on the basis of the predominance of the Minister and the 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It has acted through Bureaus 1 and 5 and the Permanent 
Representation in Brussels. However, in the late 1990s the role of the Permanent 
Representation has been reshaped126: it must now transmit the available information 
about EU political and administrative processes to the department for the coordination 
of EC policies and not to the Foreign Affairs Ministry (della Cananea, 2001: 111).  
 On the other hand, the Minister for the Coordination of EU policies has no portfolio 
and acts under the Prime Minister. Following the Legge Fabbri127 Italy has a department 
of EU affairs since 1990. This department (Dipartimento per le Politiche Comunitare) is 
headed by a minister without portfolio under the Italian minister president who is 
responsible for European affairs and European integration issues.128 It is divided into 
six offices.129 The tasks of the minister for European Affairs are derived from the 
delegated tasks by the Italian prime minister.  
 Recently, the Minister for the Coordination of EU policies tends to acquire more 
power in the phase of policy formulation although his main competence lies within the 
field of implementation of EU policies. More and more, the Directorate General for 
European Integration, however, oversees European integration activities related to 
issues and negotiations of the treaties of the EU, European Community, the ECSC and 
Euroatom. In particular, the Directorate General is increasingly responsible for 
formulating Italy's position with the EU's institutions and bodies and oversees relations 
with the European Commission and other institutions of the European Union.  
 There are two scenarios when it comes to Italian European policy making (Giuliani 
and Piattoni, 2001): If an issue negotiated at the European level is of only one 
ministry’s interest, it prepares the Italian contribution, which is then channeled via the 
specialized units of the Foreign Affairs Ministry in Rome to the Italian Permanent 
Representation in Brussels (Senato della Repubblica, 1991). If the Commission’s 
proposal falls under the competences of more than one ministry, the coordinating 
bodies mentioned above produce a coherent Italian contribution. It is the responsibility 
of the interministerial Committee for Economic Prospects (CIPE), in which the 
Minister for European Affairs takes part, and the coordination department of the prime 
minister’s office to merge the different positions in the ministerial administration. In 
theory, the minister of European Affairs has to inform the regions and the parliament 
on European matters. 
 The member of Italian delegations participating in EC policy-making are proposed 
by the different ministries and are officially appointed by the Foreign Affairs Ministry, 
and not by the Minister of European Affairs or the coordination department of the 
prime minister (Gallo and Hanny, 2003). Behind the formal distribution of 
competencies and the coordination tasks there is apparently ‘fragmented access for 
different ministerial units to the European level’ (Gallo and Hanny, 2003: 279). Most of 
these units have direct contacts with their Brussels counterparts and quite often ignore 
the formal competencies of coordinating bodies at the national level. Gallo and Hanny 
(2003: 279) argue that a major problem for the definition of coherent national positions 
                                                 
126  For a detailed overview of the Italian Permanent Representation’s work consult della Cananea (2000). 
127  Legge Fabbri, n. 183/1987  
128  Legislative decree 30 juli 1999, Suppl. Ord. Gaz. Uff. 1 september 1999, n. 205. 
129  Office I: Economic issues and sector policies for the European Union; Office II: External relations for the 
European Union; Office III: Economic cooperation and development cooperation between the European 
Union and third countries. Implementation of internationalization policies for local areas; Office IV: 
Common foreign and security policy. European correspondent; Office V: EU cooperation for justice and 
home affairs; Office VI: Judicial and institutional affairs. 
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within the ministerial administration in the preparation phase of EC policies seems to 
be a kind of ‘privatisation’ of information. Important details concerning difficulties 
with the implementation are always well known somewhere in the administrative 
apparatus, but seldom spread among all interested actors in the system.  
  The monopoly of the central state over EU affairs, however, has remained stable. 
Regions have demanded a greater role in the preparation of EC policies (della Cananea, 
2000: 108). In 1995 a special body has been set up to enable regions to participate in 
EU policy coordination, the Conferenza Stato-Regioni and regions have been allowed to 
establish permanent offices in Brussels. The ‘state-as-a-unit paradigm’ which has long 
influence EU policy making in Italy under the supervision of the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry has been abandoned (Sirianni, 1997). The amendment of the Italian 
constitution in 2001 led to a growing role for the regions and provinces, though limited 
to areas or relatively minor significance. 
14.4.1.2  National transposition 
In Italy, the transposition of EC directives into national law takes place by means of the 
annual ‘Community law’ (legge comunitaria annuale) which was created by another 
reform package the Legge La Pergola (Law 86/1989). Whereas in the past 
implementation of EC legislation relied on a variety of techniques, the Community law 
offers a specific and ‘systematic method for the harmonizing of domestic regulations to 
EC norms’ (Bindi and Cisci, 2005: 150). By 31 of March of each year, the government – 
namely the Minister for EU affairs – submits to Parliament a bill including all 
legislative texts in need of national implementing measures. The law allows different 
techniques to be chosen for direct and indirect transposition: (1) parliamentary 
abrogation or modification existing domestic legislation; (2) delegation of legislative 
powers at to the government; (3) authorization to the government to adopt regulations 
in subject areas beforehand regulated by primary sources, and (4) administrative acts 
(Giuliani and Piazotta, 2001).  
 Whereas the preparation of EC law within the ministerial bureaucracy tries to 
ensure the effective integration of different views, the situation is slightly different with 
regard to the transposition of EC law. Whereas the Foreign Affairs Ministry 
dominantes the preparation phase, the coordination department for Community 
policies in the Prime Minister’s office plays a decisive role in the transposition phase 
(Sepe, 1995). The prime ministerial department for Community policies organizes the 
drafting of the annual legge comunitaria, the main instrument for introducing EC 
decisions into the national legal apparatus. This legge is presented at the beginning of 
each year to the Italian parliament by the Minister of European Affairs or the Prime 
Minister. The specific legal measures are initially drafted in the lead ministry, i.e. 
mostly affected by the EC legislation. Note that the interdepartmental conflicts of 
competences could be mentioned as functional obstacles for the transposition. The 
distribution of the directives between ministries is not always rational and functional: 
the ministries keep directives that should fall within the competence of other ministries 
or the competence of several ministries. 
 Nevertheless, the coordination department brings them together into one draft text 
and sends it to the parliament. From here on the draft text follows the same logic as 
ordinary Italian legislation, depending on the performance of different ministerial and 
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regional bodies (Ziller, 1988: 141). The department for the coordination of Community 
policies only returns in the case of complaints from by the European Commission. 
 The procedures following the different legal instruments to transpose EU legislation 
are outlined in section 14.3. 
 The Legge La Pergola was designed to improve the transposition rates of European 
legislation in Italy. It brought in a more systematic approach but, if the annual 
Community law itself became held up in parliament, the consequences for 
transposition could be serious (Giuliani and Piattoni, 2001: 118). The instability of the 
political system hindered the timely presentation of the bill and delayed its 
parliamentary approval. The zenith of inefficiency was reached with the 1995 Annual 
Community law: first added to the 1996 bill, it was then attached to the 1997 bill only 
to be finally approved in April 1998 (Giuliani and Piattoni, 2001: 118). 
14.4.2 Bureaucratic consultative and coordinating bodies 
Gallo and Hanny (2003) identify three coordinating bodies that play a role in the 
national preparation and implementation of European decisions: the interministerial 
Committee for Economic Prospects (CIPE), which is considered to be a ‘heavyweight’ 
among the Italian interministerial committees, the Minister for European Affairs in the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the department for the coordination of the Community 
policies in the prime minister’s administration. But, in Italy there is no dominant body 
charged with the interministerial coordination of European affairs, such as exists in 
France with the SGCI or with the Cabinet Office European Secretariat in the UK. Intra- 
and interministerial coordination thus remain unsolved problems in the Italian 
government (Bindi and Cisci, 2005: 152). 
 Whereas the Ministry of Foreign Affairs coordinates the policy-making process, the 
Ministry for the Coordination of EC policies has become more and more central figure 
in the transposition process. It was created in 1980 within the Presidency of the 
Council. Its lack of resources was such that it was once defined ‘cinderella of the Italian 
Ministries’ (Grottanelli de Santi, 1992: 186). In 1995 it was suppressed and its tasks 
attributed to the Undersecretary of State for Economics; in 1996, they were further 
shared between the Undersecretary of State at the Presidency of the Council and the 
Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs charged with European Affairs. In 1998, the 
renamed Minister for Community policies was reintroduced and given enhanced 
means and political role. They concern above all the transposition of EC directives into 
national law. Apparently, the fortunes of the department for Community policies have 
varied over the years: it is only from 1998 that it was given substantial new means and 
resources (Bindi and Cisci, 2005: 151). 
 In the ministries, the level of intra-ministerial coordination on European affairs 
varies from no coordination at all (Ministry of Environment) to little coordination 
(Ministries for Telecoms, Health, Treasury and Transport) to the only example of 
effective coordination: Ministry of Finances where the unita di indirizzo has been set up 
in 1999 at the Director General’s level to coordinate EU issues (Bindi and Cisci, 2005: 
152). The lack of intraministerial coordination and interministerial rivalry have 
prevented any attempt at creating a body entrusted with interministerial coordination 
on EC matters (Bindi and Cisci, 2005: 152). 
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14.4.3 The role of compulsory advisory bodies 
There are hardly any compulsory advisory bodies in the Italian transposition process. 
14.4.4 The role of parliament 
With the mentioned reform laws the parliament has the right to be regularly informed 
about EC laws which is in preparation or adopted at the European Council of Ministers 
since 1987. It has the right to ask the government or individual ministers for an 
‘evaluation of the conformity of EC law with the national legal system’ (Gallo and 
Hanny, 2003: 281) or to hear them on concrete policy issues and to be informed about 
the general development of the Union. Furthermore, the parliament has the right to 
submit comments on these matters to the government. With the legge Fabbri the 
parliamentary committees and the regions have received regularly all the draft EC 
decision that the Minister of European Affairs receives from the permanent 
representation via the Foreign Affairs Ministry in Rome. With the extension of its 
formal rights of access to and information and the incorporation of EC law, with the 
instrument of the legge comunitaria, the procedures in both houses have been improved 
and the parliament regained some control over the activities of the ministerial 
bureaucracy in comparision to the former ‘unsystematic delegation of legislative 
competencies to the government for the incorporation of EC decisions (Gallo and 
Hanny, 2003: 282; Seppe, 1995: 325).  
 In 1990, the parliament set up a special committee for EC affairs (Commissione 
speciale per le politiche communitarie). Both were ad hoc committees, equal to the 
standing committees in size, structure and functions, but without full legislative power. 
The permanent committees thus had the primary responsibility for reviewing proposals 
for European legislation in their subject area (Bindi and Cisci, 2005: 153). In August 
1996, the ad hoc committee of the chamber of deputies was transformed into the 
standing committee of EU policies. With the Community law 1995-97, the parliament’s 
scope of action in European affairs was expanded However, notwithstanding the so-
called ‘perfect bicameralism’ of the Italian parliament, as far as control over EU affairs 
is concerned there is a clear imbalance between the two chambers (Bindi and Cisci, 
2005: 154). While in the chamber of deputies the committee on European policies now 
coordinates the other standing committees and is in charge of the examination of 
‘Community law’, in the Senate the Giunta per gli affair delle Communita Europee is still 
a consultative body. 
14.4.5 The role of other, subnational or functional governments 
For a long time, the Italian regions had a very weak role in European affairs, both in the 
making and transposition of EC law (Bindi and Cisci, 2005: 155). 
 Article 9 of Law No 183/1987 started to stipulate that the regions have to be 
consulted on the proposals for regulations and directives submitted by the institutions 
of the EC. They have the right to submit their observations which have no binding 
result for the policy adopted by the Italian government however. Furthermore, since 
1987, Italian regions and autonomous provinces have their own regional offices in 
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Brussels to maintain direct contacts with administrative units and political actors at the 
European level. 130 
 Furthermore, Law No 400/1988 which concerns the organization of the Prime 
Minister’s Office established the Permanent Conference for the Relations between the 
State and the Regions. This conference is responsible for informing and consulting the 
regions on issues of general policy that may affect their competence. 
 The Italian regions only recently do actively participate in the process of the 
formulation of the Italian policy on EU affairs. Information rights for the regions and 
new mechanisms for the cooperation of national and sub-national administrative units 
have been established. The main aim here has been to institutionalize regional access 
to the national preparation on the European level. The legge comunitaria of 1998 
introduced an obligation for the government to inform the parliament and the regions 
and autonomous provinces at an earlier stage. However, the regional opinions 
expressed still have not been binding for the central government (Gallo and Hanny, 
2003: 283). Furthermore, the regions seem to receive draft EC laws from the Foreign 
Affairs Ministry via the Minister of European Affairs ‘only at the point when these 
drafts have already been prenegotiated at the European level’ (Gallo and Hanny, 2003: 
283). Consequently, any input would be too late to be effective.  
14.4.6 The role of interest groups 
In the transposition process, interest groups are only consulted in exceptional cases by 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry for Regional affairs. 
14.5 Conclusions 
• Italy has been slow to create effective and efficient mechanisms for coordinating the 
formulation and transposition of EU law despite its centrality. Fragmentation and 
duplication seem to be very dominant in Italian EU policy-making. 
• The absence of one undisputed coordinating institutional is predominant problem. 
In the post-Maastricht period, there is a shift of activities and coordination 
competencies in the national preparation and transposition phases. Whereas the 
Foreign Affairs Ministry dominated the scene for decades, the prime minister’s 
office has become already the crucial actor in the transposition phase. This 
administrative fragmentation has lead to struggles for direct access to the EC policy-
making process at the European level. This situation has been aggravated in a way 
that the fortunes of the department for Community policies have varied over the 
years: it is only from 1998 that it was given substantial new means and resources. 
• The Italian law-making process in very unreliable. The structural reasons can be 
found in the rather powerful parliamentary committees. Sometimes those standing 
committees are given the power to pass legislation without even going through the 
floor vote. Moreover, there is too much legislation that comes before the parliament 
for approval. Because of Italian legal and bureaucratic system, even minor decisions 
have to be translated into laws, or small specific laws (leggine) 
• The personal and partisan competition among those who should have favored a 
smooth connection with Brussels, compounded by endemic governmental 
                                                 
130  Decree of the President of the Republic of 31 March 1994 GURI 167 
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instability, reduces the credibility of the Italian government at the EU level and 
diminished its complying capacity at the national level  
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Glossary of terms (on judicial instruments and techniques) 
 
annex method: the text of a directive is annexed to a very short legal text, which puts it 
into the national legal order. Users have to consult the annex for obligations or rights 
stemming from the directive. 
 
authorization law: the adoption of a law delegating the transposition of one or more 
directives to a specific actor, including sometimes procedural requirements and a time 
frame (sometimes also called a blanket provision law) 
 
copying: creating a legal measure which is equivalent to the wording of the directive. 
 
elaboration: the tendency to make directives more specific and detailed when 
transposing (it does not go as far as gold plating). 
 
gold plating: when transposition goes beyond the minimum necessary to comply with a 
directive by adding national elements to the legal measure, which aims to transpose a 
directive. The national additions may include: (1) extending the scope, (2) not taking full 
advantage of any derogations which keep requirements to a minimum, (3) providing 
sanctions, enforcement mechanisms and matters such as burden of proof which go 
beyond the minimum needed, or (4) implementing early, before the date given in the 
directive. 
 
incorporation: putting the directive into the system (corpus) of already existing national 
law (also sometimes called re-wording or re-writing). 
 
one-to-one transposition: taking over the text of a directive in a national legal measure. 
Sometimes this is done through the annex method. See also copying. 
 
one-to-one with some (terminological) adjustments: taking over the text of a directive 
making with some adaptations in terms and/or formulations used in the directive, 
which stem from existing national law. 
 
package law: combining several directives into one legal measure, which transposes 
these directives (is also sometimes called an omnibus bill when the proposal has the 
intended status of law and has not yet passed parliament). 
 
referencing: transposing by passing a legal measure which refers directly to a directive 
(see also the annex method). 
 
re-word or re-writing method: working out the contents of a directive using the terms, 
formulations and style used in national law. 
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